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The author embarked on this study because most accounts of this Basuto 
crisis do not uncover and properly interpret the events which transpired. 
Historical thought on tha British Empire and Commonwealth in recent years has 
shifted from dissemination of the "civilize the despicable and barbarous na­
tive with a gun or a Bible for the glory of the Empire" line of thought to a
circulation of the "destruction of the pure and innocent native tribes by the
gluttonous and malignant spread of European civilization" line of reasoning. 
This work, it is hoped, will illustrate the fallacies in both schools of 
thought in regard to Basutoland.
The basic argument in this thesis contends that the Basuto conflict was
not caused by opposition of the entire tribe to disarmament but rather by
civil insurrection and rebellion of one section of the tribe against lawful 
authority. Up to this time, there has been written no adequate history of the 
Dasuto Rebellion, Civil War, and Reconstruction, 1800-1884. Some secondary 
works cited supply much of the background; other books are outdated, incom­
plete, or inferior studies. My thesis is intended to fill a gap in historical 
thought and to rectify a historical error perpetuated since 1884.
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ADJUSTMENT OF BASUTOLAND TO EUROPEAN DOMINATION
BASUTOLAND UNDER BRITISH RULE
Ths Rasutos did not become an organised tribe and therefore not a promi­
nent factor in British affairs until 1818, when Moshesh, a minor chief (Infra, 
family tree, p. 239, PI. XXV ; illust., p. 225, PI. VII), unified remnants of 
various clans scattered by Zulu and Matabele raids. After these incursions 
stopped, a greater threat arose from the trekker Boers, who coveted Basuto 
land but refused to recognize the suzerainty of Moshesh. Chief Moshesh because 
of this threat continuously sought British protection, and his pleas became 
more plaintful as the Boers seized more of his land"!1 When a military expedi­
tion under a Major Warden from Cape Colony attempted to intimidate the tribe 
into accepting definite boundaries with the Boers, Moshesh smashed this force
2and soon after destroyed a punitive expedition commanded by a General Cathcart.
Chief Moshesh, nevertheless, desperately sought British protection in
3 41868, and, on March 12, 1868, Basutoland became British territory; the Duka of
Buckingham, then Colonial Secretary, yielding to the insistent pleas of Mo­
shesh for protection when it appeared to London that the Boers threatened the
iBasutoland, Report for the Year 1963 (London: HMS0, 1964), p. 123.
2
Lord Hailey, The Republic of 5outh Africa and the High Commission Terri­
tories (London: Oxford University Press, 1263), pp. 15-l6.
3Austin Coates, Basutoland (London: HM5Q, 1966), p. 37; Richard P. 
Stevens, Lesotho, Botswana, and Swaziland (New York: Frederick A- Praeger, 
1967), pp. 24-25. Hereafter cited as Stavsns, Lesotho, etc.
^The Basutos became British subjnets but not protected persons until Ba­
sutoland received protectorate status in 1884, W. E. 5imnett, The British Co­
lonial Empire (London: Geo. Allen &. Unwin Ltd., 1949), p. 108.
1
25
Basutos with extinction. Britain had not wanted to increase the financial
burden of administering her Empire during this period, but the annexation of 
Basutoland seemed the only method to maintain a peace on the frontiers of Cape 
Colony and to protect the stability of the Empire^ Earlier, in 1B66, the 
Orange Free State had closed mission stations in Basuto territory after Boer 
commandos had overrun much of the region. Another factor leading to the an­
nexation was growing British fear that the Boer republic would secure an east 
0
coast seaport. The Colonial Secretary at first had thought that Governor Sir
Philip Wodehouse had exceeded his authority by annexing Basutoland but later
9
advised the governor to act at his own discretion. Soon after, however, the 
Cape"Parliament expressed some hostility to the Wodehouse actions, contending 
that hs had exceeded his instructions. The parliament berated London for con­
senting to an annexation which excused the Imperial Government from financial
Great Britain, Parliament, Hansard’s Parliamentary Debates, 3rd ser.,
Vol. 257 (1881), p. 1073, 5ir Henry Holland speaking, January 20, 1881. Here­
after cited as Hansard, etc.; Great Britain, Parliament, Sessional Papers 
(House of Commons), (1883), XLVIXI: "Correspondence Respecting the Affairs of 
Basutoland," 330, Mr. ’Wood speaking on^a memorandum of the Basutos in the House 
of Representatives. Hereafter cited as 13.j5.P., (date), etc.
^Margaret L. Hodgson and W. G. Ballinger, Indirect Rule in Southern Afri­
ca , (Mo. 1) Basutoland (Lovedale, Cape Colony: Lovedale Press, 1931), p. 7. ; 
Hereafter cited as Hodgson and Ballinger, Indirect Rule.
^Orange Free State: This Boer republic bordered Cape Colony on tTie north 
and Basutoland on the north and west, Eric Rosenthal, ed . , Encyclopedia of 
Southern Africa -"(London: 1961), p. 374. Hereafter cited as Rosenthal, ed., 
Encyclopedia.
8
Stevens, Lesotho, etc.. pp. 23-24; J. Du Plessis, A History of Christian 
Missions in South Africa (Cape Town: C. Struik, 1965), p. 317. Hereafter 
cited as Du Plessis, Christian Missions in South Africa.
"History of South Africa," (11 vols., 4th ed., rev.; Cape Town: G. Struik, 
1964), p. 313: Being originally Vol. IV of History of South Africa from 1795 
to 1872 (4th ed., rev.; London: George Allen &. Unwin Ltd., 1919). Hereafter 
cited as Theal, 5outh Africa.
^George M. Theal, History of 5outh Africa- from 1795 to 1872, Vol. VIII of
3or military demands'^ Most South Africans believed that this almost total re­
versal of existing Imperial policy only served to protect obnoxious tribesmen 
from deserved punishment and was detrimental to the Orange Free 5tate. Only 
a small minority perceived the action as not hostile to the Free State and 
felt that the annexation was beneficial^" The annexation, nevertheless, re­
mained a fact. The proclamation of annexation was declared at Cape Town; de­
tails regarding the future of Basuto territory were spared for future consi­
deration, with the natives told that they could discuss detailed provisions 
with the Cape Colony Governor in his capacity as High Commissioner of South 
Africa^
13
The 3ritish initially had authorized Governor Sir Philip Wodehouse of .
Cape Colony to administer the territory temporarily. London attempted to 
evade further financial responsibility, for a lack of funds was already limi­
ting Colonial Office involvement in the administration of areas of native 
settlement to coastal cities and surrounding districts. Richard Stevens agrees 
with the British assumption that Basutoland was under direct British control 
only until the death of Moshesh, that later, either Natal or Cape Colony would
. P.., (1883), XLVIII, 330, Mr. Wood speaking.
^"Theal, South Africa, VIII, 302-03.
*^3..3..P., (1880), LI: "Affairs of Basutoland," 600, ltr. carl of Kimber­
ley to Governor Sir Bartle Frere, May 20, 1880.
13
Eric Rosenthal, comp,, Southern African Dictionary of Notional Biogra­
phy (London: 1966), p. 422. Hereafter cited as Sir Philip ’Wode­
house: Born in England, Wodehouse became Governor's Agent for the West Province 
of Ceylon in 1843. In 1851, he was appointed Superintendent of British Hon­
duras, and three years later he became Governor of British Guiana. He helped 
settle the long conflict between the Basutos and Boers in 1869. After fighting 
against responsible government at Cape Colony, Wodehouse left to assume the 
post of Governor of Bombay in 1872.
4assume administrative and financial responsibility for native territories on 
14
the frontier. According to Austin Coates, Sir Philip opposed Basuto annexa- 
15
tion to Natal.
In that British administration aided the Basutos at the expense of the 
Boers, the Orange Free State thought itself et the mercy of Sir Philip, who, 
though blamed by some influential Englishmen for allowing the Boers to mis­
treat the natives, had allowed the Basutos to rearm and also unjustly had re­
versed the situation won in the wars against these mischievous and aggressor 
natives^ Wodehouse had interfered in one of these conflicts in 1868 by sen­
ding colonial troops into Basutoland‘S  The Basutos had welcomed this interven­
tion, because, otherwise, the Boers would have scattered the natives into
3 L 8
Kaffraria, a native region in Caps Colony, forcing Basutos to live on charity
19and perhaps forcing M.oshash to raid European settlements. The Free State,
inhibited by the British and therefore anxious to end the wars, reluctantly
recognized the annexation and signed with the Basutos the Second Treaty of
Aliwal North in 1869, by which all conquered territory east of the Caledon
20
River reverted to Basutoland. The British annexation ended the Boer,retalia-
14Stevens, Lesotho, etc., pp. 24-25; George M. Theal, The South Africa 
Republic from 1870 to 1872, Vol. IX of "History of South Africa,” (11 vols., 
4th ed., rev.; Cape Town: C. Struik, 1964), p. 67: Being originally Vol. V of 
History of South Africa from 1795 to 1872 (3rd ed., rev.: London: George 
Allen &. Unwin Ltd., 1920). Hereafter cited as Theal, South Africa,
15
Coates, Basutoland, p. 37.
l6Thaal, South Africa, VIII, 318, 305; B.S.P., (1880), LI, 601, ltr. 
Kimberley to Frere, May 20, 1880.
^ D u  Plessis, Christian Missions in South Africa, p. 317.
1 D
,3._5.£., (1880), LI, 598, ltr. William Ayliffe, Secretary for Native 
Affairs, to J. Gordon Sprigg, Prime Minister of Cape Colony, April 12, 1880.
19Hodgson and Ballinger, Indirect Rule, p. 7.
20Stevens, Lesotho, etc., p. 24.
21tion against the Basutos but not Basuto raids into the Free State.
Regarding the confusion surrounding the provisions of the annexation, one
member of the British Parliament alleged that Moshesh wanted Basutoland to be
an exclusive native reserve and his tribe dependent upon the High Commissioner 
22
only. A proclamation issued by Governor Napier of Cape Colony on September 7,
23
1842, promised that Britain would disallow European ownership of Basuto land.
Since 1843, the British repeatedly had assured Moshesh of his right to the
24
lands of his people under grants of terminable leases. After the annexation,
the chief, naturally, bargained with Natal and Cape Colony for the best ar-
25rangements for continued protection and was assuming that Basutoland was not 
held in possession by the Crown. The natives feared that the British would 
surrender Basuto territory to outsiders, as previously had been done far the 
benefit of the Orange Free State. The British were claiming absolute posses­
sion of the country based on the fact that colonial Government Blue Books
failed to show Basutoland restricted to only natives. Basutoland, advised
26
'Wodehouse, had devolved directly to the Crown, and Government documents of
. , (1883), XLVIII, 330, Mr. ’Wood speaking.
22
Hansard, 3rd ser., Vol. 257 (1881), 1074r Sir Henry Holland speaking, 
January 20, 1881.
., (1881), LXVI: ’’The Affairs of Basutoland, ” 174, Cape Argus re-
porting on Mr. Orpen speaking in the June 30, 1880, House Assembly session.
24All Basuto land belonged to the people with tha paramount chief as 
trustee. He controlled its use, distribution, and was responsible for its 
protection, Hugh Ashton, The Basuto (London: Oxford University Press, 1952), 
p. 144.
25 , (1881), LXVI, 178, Cape Argus reporting on Mr. Solomon speaking
in the House Assembly, July 1, 1880; Theal, South Africa, VIII, 315.
2 ft
_B.S_.£., (1881), LXVI, 174-75, Cape Argus reporting on Mr. Orpen and the 
Attorney-General speaking in the House Assembly, July 1, 1880. Coates main­
tains that Wodehouse wanted Basutoland governed as a separate native state 
and that the Colonial Office later agreed, Coates, Basutoland, p. 37.
6communication between Sir Philip and Moshesh mentioned the absolute cession of
27
Basuto territory to the Queen. In contrast to this interpretation, the Earl 
20
of Kimberley, the new Colonial Secretary in 188D, considered Basutoland prac­
tically a native reserve and presumed that Wodehouse, in order to end border
29
skirmishes and to demarcate for the Basutos their territory, felt likewise.
Concerning native feelings and objectives, since the disastrous War of
1865 with the Boers, the Basuto economy had become basically agricultural,
supplemented by increased service to whites. Basutos had expected to receive
back all their land after the war, but instead the tribe had lost its best
30
pasturage and farmland. Lack of land had left the Basutos disappointed and
31
provided a source of friction. Under the Aliwal Treaty, the governor instead
->
of the paramount chief assigned land to clans and individuals. Most of the 
chiefs detested this treaty, and many of them refused to move from ceded lands,
27
E[.j3.JP., (1880), LI, 563-64, ltr. Undersecretary for Native Affairs 
Bright to Adolphe Mabille, February 26, 1880.
^ W h o  Was Who 1897-1915 (London: 1935), pp. 397-98. Earl of Kimberley: 
John Wodehouse, 1st Earl of Kimberley, was born in England in 1826. He was 
Undersecretary for Foreign Affairs from 1852-56, from 1859-61, and from 1894- 
95. Undersecretary of the India Office in 1864, he became Lord-Lieutenant of 
Ireland from 1864-66, during which time he acted firmly against the Fenians. 
Kimberley was Lord of the Privy Seal from 1868-70, Secretary of State for the 
Colonies from 1870-74 and from 1880-82, and Secretary for Foreign Affairs from 
1894-95. He became the leader of the Liberal Party in the House of Lords in 
1897 and Chancellor of London University in 1899 after service as a member of 
its Senate since 1859; Clarence L. Barnhart, ed., The Hew Century Cyclopedia 
of Names (New York: 1954), Vol. Ill, 4158. As Colonial Secretary, Kimberley 
formed Rupert*s Land into the Province of Manitoba and brought British Or;lumbia 
into Candda. Kimberley, South Africa, was named for him in 1872, and the earl 
upheld self-government for the Boers in South Africa in 1831.
29B.S.P., (1880), LI, 601, ltr. Kimberley to Frere, May 20, 1880.
30Stevens, Lesotho, etc., pp. 24-25.
JP., (1880), LI, 601, ltr. Kimberley to Frere, May 20, 1880; Theal, 
South Africa, VIII, 323.
7from which they ceaselessly raided Boer farms in the Free State for cattle.
Boer farmers did not pursue the natives back across the Basuto border for fear
of antagonizing the British, whose rule over the tribe they thought too le- 
32
nient. The Basutos, secretly bellicose since before the War of 1865, waited
33
for an opportunity to begin a quarrel between their white neighbors.
Regarding different accounts of the French missionary attitude towards 
the then current political events, George M. Theal, noted South African his-
34
torian of the Settler School, contends that the Aborigines Protection 5ociety
and French mission facilitated native disregard for the Aliwal treaty and thus
35
perpetuated crime and anarchy. The Boers, notes J. Du Plessis, after the War 
of 1865 expelled the French from Basutoland temporarily after the missionaries 
indignantly refused counsel from the Free State Volksraad. Du Plessis found 
no reliable evidence to prove Boer charges that these missionaries had inter­
fered in political affairs and had become a menace to the republic but rather
36
discovered that the mission attempted to promote peace. The French, said Sir
Bartle Frere, later Governor of Cape Colony, encouraged the Basutos to accept
37British annexation provisions.
32Theal, South Africa, VIII, 306, 314, 322, 324-27; IX, 65.
33
Du Plessis, Christian Missions in South Africa, p. 315.
34Aborigines Protection Society (frequently referred to in the following 
text as APS): This English philanthropical society founded by Sir T. F. Buxton 
in 1837 sought to protect indigenous native tribes from extermination by white 
men or from other causes, C. £. Carrington, Making of the Empire, Pt. I of 
"The British Overseas" (Cambridge, England: University Press, 1968), p. 298. 
The zeal of the organization outstripped its knowledge and discretion, Eric A. 
Walker, The British Empire (2nd ed.; Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University 
Press, 1956), p. 107*
35Theal, South Africa, VIII, 325.
36
Du Plessis. Christian Missions in South Africa, pp. 317-18.
37B.S.P., (1881), LXVI, 201, ltr. Frere to Kimberley, July 27, 1B80.
8Ths British, aside from the French influence, never adequately enforced
their rule, and conflict of authority arose. The Imperial Government intro-
38
duced indirect rule through the amenable Chief Moshesh, who wanted benefits of 
British rule without the regulations, interference, or responsibilities. Lon­
don administered Basutoland at a profit, but anarchy reigned. The chiefs were 
disgruntled over loss of so much land to the Free State and thought their 
positions as chiefs ignored. They wanted only protection from the British,
for themselves they desired territory for expansion and retention of all pos- 
39
sible authority. Moshesh had consolidated his rule during tribal adjustment
to annexation but never had dominated absolutely. Important tribal decisions
40
required the opinions of the royal family and other chiefs at a pitso. The
renowned "Laws of Moshesh” prohibited the sale of liquor, punished witchcraft,
41
and forbade white settlement in the country. British arrests of chiefs who
38Coates, Basutoland, p. 40.
39
Theal, South Africa, IX, 56, 63-64, 66, 68; VIII, 311; Coates, Basuto­
land , p. 35.
40
Pitso: A meeting called by a chief or chiefs to which all adult males 
were invited to discuss matters already debated by a chief or chiefs and coun­
cilors, Ashton, The Basuto, pp. 215-16; Chiefs, of prime Importance in the 
leadership of the tribe, could delegate authority to subordinate chiefs, sub­
chiefs, and headmen. A few advisers, mostly relatives, guided a chief. A
proper, generous, and brave leader was one who accepted advice freely from
councilors. Deciding minor matters by himself, a chief, after meeting with 
his councilors, discussed more important issues with his people at a pitso.
The chief could announce a decision at the end of a pitso but would not per­
sist in an issue facing stiff opposition. Dissatisfied natives could join
another chief or set up another clan under a more popular man, such as a
younger brother or son of the clan leader. In critical circumstances, dissi­
dents might murder their chief. The Basutos, remarked one French missionary, 
almost superstitiously worshipped chiefs with a reverence that paralleled the 
divine right of kings. Such reverence for their chiefs, without who the na­
tive community would doubtlessly become anarchic, did not excuse the failings 
of leaders or prevent tribesmen from joining another chief. Ibid., pp. 144, 
215-17, 220.
41Stevens, Lesotho, etc., p. 26.
9stole cattle caused animosity to British justice, as cattle thievery was deep­
ly ingrained in tribal custom. Officials continued to strictly enforce neither 
British nor Basuto law, however, except to halt liquor traffic. Gun smugglers 
freely roamed the Countryside and reaped huge profits. Tha chiefs acted as 
they pleased* Despite 100 policeman temporarily stationed in Basutoland, clan
quarrels erupted, and, as time passed, numerous Basutos thought they had
42gained nothing as British subjects*
The British annexation, in conclusion, should have involved more preci­
sion so that all parties fully would have understood the compact. The annexa­
tion seemed not to protect the Basutos from the Boers so much as to guard Cape 
Colony from refugee Basutos. Indirect rule was inadequate and too permissive 
for the deceitful Basutos, and worse* the British refused to support their own 
actions decisively. Britain owned Basutoland; it was not a native reserve.
The tribe ungratefully chafed under agreed procedures once the merited Boer 
threat dissipated. The Boers themselves incurred a disadvantage strategically 
and deserved to retain more of their spoils.
BASUTOLAND UNDER CAPE COLONY RULE
The Cape legislature, as expected by London, outmaneuvered Natal and an­
nexed Basutoland on August 10, 1871. The colony did not directiy incorporate
Basutoland, unlike British administration in Kaffraria* The governor, subject
43
to parliamentary veto, became the legislative authority. With full knowledge 




of its responsibilities, Cope Colony annexed Basutoland from a grateful Bri­
tain, which encouraged extension of the successful colonial native policy to 
45
the Basutos. Colonial decrees did not apply to Basutoland unless specified or
subject to proclamation by the governor. Basutos, assumed Governor Sir Henry
Barkly, realized that colonial annexation would come eventually, and the ap-
46propriation, which the natives comprehended, gave them no unfair burden.
47
Barkly in early 1871 had visited Letsie, the eldest son of Moshesh and para­
mount chief after the death of his father in 1870, and had warned him of the
48
impending decision by Cape Colony to annex Basutoland. On August 16, 1871, a
pitso called by Basuto chiefs learned of the annexation, which did not alter
49
their tribal status, and no natives objected to the decision. While Colonial
50
Secretary Kimberley agreed that the attainment of responsible government at
43
Edgar H. Brookes, The History of Native Policy in South Africa from 
1830 to the Present Day (Pretoria: J. L. Van Scbaik Ltd., 1927), p. 99. Here­
after cited as Brookes, History of Native Policy.
44
B._5.p. , (1883), XLVIII, 330, Mr. Wood speaking.
45
Walker, The British Empire, p. 64.
46
Hansard. 3rd ser., Vol. 257 (1881), 1075-76, Lord Holland speaking, 
January 20, 1881.
47
* P • 215. Letsie: His son Lerothodi soon relegated this weak 
and colorless chief; Theal contends that only British authority prevented the 
brothers of Letsie from declaring independence from him, Theal, South Africa, 
IX, 60.
^ 5 tevens, Lesotho, etc., p. 26.
^T.heal, South Africa, IX, 69.
50
In British constitutional machinery, responsible government is distin­
guished from representative government by the need for the executive to retain 
the confidence of the majority in parliament and receive parliamentary permis­
sion for all expenditures and all executive actions. Therefore, a government 
must resign or hold elections if it fails to get support from the legislature. 
Under representative government in Cape Colony from 1854-72, the executive 
acted independently of the legislature, Hector M. Robertson, South Africa 
(London: Cambridge University Press, 1957), p. 140.
11
Cape Town allowed the governor mo3t authority in Basuto matters, he felt that
the natives had been neither notified nor consulted on the annexation and that
51
Basutos believed that London still directly ruled them.
The 1871 annexation in fact caused immediate controversy. The annexation
bill met stiff initial resistance in Cape Colony, as its Government allegedly
had neither the experience nor resources to deal with Basutoland, and some
52colonial politicians resented the burden. Joseph Orpen, a life-time friend of
Moshesh, persuaded reluctant Letsie to petition for direct representation in
the Cape Parliament, although the Basutos wanted only a voice in considering
legal measures applied to them. Representation would subject Basutoland to
all colonial law3 and European ownership of land, which the "Laws of Moshesh”
and the prasent chiefs would not accept. The Cape Parliament rejected the 
53
petition. The Act of 1871 did not recognize the right of Basuto chiefs to 
cede or negotiate tribal land belonging to individuals, although tribal pro­
perty had no registered titles, and although the chiefs always had ruled
54
supreme in land matters.
Application of colonial native policy under the 1371 statute became bog-
^Hansard, 3rd ser., Vol. 257 (1881), 1066-67, Sir Wilfrid Lawson spea­
king, January 20, 1881.
52 •» P* 280. Joseph Orpen: Born in Dublin, Orpen emigrated to 
South Africa in 1846 where he fought in several native wars. In 1850, he be­
came a government surveyor. In 1853, he was elected to the first Volksraad of 
the Orange Free State, helped write a constitution, served on the Free State 
Supreme Court, and negotiated with Chief Moshesh. After serving as Chief Ma­
gistrate in Basutoland, he won election to the Caps Parliament in'1871. In 
1373, he moved to St. John's Territory on the Transkei coast to serve as 
British Resident Magistrate.
53Coates, Basutoland, pp. 39-40; Stevens, Lesotho, etc., p. 27.
54
A 4» (1881), LXVI, 175-76, Cape Argus reporting on the Attorney- 
General speaking in the House Assembly, July 1, 1880.
12
gsd down in a quagmire. John X. Merriman, Charles Brownlee, and Colonel
Charles Griffith had formulated a unique system for native policy in 5outh
Africa which failed in Basutoland because of magistrate mistakes, ignorance of
colonial politicians, party politics, and changes of government. Critics
questioned the rapid spread of magistrate authority which had belonged to the
chiefs. The Basutos ware stubborn; thus, this transition required.time. Host
judicial cases gravitated to the chiefs because of active or passive coercion;
55thus, few natives appealed to the magistrates. A chief could "eat up” an 
appellant, and the magistrates had no power to correct this injustice. A 
chief, only if he wanted relief from the routine of presiding, assented to the 
native tendency to bring legal matters to a magistrate, but if magistrate con­
fronted chief, tribesmen backed the chief. Colonial rule, however, reformed 
and revised other native customs.
These alterations may seem liberal and enlightened, yet they undermined 
the entire Basuto legal and social structure. Administrators made no effort 
to conciliate public opinion and made sudden reforms which should have awaited 
mollification of the public. Natives considered marriage and cattle matters 
private; these affairs should have remained so. One beneficial measure sought 
in vain to halt the ietsima— forced labor for the chiefs. Surprisingly, the 
natives seemed more attached to their chiefs than averse to this work. In an 
attempt to enlighten the magistrates, a commission compiled a handbook of Ba­
suto customs in 1873. This hurried and mediocre effort made some erroneous 
conclusions on native life, and regulations already in force further hamstrung
55"Eat up": Refers to a Basuto custom by which a chief could deprive an 
offender of livestock, land, home, and sometimes life, _B.S..P., (1881), LXVI, 
201.
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innovations. The speed with which the Government collected a hut tax of 10s. 
a year directly correlated with the kickbacks retained by the chiefs for col­
lecting it. This adequate allowance reconciled them^somewhat to magistrate 
jurisdiction. Unfortunately, the hut tax rose too soon to 3Ll a year, and,
though common enough procedure today, this tax hike did not constitute diplo-
56
matic procedure in native policy. The tribe became sullen. V
Governor Darkly, nevertheless, in the roid-lBTCPs declared, among the posi­
tive impressions, that the approximately 150,000 Basutos who only a few years 
before had terrorized their neighbors now resided in a peaceful, contented,
and prosperous manner under the guidance of six European magistrates who for
57soma time had no European police protection. Barkly had formed a Basuto police
58
force of eleven officers and 100 privates in 1872. A model farm and schools
appeared, and surplus revenue from taxation enabled construction of roads and
59
bridges to facilitate trade. Officials easily detected cattle theft, settled 
neighborhood squabbles, and magistrates, schools, and some churches worked 
together for progress^ The Basuto government functioned orderly, economic 
conditions were good, and public revenue gleaned mostly from the hut tax rose 
toS.18,000 in 1879^X
^Brookes, History of Native Policy, pp. 100-03; Theal, South Africa,
IX, 71, 74, 76, 79.
57 -
P . A. Moltsno, The Life and Times of Sir John lharles Molteno, II
(London: 5mith, Elder S. Co., 1900), p. 424. Hereafter cited as Molteno, Mol-
teno.
^Thsal, South Africa, IX, 77.
59
EL 5..P,., (1381), LXVI, 229, ltr. Bright to Griffith, February 26, 1880.
^B.S.P^., (1880), LI, 600, ltr. Kimberley to Frere, May 20, 1880.
^^Stevens, Lesotho, etc., p. 27; George M. Theal, History of South Africa 
from 1873 to 1884, Vol. XI of "History of South Africa," (11 vols., 4th ed.,
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Some authors, to the contrary, observed alleged colonial mistakes and
Basuto displeasure. The Cape Government did not realize the evils of its hasty
62and injudicious actions, says A. Aylward, and Governor Sir Bartle Frere,
successor to Barkly, replied to Basuto complaints by advising the tribe to
63
migrate to Zululand. The Chief Magistrate of Basutoland of fended v.the natives 
by making Chiefs Masupha and Molappo appear equal to Letsie. By 1875, Basuto­
land had become a granary instead of a pasturage, as overmuch cultivated land 
curtailed sufficient grazing for tribal cattle. Land hunger was evident the 
next year, and Basutos complained that their land had not supported them since 
1869. The natives paid taxas without representation, and surplus funds taken 
without their consent filled the colonial treasury. Numerous natives believed 
without substantiation that sale of Basuto property at the magistracies was 
contrary to tribal law and custom and against the conditions of British an­
nexation, Knowing the wealth of Basutoland, traders moved there in droves.
It was a mistaken notion, continues Aylward, to believe that Europeanization 
could transform a savage into a civilized being. A pagan reaction set in,
rev.; London: George Allen &. Unwin Ltd., 1964), p. 55: Being originally Vol.
II of History of South Africa from 1873 to 1884 (London: George Allen &. Un­
win Ltd., 1919). Hereafter cited as Theal, South Africa.
62
» PP- 129-30. Sir Bartle Frere: Born in England in 1815, 
Frere became Governor and High Commissioner of C&pa Colony in 1877. Adverse 
English criticism surrounded his native policy, especially that towards the 
Zulus. He sanctioned the annexation of the Transvaal but promised to allevi­
ate Boer grievances. The colonists supported the Frere programs, and his re­
call in 1880 angered them. He published a defense of his policies in 1881 
and forewarned of the First Anglo-Boer War.
63
A. Aylward, "Basuto," Fraser's Magazine, March, 1882, p. 339;
N.B., p. 12. Alfred Aylward: Aylward, alias Murphy, was a South African ad­
venturer associated with the Fenian movement, and in the 1860's he helped lead 
the diamond laborers on the Vaal River who wanted to establish a republic.
He then moved to the Transvaal to fight in the Sekukuni War and to aid the 
Boer cause.
15■ %
heathen ceremonies resumed, and children quit school. Missionaries complained
to Cape Town that the chiefs instigated the retrogression in order to preserve
ancient modes to sustain tribal authority and hereditary power against en-
64croachments by European magistrates and law. The Cape Government, failing to 
support its few Basuto officials, never established'absolute control over 
Basutoland^
The natives undoubtedly were severely restricted domestically. Basuto­
land was the most heavily populated territory in South Africa, and natives 
cultivated all the arable land^ But only a small portion of Basutoland was 
habitable: s otrip, unequally fertile, 1 to 20 miles wide, and 150 miles long. 
In such cramped circumstances, the Basutos with difficulty adjusted to Euro-
67pean restrictions, particularly when suffering from a severe drought in 1879.
Because of uncontrolled grazing, land in numerous parts above arable areas
68
became empty of grass cover.
Regarding conclusions at this point, the Earl of Kimberley was mistaken 
in his interpretation, as the tribe wanted control of its destiny in parlia­
ment but selfishly wanted to remain independent with preferential treatment.
^Edwin W. Smith, The Mabilles of Basutoland (London: Hodder and Stough­
ton Ltd., 1939), pp. 247-48.
65Eric A. Walker, ed., South Africa, Rhodesia, and the High Commission 
Territories, Vol. VIII of "The Cambridge History of the British Empire," (8 
vols., 2nd ed.; London: Cambridge University Press, 1963), p. 490. Hereafter 
cited as Walker, ed., South Africa.
^*A. Gordon-Brown, ed., The Yearbook and Guide to Southern Africa (1958 
ed.; London: Robert Hale Ltd., 1958), p. 202.
67C. W. De Kiewiet, The Imperial Factor in South Africa (London: Frank 
Cass &. Co., Ltd., 1965), pp. 263-65. Hereafter cited as Be Kiewiet, The 
Imperial Factor.
68
3asutoland, Report for the Year 1963, p. 122.
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Secondly, Basutoland, if directly incorporated, would have contracted more se­
vere restrictions to its voice in its government; the tribe already had ade­
quate legislative representation. The chiefs used maladjustment to colonial 
rule to stir up dissension when actually tribal obnoxiousnass had caused the 
loss of so much land. Next, Cape Colony should have studied more carefully 
Basuto culture before promoting Europeanization. Europeanization, neverthe­
less, helped to pacify and civilize the tribe, which now had an opportunity to 
prosper.
BASUTO LABOR IN THE DIAMOND FIELDS
As previously mentioned, the Basuto economy depended somewhat on service
to whites. The growth of the Kimberley diamond fields provided profitable
employment for Basutos, who migrated there to secure a cash salary. Although
69
the Basuto chiefs supposedly voiced opposition to this service, Governor Frere
countered that the chiefs instructed their men not to return from the fields
7C
until they had earned a gun and ammunition. The native workers, following
such chiefly advice because they feared the future, helped Basutoland gain the
reputation as the "powder magazine" of South Africa!^ Basutos prized guns and
72worked diligently to buy them. The policies of the Cape Government and the 
Stevens, Lesotho, etc., p. 27.
70Sir Bartle Frere, "The Basutos and the Constitution of the Cape of Good 
Hope," The Nineteenth Century, IX (Jan.-June, 1881), 181. Hereafter cited 
as Frere, HThe Basutos . . .. Cape of Good Hope."
^Hailey, The Republic of South Africa and the High Commission Territories, 
p. 19; Coates, Basutoland, p. 40.
^Theal, South Africa, IX, 81.
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mine companies stimulated the armaments trade and thereby assured a large re­
venue J^because Basutos had to accept guns instead of moneyl^ Cecil Rhodes noted 
that natives would walk 100 miles to earn wages to buy the Mwhite manfs magic,”
yet he failed to emphasize that guns were tha white tnan's major enticement for
75workers to coma to the diamond fields.
Thus, while the diamond fields generously provided a benaficial source of 
employment, the natives intentionally armed themselves with guns and allowed 
the chiefs to sustain despotism.
THE QUTHINS QUESTION
The Basuto hoarding of guns only made more ominous the later native grie­
vances about overcrowding. Morasi, chief of ths Baphutis in Quthinq^(Infra,
77map, p. 234, PI. XX ), sought and received British protection in 1870, but
78
suddenly the chief became restless. Chief Magistrate Charles Griffith of Ba-
73
Hansard, 3rd ser*, Vol. 252 (1880), 453-54, Mr. Lyulph Stanley speaking, 
May 25, 1880.
74
Hansard, 3rd ser., Vol. 257 (1881), 1068, Sir Wilfrid Lawson speaking, 
January 20, 1B81.
75
Sarah G.■ Millin, Rhodes (Rev. ed.; London: Cbatto &. Windus, 1952), pp.
47-48.
7^The Baphutis consisted of two tribes. The first were original Baphu­
tis; the second were Matsitsi. Both were of Zulu origin, though each origina­
ted from different areas, J. C. MacGregor, Basuto Traditions (Cape Town: C. 
5truik, 1505), p. 46.
77Theal, South Africa, IX, 61-62.
78 ~
P.'il'Sl.'ili’M.*» P* 3-50* Chief Mayia Irate Griffith: Colonel Charles D* 
Griffith was a British soldier and administrator. An emigrant from England to 
Caps Colony, he fought in the War of the Axe in 1846, in the 1851 Kaffir War, 
and was inspector in the Frontier Armed and Mounted Police in 1852. He re­
ceived citations in the Tembuland campaign and in 1871 became Chief Magistrate 
of Basutoland.
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sutoland requested the help of Letsie in settling the problem with Morosi.
Chief Letsie in vain sent messengers to dissuade Morosi from rebellious action,
and, on March B, 1879, a party of Basutos, probably at the instigation of
Morosi, raided across the border into Cape Colony, Griffith arrived there
79with 2,000 loyal Basuto tribesmen immediately after the skirmish. Unaware of
80
possible consequences, Prime Hi,lister J. Gordon Sprigg of Cape Colony mobi-
81
lized the Easutos against Morosi. One Basuto tribesman said that the chief 
had discerned the Zulu successes and that his own rebellion provided an op­
portunity for him to escape punishment. Morosi did not consider himself a
British subject or subservient to Letsie, and he told his people that the Ba-
82sutos would support them in rebellion, which seemed unlikely, for the Basutos
83
did not hold the Baphutis in high esteem.
John Martineau, furthermore, believes that British decisions at this 
juncture did irreparable harm. Missionaries advising Zulu Chief Cetewayo ex­
aggerated the report of the British military disaster at Isandhlwana in Zulu- 
land, and the rumor spread among all the South African natives. The British 
army supposedly had suffered total destruction and could no longer maintain
79
13.3^ .P., (1880), LI, 551,'ltr. APS to Colonial Office, April 5, 1879.
80
» P- 357. Prime Minister 5prigg: Sir John Gordon Sprigg was 
born in England. He became a shorthand clerk at Gurney and taunted the Par­
liament. In 1853, ha visited Cape Colony and decided to remain. A prominent 
dairy nd sheep farmer, he served as MP for East London in the House Assembly 
in 18o9. Governor Frere asked him to form a cabinet in 1878 to replace Sir 
John Molteno. Prime Minister until 1881, he was Colonial Treasurer from 1884- 
86, and from 1886-90 served again as Prime Minister and Colonial Treasurer.
81
G. Tylden, The Rise of the Basuto (Cape Town: Juta & Co., Ltd., 1950),
p w 151 +
A*£.•» (1881), LXVI, 234, 240, ltr. Mofetude to Magistrate John Austen, 
March 3, 1880.
S3
Sylward, ’’Basuto," p. 338.
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control* Two regiments marching through Basutoland could have dissolved the
rumor quickly, the moral effect produced would have outweighed the fractional
expenditure, and Britain might have averted the future Basuto crisis. But Sir 
84
Garnet Wolseley, Commander-in-Chief of all South African Imperial troops, de­
nied the request of Frere for this march, just as he refused to dispatch 200- 
300 British infantry to help attack Morosi. Colonial troops alone stormed the
rebel Baphuti stronghold on Movember 20, 1879, suffering a much greater loss
85
in men and money than otherwise necessary. The Baphutis, morally sapped,
86
ware completely dispersed.
The native police under a white officer, moreover, were the only Basutos
who fought earnestly in the mountain assault. The operation provided Lero~
87thodi (Infra, illust., p. 226, PI. IX ), son of Letsie, with a superb view of
a European attack covered by desultory Basuto gunfire, and he noted the quality
88
of the colonial forces which he soon would battle. The tribe feigned loyalty 
by assisting the troops but later would use the training gained.to direct their
84
> P* 423. Sir Garnet Wolseley: Field-Marshal Viscount Garnet 
J. Wolseley was born in Dublin. In the British army he served in Burma, the 
Crimea, Indie, and China. He smashed the Red River rebellion in Canada in 
1870, then led an expedition against the Ashantis in 1873. Wolseley almost 
replaced Lord Chelmsford during the Zulu 'War and captured Chief Cetewayo. He 
became Governor of Natal, then as Governor of the Transvaal wrote a new con­
stitution for that colony. He failed to relieve in time General Gordon at 
Khartoum. Wolseley implemented many reforms in tha arrnv, despite opposition. 
Thereafter, he became Commander-in-Chief of the British army from 1895—99-
85
John Hartineau, The Life and Correspondence of Sir Bartle Frere, II 
(London: John Murray, 1895), p. 348. Hereafter cited as Martineau, Frere.
86Tylden, The Rise of the Basuto, p. 137.
87 A_. 1).^ .13., p. 214. Lerothodi: Son of Letsie I, who he succeeded in 
1891, Lerothodi had great capability and was responsible for the creation of 
the Basuto National Council.
RR
Tylden. The Rise of the Ba3uto. pp. 132-33.
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weapons against the colony. Mo doubt the Basutos thought they could evade
90tuture disarmament by aiding the troops.
The major point to examine involved disposal of land overrun by troops in
91Quthing. Sprigg at first did not allow Basutos to settle in the area, which
92
was attached administratively to Basutoland. Moshesh never completely had 
conquered the area, and Morosi had pledged only nominal allegiance to him. The 
Cape Prime Minister and Secretary for Native Affairs visited Quthing and after 
much consideration agreed to divide the land into individual lots for sale by 
auction to whites and blacks. This action would give the Basutos an opportu­
nity to buy land and would place orderly farms in a frontier area then sparss-
93
ly populated, though capable of supporting a large agricultural papulation.
Some Basuto chiefs and Europeans who disliked this decision asserted that 
Wodehouse had promised Moshesh that Quthing would become an integral part of 
Basutoland. Sir Bartle countered that he could find no record of such an p 
agreement. The chiefs wanted to select people for Quthing settlements and 
thereby manipulate the feelings of their subjects in order to retain as much 
of their wilting chiefly power a3 possible. Chief Letsie argued that his 
tribe readily helpsd isolate Morosi; thus, he hoped that the overpopulated 
Basutos could occupy all Quthing. Basutos, thought Frere, had displayed in­
sufficient loyalty in the Morosi campaign and therefore did not warrant a land
Aylward, "Basuto,” p. 339.
90Theal, South Africa, XI, 45.
f (1881), LXVI, 257, ltr. Sprigg to Griffith; November 23, 1879.
92
JB.J5., (1880), LI, 582-83, Minutes of Frere, January 3, 1880.
93
Ibid., 581-82, ltr. Frere to Secretary of State for the Colonies, Sir 
Michael Hicks-3sach, March 18, 1380; Theal, South Africa, XI, 42, 57-58.
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reward from the forfeited rebel territory. Wo rights existed or warranted 
recognition that allowed a distant chief, such as Letsie, or group to occupy 
property forfeited from a related clan. Basutos never wholly had occupied 
Quthing, an area largely inhabited by Baphutia and Moputis. Sir Bartle thought 
that land sales by auction would repay Cepe Colony for war expenditures* He 
also challenged the dissenting Chief Magistrate Griffith to find a Wodehouse 
statement that promised exclusion of all other tribes from Basutoland proper 
in the future, but the governor reassured Letsie that his tribe would not lose 
its own land. If Basutos felt crowded, they could settle with the assistance 
of their magistrate on empty lands further south along the Orange River.
In spite of reassurances by Frere, Griffith, upon whom the Basutos looked
94 95
as their guardian and savior from the Boers, said that the deprivation of
Quthing would alienate the Basuto tribe and cause it to think it would lose
all its land. Also, Europeans in that rugged district would feel isolated and
unprotected, panic, and become useless for defense. A latter found by Griffith
sent from Moshesh to Wodehouse and dated April 21, 1368, referred to a law
proposed that would make illegal alienation of land then occupied by the Basu-
96tos. The 1868 annexation proclamation unfortunately had not defined Basuto 
borders?7
Sprigg, in the legislative debates, offered a resolution in the House
94
B..5..P,*, (1880), LI, 586, ltr. Letsie to Griffith, December 9, 1879;
Ibid., 582-83, Minutes of Frere, January 3, 1880.
95Tylden, The Rise of the Basuto. p. 177.
96
(1880), LI, 584-85, ltr. Griffith to Ayliffe, November 27, 1879* 
97Theal, South Africa, VIII, 304.
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Assembly that European farms fill part of Quthing, with Basutos or other na­
tives filling the large remainder. He argued that Griffith wanted Quthing for 
only the Basutos because of expediency, power to select the occupants, and a
promise to give Basutos land if'they aided against Morosi. Griffith denied
90
the last accusation. Another member, Mr. Grpen, thought that a law must ac­
knowledge that Quthing belonged to the Crown and that the district could not
devolve to Letsie, and the Attorney-General of the colony believed that Letsie
99had no rights in the district.
The Earl of Kimberley, the ultimate authority, favored the Griffith pro­
posals and thought that the Frere policy destroyed the atmosphere of isolation 
in which Basutoland was governed. The secretary narnsd that Quthing, because 
of Frere actions, might attract a considerable settlement of whites in the 
immediate vicinity of dense Basuto localities. Colonel Griffith in 1878 had 
persuaded Kimberley that in other areas of Cape Colony, integration of the 
races caused native drunkenness, cattle thievery, and black degradation.
Though the immediate responsibility of dealing with Cape Colony natives, con­
tinued Kimberley, still rested with tha colonial ministers^?he earl advised 
that, after the Cape Mounted Rifles^garrison in Quthing had routed squatters,
98
The Paris Evangelical Society alleged that Griffith told the tribe that 
it would lose title to Quthing by not fighting Morosi, jB,3_._P., (1881), LXVI, 
703.
99
Ibid., 176-80, Cape House Assembly, June 307 1380.
^°°B_.5^.P>., (108Q), LI, 599-600, ltr. Kimberley to Frere, May 20, 1880.
Cape Mounted Rifles: This semi-military unit evolved from the Frontier 
Armed and Mounted Police established in 1878. Capable of rapid movement, its 
members were responsible for their own horses and supplies. They gained honor 
in the Morosi campaign and Basuto Rebellion. Hereafter referred to as CMR, 
Rosenthal, ed., Encyclopedia, p. 88. In Basutoland, Magistrate Arthur Darkly, 
son of Governor Sir Henry Barkly, thought the CMR a fine corps, composed most­
ly of sons of gentlemen, Fanny Barkly, Among Boers and Basutos (London:
23
102
loyal 3asutos must have tbs right to occupy the territory, and he forced tem­
porary suspension of Cape colonization plans after disallowing the confiscation?
Another issue ultimately overshadowed the land controversy. Frere con­
tended that the Morosi rebellion convinced Cape Colony that it could no'1 longer
delay in extending to Basutoland the disarmament act in force among other
104
tribes, an act needed to protect the colony against native disturbances.
The Basutos, in conclusion, missed an opportunity to demonstrate their 
loyalty by earnestly fighting Morosi; by showing untrustworthiness, the tribe 
became suspect and liable to more rigid control. The British should have ai­
ded against the Baphutis to show solidarity with Cape Colony. Kimberley mis­
takenly still believed Basutoland a native reserve and shamelessly compromised 
the colony in Basuto eyes. As an example to the Basutos of punishment for 
rebellion, Cape Town should have received permission to profitably colonize 
Quthing immediately, as was the usual procedure. European settlers might have 
felt isolated in primitive Quthing, but they had every right to settle there.
Remington &. Co., Ltd., 1BB3), p. 237. G. Tylden otherwise contends that in 
1878 a new commando law sanctioned the enlistment of untrained men in a unit 
for only particular wars. The title given the established force was the Cape 
Mounted Rifles, a revival of the name of a disbanded Imperial unit. The troop 
was understrength, and its artillery needed new equipment and training. Three 
regiments of the Cape Mounted Yeomanry (hereafter referred to as CMY), a local 
militia, also formed. It was expensive and impractical to call up more than 
half the yeomanry at ones for service outside its recruiting territory. The 
volunteers, mostly infantry, were awkward recruits, and the entire force 
carried outdated Snider carbines. There was provision for the CMY to impress 
natives as levies, Tylden, The Rise of the Basuto, pp. 129-30.
102
Hansard, 3rd ser., Vol. 252 (1880), 1619, Mr. Grant Duff speaking,
June 10, 1880.
^^Theal, 5outh Africa, XI, 57-58.
104
B...5.JP., (1880), LI, 600, ltr. Frere to Hicks-Deach, March 2, 1880.
CHAPTER II
PRELUDE TO CRISIS
THE SPRIGG VISIT TO BASUTOLAND AND THE PROCLAMATION
OF THEE PEACE PRESERVATION ACT
Prime Minister Sprigg in October, 1879, made his annual visit to Basuto­
land, this time to discuss with the natives the application to the tribe of the 
provisions of the Peace Preservation Act of 1876^ of which the Basutos had
received warning in 1868. Evidently, Governor Frere felt the importance of
2
the Sprigg visit, because he gave it publicity in Cape Colony. Sir Gordon 
attended two pitsos and was stunned to see an assembled cavalry legion of ap­
proximately 7,000-8,000 trained men. He thought it deplorable that Basutoland
3
could muster such a large unit of cavalry. Sprigg obliviously weathered a
4disparaging reception at Maseru. Ignorant of the native language and customs, 
he did not notice that many of the chiefs and throng did not show good will 
towards or agreement with him but spoke derisively in their native language. 
Magistrate Arthur Barkly, on intimate terms with the tribe, contended that the
5
Basutos were restless because of the battle of Isandhlwana and would not disarm. 
Sir Gordon, following his agenda, summarily thanked the tribe for assis-
Peace Preservation Act (frequently referred to in the following text as 
PPA): Cape Colony enacted this measure to remove guns from native tribes. A 
reproduction of the entire proclamation is in J3.5JP., (1880), LI, 577-80.
2
Ibid., 571, ltr. Frere to Hicks-Beach, March 15, 1880; Ibid., 358, ltr. 
Frere to Kimberley, n.d., r. August 5, 1879.
3
Martineau, Frere, II, 381.
4
Maseru: A town in western Basutoland which is the administrative capital 
of the country.
5
Darkly, Among Boars and Basutos, pp. 112-13, 116.
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tance against Morosi and in ths same manner announced the PPA and the doubling 
of the hut tax to provide for Basuto education, roads, bridges, and enough 
police protection to end cattle thefts in and adjacent to Basutoland. These 
provisions did not invoke a violent reaction at the time, but junior chiefs 
did seize ths opportunity to voice their accumulated grievances loudly in 
order to keep silent older chiefs. Letsie, nevertheless, asked 5ir Gordon 
who the tribe had offended to deserve disarmament. Sprigg, in his confusion, 
assumed that the Basutos had assented to his proposals, and he thanked thsrn.
The second day, he mat with numerous chiefs and councilors; these, however, 
made apparent their opposition to the PPA. Chief Tsekelo argued that Frere 
and his ministers purposely wanted to break faith with the Basutos. The major 
chiefs, Letsie, Masupha, and ’“lolappo, who did not attend, allegedly because 
of illnsssf were conspicuous by their absence. The Prime Minister thought it 
sufficient to mention that the Queen and British Government and people approved 
of the PPA. He also indicated that the Cape Government would trust Basuto 
loyalty in the future as in the past and that Cape Colony did not believe the 
tribe so sentimentally attached to its arms that it would not surrender them!
Sir Godfrey Lagden, The Basutos, II (New York: D. Appleton and Co., 
1910), pp. 493-97; , pp. 206-07; Born in England, 5ir Godfrey Yeat-
man Lagden came to South Africa in 1878 to serve as chief clerk to the Secre­
tary of State for the Transvaal. During the Majuba campaign, he withstood a 
siege at Pretoria. After working for the Colonial Office in Sierra Leone and 
in the Gold Coast, L%gden in 1884 secured a post in Basutoland and became 
Chief Magistrate in 1890 and again from 1893-1901. As chairman of the Inter­
colonial South African Native Affairs Commission in 1902-04, he authored a 
noteworthy paper on native problems. Lagden distinguished himself in the 
5econd Anglo-Boer War and thereafter wrote a standard text on the Basuto tribe 
in 1909; Smith, The Habilles of Basutoland, p. 248; Molteno, Molteno, II, 425.
7
S_, _D._N.Bi., p. 227. Adolphe Mabille: After joining the Paris Evangeli­
cal Mission in 1856, Mabille married a daughter of Eugene Casaiis find came to 
Basutoland in 1860. He worked as a missionary there and in the Transvaal, and 
he held great political influence among the Bantu,
After the pitso, the reverend Mr. Adolphe MabilleJ a French missionary, 
added to the confusion by exposing alleged Government misconduct. He com­
plained that the Prime Minister deleted from the official report comments that 
the Government would not forcibly disarm the Basutos but would await surrender 
of guns at native discretion and contended that Sprigg intentionally omitted 
the last statement as a pretext to use farea against Basutoland to end its 
status as a native territory. Besides these allegations, the pastor recalled
only two pjtsos to which the Basutos had come armed; usually they had instruc-
8
tions from chiefs to leave weapons behind.
Colonial Undersecretary for Native Affairs Bright- in answer to the Ma- 
bille accusations, reported that the pitso instructions had been printed in 
Sesuto in a pamphlet and distributed to the tribe in order to prevent miscon­
ception and to announce that the Government would wait for calmer times to act 
on disarmament. The Government, convinced that Basutos would see that the PPA
was to their own advantage, therefore stood firm on its policy and instructed
9the magistrates to eventually disarm the natives.
Concerning opinion on the Sprigg journey, C. W. De Kiewiet alleges that
the protesting Basutos had the better platform and that the Prime Minister,
had he consulted with Basuto magistrates, would have disavowed speedy disarms- 
10ment. Edgar Brookes, an authority on South African native policy, terms 
Sprigg tactless^
8Smith, The Mabilles of Basutoland, pp. 246-48.
B^_.S_.P_., (1880), LI', 563, ltr. Bright, February 26, 1880.
■^De Kiewiet, The Imperial Factor, p. 266.
*^Brookes, History of Native Policy, p. 103.
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In final appraisal, the increased hut tax would obviously benefit the 
tribe. Prime Minister Sprigg sincerely wanted to discuss this and other is­
sues with the natives and did not want to employ force. Mr. Mabille misrepre­
sented the pitsos and status of Basutoland. The chiefs probably pretended 
their illness for personal reasons and knew very well that the PPA was neither 
an insult nor stemmed from tribal offense. The Basutos produced no valid ar­
guments at the pitsos against disarmament, a decree discussed next in detail. 
The Sprigg journey fit into a larger perspective. The climax of Cape
Colony policy of direct rule over the Basutos came in an attempt to disarm the.
12
tribe under the Peace Preservation Act of 1876. The Basutos were excellent
13marksmen and much better armed than the Zulus. Over 20,000 tribesmen owned
14
guns, many of them superior weapons.. William Greswall declares that some ob­
servers felt that Basuto war spirit had increased over a long period and that 
guns heavily bolstered native confidence. The tribe had increased its self- 
respect and had learned European battle tactics, and knowledgeable tribesmen
15with guns could easily defend cliffs and natural fortresses like Thaba Bosigo.
Armed with guns, many Basutos thought that they could push the Europeans into 
16the sea. A. lAylward believes that, had Cape Colony correctly appraised the 
performance of tribal infantry and cavalry in irregular warfare, the Govern­
ment might have governed Basutoland more carefully^ Guns in the hands of the
12Stevens, Lesotho, etc., p. 27.
13Kathleen Shervintan, The Shervintons: Soldiers of fortune (London: T. 
fisher Unwin, 1899), p. 59. Hereafter cited as Shervinton, The Shervintons.
14
Theal, South Africa, XI, 55.
^William Oreswell, Our South African Empire, II (London: Chapman and 
Hall, Ltd., 1885), p. 78.
^Walker, ed., South Africa, p. 49Q.
■^Aylward, MBasuto,” pp. 330, 339.
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strong and self-conscious 3asuto3 was an incentive to war and rebellion. To 
rule this large tribe rampant with quarrels, Cape Colony wanted positive 
guarantees for peace. Disarmament was part of a process to extend Cape Colony 
control over all native tribes up to the Natal border. One irate colonist 
complained that, although the previous Cape administration had illegally al­
lowed unlimited sales of guns to the natives while the Transvaal and Orange
18
Free State objected, loyal natives like the Fingos had been disarmed and even
Europeans in the colony held gun licenses. De Kiewiet indicates that Bssuto
magistrates denied that arms made the natives rebellious and that the colony
19used the PPA in 1880 to force war on the Basutos, but the original dispatch
of the Natal Mercury relates that the tribe would not have had to disarm had
its loyalty been unquestionable. Griffith added that guns were toys to these 
natives and that this incisive proclamation might eradicate polygamy, native
mischief, and heathenism. Disarmament was a prerequisite for Europeanization
20of traditional Basuto customs. Brookes, nevertheless, relates that the timing
of disarmament was poor because of the affect of Isandhlwana and because of
the slow spread of news regarding the British victory over the Zulus at Ulundi.
21
The Zulu War had created the impression that whites feared blacks.
Governor Frere, giving additional reasons for disarmament, asserted that 
it was impossible for a colonial ministry to uphold law and order when whole
18Fingos: A native tribe in the Eastern Province of Cape Colony, these 
nomads united as a result of Zulu aggressions by Chief Chaka. Older tribes 
regarded them with disdain, Rosenthal, ed., Encyclopedia, p. 167.
19De Kiewiet, Tha Imperial Factor, pp. 263, 266; The Times (London), 
September 24, 1880, p. 4.
20
The Times (London), January 1, 1879, p. 5.
21Brookes, History of Native Policy, p. 103.
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tribes secreted arms. Basutos were fully-armed and obedient to a few young
22chiefs and their own dignity. A3 the last three years had shown how firearms 
aided native fighting power, he deprecated people who fictionalized arguments 
to prove that the Government should not worry about tribes purchasing guns and
that natives would not learn their use and posed a more dangerous threat with
23assegais. The Basutos, in reality, since early in the century had increased 
and organized their cavalry and marksmanship. In a few days thejr could muster 
thousands of men and avalanche from the mountains towards European settlements. 
The Basutos, felt Sir Bartle, had noivalid excuse for hoarding guns and posing 
a military threat to Cape Colony and merely wanted to cast off colonial domi­
nation. Basutos from Natal had joined Natal native units against the Zulus
and had fought bravely, but the behavior of a few, felt the governor, did not
24
vouch for the loyalty of the entire tribe. Frere maintained that the Basutos 
were loyal to the Crown in an abstract fashion but that they mistrusted or ig­
nored colonial camnunds, an aversion which time and experience hopefully would 
alter. Tbe tribe believed itself disarmed as a punishment and that the colony
deemed all guns evil, but Frere thought that Chief Letsie realized the true
25reason for disarmament. Sir Bartle did not delay disarmament, because he did
26not trust the tribe. Other Cape officials did not agrea on Basuto constancy.
22B .5.P., (1881), LXVI, 204-05, ltr. Frere to Kimberley, July 26, 1880.
23Assegai: A South African native spear which takes its name from a Latin 
origin. The older type is a throwing assegai, the newer model is a stabbing 
spear having a broad and sharp blade on a short handle, Rosenthal, ad., Ency­
clopedia, pp. 24-25.
24
Frere, "The Basutos . . .  Cape of Good Hope," pp. 168, 182.
25B.SiP.% (1880), LI, 557-58, ltr. Frere to Hicks-Beach, March 2, 1380.
26
Ibid., 597, ltr. Ayliffe to Sprigg, April 12, 1880.
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London could have compelled Frere to dispatch a special commission to investi­
gate Basuto feelings on the PPA, but Wolseley refused to permit the use of
27British officers. Thus, Frere had to accept reports of Basutoland officials.
The governor, furthermore, was convinced of the virtuous intentions of
the Cape Government and of the necessity of the PPA. The British Government
approved the PPA, and Prime Minister Sprigg merely effected a practical theory
used before and approved by his predecessors. People qualified to judge, in-
28
eluding those who sought native advancement, supported the Government. On
December 22, 1879, Colonel Griffith ordered the tribe to disarm and receive
29compensation within a month following. Only a few natives obliged. The Chief
Magistrate said that a PPA circular carrying the order to the chiefs was not
30
very successful but that natives from different areas brought in guns. Frere 
therefore thought the PPA a success thus far. The tribesmen claimed a senti­
mental attachment to their arms; thus, Cape Colony bad to act like a parent 
taking a knife from a child. Frcere thought that the measure would civilize 
the Basutos. If disarmament was as difficult as some said, its attainment was 
more urgent. The failure of the magistrates and missionaries to explain the 
PPA properly offered no excuse for resistance. Troops would mobilize if colo­
nial ministers saw a risk of rebellion and would crush chiefs who disobeyed, 
though the governor expected no turmoil unless the natives followed a trouble­
maker. If PPA adversaries voided the act, African civilization would suffer
.5^ .JP., (1881), LXVI, 163, ltr. Frere to Kimberley, May 30, 1880.
^J3 »5_. £., (1880), LI, 591, ltr. Frere to Hicks-Beach, n.d., r. April 15,
1880.
^Theal, South Africa, XI, 58-59.
30
.B.J5.P_,, (1881), LXVI, 258, ltr. Griffith to Sprigg, January 28, 1880.
31
a setback*^
The Cape Government, on April 6, 1880, thereupon proclaimed the provi­
sions of the PPA in Basutoland. Natives could voluntarily surrender arms for
32compensation up to the extended deadline of May 21, 1880. A permit for a
weapon would be issued only after a magistrate submitted a name to the Chief
Magistrate and to the colonial Secretary for Native Affairs along with the
33
reasons for recommendation, A warranted officer could ask to see a permit, 
and if a person could not or refused to show it, his arrest would immediately 
follow. Officials could carry arms; othsrs had to deposit thair weapons at 
the office of thsir district magistrate. The PPA covered guns, pistols, 
swords, bayonets, daggers, pikes, spears, and all kinds of ammunition, A com­
petent appraiser appointed by the Chief Magistrate would value within one
month all arms given to the magistrates and compensate natives proving owner- 
34
ship. Undersecretary Bright added that a board of valuers comprising the
35magistrate, a headman, and a trader supervised each district. Compensation 
for surrendered guns equalled the appraised value, though most Basutos had
bought guns with the sanction of British magistrates at more than the market
. 36prrce.
One magistrate, however, offered beneficial but mostly ignored amendments,
^^13.S^P., (1880), LI, 588-91, ltr. Frare to Hicks-Beaeh, n.d., r. April 
15, 1B8Q.
^^♦S l.P,. , (1881), LXVI, 157, ltr. Frere to Hicks-Beach, April 6, 1880.
33
Ibid.. 162, ltr. 5prigg, April 9, 1880.
34
Ibid.. 157-59, Proclamation by Frere.
^ I b i d ., 236, ltr. Bright to Griffith, March 4, 1880.
36
Theal, South Africa, XI, 56.
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He believed that it was unnecessary to confiscate assegais and that a diploma­
tic endeavor might enable superior chiefs to retain guns for hunting. Traders
37and other whites also needed to keep guns for self-defense.
The colonial Government, in any event, acted cautiously. Frere decided
that a magistrate could humor chiefs by licensing theix' guns for sporting
purposes. Ha noted the short time allowed for translation and distribution of
the PPA and realized that officials searching for arms without a warrant might 
38
cause resistance. Searches and seizures therefore were authorized only if the
39public peace became endangered. Sprigg said that an officer could seize a gun 
without a warrant only if it was inconvenient to travel far for a warrant and 
only if a wrongdoer could hide guns before the officer returned. Sir Gordon 
expected less danger of friction with the PPA in Basutoland than elsewhere,
because the few whites residing there did not seem to present a threat to the
40 trxbe.
The governor, nevertheless, felt that great danger would arise from post­
ponement of disarmament and felt obliged to enforce disarmament immediately or 
perpetuate what frontier colonists thought a continual source of danger to 
public peace and governmental authority. The rebellion of Morosi had showed 
thB risk of allowing such a menace to remain. To defenders of native rights 
in the Government who opposed him, 5ir Bartle answered that delay would offer 
inspiration to Basuto lackeys, including missionaries and professedly loyal 
tribesmen. These people believed that opposition to the PPA was small, sup-
37£.S.P>*, (1881), LXVI, 256, ltr. nharles H. Ball to Griffith, March 14,
1880.
38
Ibid., 160, ltr. Frere to Ministers.
> (1880), LI, 557, ltr. Frere to Hicks-Beach, March 2, 1880.
40
B.5..P., (1881), LXVI, 161, ltr. Sprigg, April 9, 1880.
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ported by groundless fears of the natives, and that unenforced disarmament would
41reassure ignorant natives and allow easy implementation of the PPA.
Frere further noted that arms always had increased the native threat. As 
South African natives first bought guns, Cape Government policy deemed that 
frontier tribes should not have access to arms or ammunition. During wars, 
the Cape Government enforced strict gun-control regulations, but in peacetime 
the control was less stringent. In 1870, it became the common practice of 
public officials to pay natives with guns. 5ome traders liked this practice, 
and missionaries argued that natives armed with guns would quickly decimate 
the game, with the result that the tribes would became more settled and indus­
trious, Before Frere*s arrival in South Africa, a commission on border defense 
noted the increasing danger from guns in the hands of frontier tribesmen. Ex­
perienced frontiersmen advised Frere to disarm natives and halt the sale of 
guns. Sir Bartle contended that the guns in a tribe did not diminish the im­
portance of the assagai, the native weapon most commonly used. It was a lethal 
weapon, and most natives needed little practice in its employment. Others, he 
continued, erroneously thought a native ignorant of the use of guns less dan­
gerous than if trained in the use of the assegai. Guns were to natives what 
artillery was to Europeans. Guns increased martial pride and conceitcausing 
insubordination and a feeling of invincibility. Frere felt that it was impos­
sible to know which natives, until they were informed of disarmament, were 
friends or enemies of the Government. During his service in India, rebellion 
had not spread to districts where guns were inaccessible. Frere did not, 
however, seem to fear a union of tribes uniting against Cape Colony^
41
Frere, "The Basutos • . . Cape of Good Hope,” pp. 181-82, 190, 193.
34
In regard to unwarranted hindrance and imputation, portions of the press
and some missionaries encouraged native resistance. British interference with
his ministers, said Frere, wouid tend to lessen their constitutional responsi- 
43
bility. Edwin Smith, apologist for the obnoxious French missionaries, mista­
kenly remarks that Sprigg confirmed Basuto suspicions by distinguishing between
44
blacks and whites in application of disarmament. Godfrey Lagden, a later 
Basutoland Chief Magistrate, insists that Sprigg, formally pledged to apply 
the PPA to Basutoland, had excellent reasons to withdraw the act and that the 
governor announced that it was impossible to withdraw this erroneous applica­
tion of the PPA. Lagden alleges that most Basuto magistrates, missionaries,
traders, and other native officials detested tha PPA, which he believed caused
45
the tribesmen to distrust the Cape Government.
Sir Garnet Wolseley was the most outspoken critic in South Africa against
the PPA. Sir George Grey, a former High Commissioner of South Africa, said
46that few persons there differed from Wolseley regarding the view that indis­
criminate ownership of guns by natives was dangerous. Basutos, pointed out 
Wolseley, had aided Cape Colony in the Zulu War, and he felt that it was asi­
nine to reward such loyalty by disarmament. To disarm natives indiscriminate­
ly would incur international censure. It was impolitic to disarm the Basutos
42
B . S J \ , (1880), LI, 567-70, ltr. Frere to Hicks-Beach, March 15, 1680; 
Theal, South Africa, XI, 55-56.
43
J3.5_.<P., (1880), LI, 571-72, ltr. Frere to Hicks-Beach, March 15, 1880.
44
Smith, Tha Mabilles of Basutoland, p. 255.
45Lagden, The Basutos. II, 500, 502, 492.
4^Earl Grey, ’’South Africa,” The Nineteenth Century, VIII. (Dec., 1879- 
July, 1880), 935.
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and not neighboring tribes; disarmed Basutos would never again help Cape Colo­
ny. In addition, he indicated that enforcement of the PPA would require a
large military force, and Cape Colony did not have tha military capability to
47handle a Basuto rebellion. To start a war to confiscate guns from loyal Basu­
tos, while leaving hundreds of thousands among neighboring tribes, was too
serious a risk. Though Wolseley admitted that he may have overestimated the
48
future Basuto reaction, his unexpected rebuke caused embarrassment and rein­
forced Opposition arguments in the Cape Parliament.
Frere, in defense of his management of the PPA, failed to find in Wolse- 
ley*s contentions anything that warranted a change in the position of the 
Government. Wolseley, in Frerefs view, might have warned Cape Colony earlier 
of ths supposed danger of mass native uprisings or suggested a remedy against 
indiscriminate Basuto ownership of guns. Whereas colonial boundaries expanded, 
the London Government constricted the area protected by British troops; there­
fore, the PPA substituted for them as a guarantee of the peace. While several 
large districts of Kaffraria had successfully undergone disarmament, government 
and military officers in England, India., and elsewhere had agreed VJith the 
Frere method of disarmament. Three of Frere*s ministers, plus Sprigg and se-
49
veral local advisers with experience in frontier warfare, supported his views.
Cape Colony newspapers, moreover, reflected two viewpoints. The Cape
50
Times espoused the Sprigg ministry cause, while the Cape Argus, the Opposition
^3,.S.P,», (1880), LI, 586-87, ltr. Wolseley to Hicks-Beach, March 10, 1B8Q. 
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Hansard, 3rd ser., Vol. 257 (1881), 1071, Mr. Fowler speaking, January 
20, 1881.
, (1881), LXVI, 202-05, ltr. Frere to Kimberley, July 26, 1880.
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The Times (London), September 6, 1880, p. 6.
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51
tabloid, condemned the PPA application to Basutoland.
52
Sir Michael Hicks-Beach, predecessor to Kimberley as Colonial Secretary,
subsequently carefully delineated British jurisdiction in the PPA by recalling
that the British Parliament more than a year before had sanctioned the PPA and
53 
would create trouble by its interference, The secretary did not interfere with
the colonial ministers, who must have realized that Imperial troops could not 
54
support them. Hicks-Deach in May, 1880, advised caution, as the Basutos were
loyal subjects, and he felt relieved that no one contemplated searching for
arms domestically. Sir Michael realized that the colonial ministers were morB
intimate with the situation than himself and reminded the colony that it was
55under responsible government and that he himself could offer only advice.
The Earl of Kimberley, in contrast, suddenly-altered his reaction to the 
PPA. He had said in February, 1880, that, while he supported a gradual and 
cautious disarmament throughout South Africa, he feared that the PPA would 
cause disaffection among Basutos^ After Kimberley succeeded to the Colonial
51Ibid.» April 23, 1880, p. 5. Greswell fails to see how the Basutos 
could constitutionally oppose the PPA, argues that guns in Basuto hands were 
dangerous as there was no game nearby, and asserts that gun licenses might 
have been introduced more gradually, Greswell, Our South African Empire, II, 
86, 82. Natal officials and colonists in vain protested against the applica­
tion of the PPA, Pall Mall Gazette (London), July 23, 1880, p. 4. There was 
also much opposition in radical English cliques to the disarmament, Walker, 
ed., South Africa, p. 490.
52Sir Michael Hicks-Beach: Born in London in 1837, Hicks-Beach entered 
Parliament in 1864. In 1878, he became Secretary of State for the Colonies. 
During his tenure, he interviewed Boer delegates protesting the annexation of 
the Transvaal and by his policy caused the First Anglo-Boer War, Rosenthal, 
ed., Encyclopedia, p. 226.
53
Hansard, 3rd ser., Vol. 251 (1880), 1205-06, Mr. Justin M ’Carthy and 
Sir Michael Hicks-Beach speaking, f4arch 18, 1880.
54
B..S..P.., (1880), LI, 556, ltr. Hicks-Beach to Frere, March 10, 1880.
55
Hansard. 3rd ser., Vol. 252 (1880), 645, Mr. Grant Duff speaking, May 
28, 1880.
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Office in the spring of 1880, he offered an official viewpoint similar to
Hicks-Beach. Queen Victoria, he wrote, had decided that the PPA would not
humiliate the Basutos or degrade them in sight of their neighbors and that
civilization had reached the point where Basuto habits had to conform with
57
those of other subject peoples. Kimberley saw no point in discussing the PPA,
since the colonial ministers favored the measure, which was already in force.
He thought that these ministers probably understood the situation better than
the Home Government and cautioned that the colony would have to handle subse—
58
quent contingencies without Imperial troops.
Kimberley, despite his turnabout, gave moral support to ths Basutos who 
59refused to disarm. The secretary, disquieted, and aware of Wolseley objec- 
60
tions to the PPA, himself disagreed on the manner of implementation of the
a c t ^  The earl showed his sympathy for the rebellious element by repudiating
62British responsibility for disarmament. The London Government had incurred
serious burdens in recent native wars and, necessarily, felt that it must take
63a position on native relations which would assure peace in South Africa. Kim­
berley warned Cape Colony that the recent lengthy and bloody conflicts between
Hansard, 3rd ser., Vol. 250 (1880), 258-59, The Earl of Kimberley spea­
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natives and British troops in South Africa made it wise to avoid provocations 
that might lead to new fighting. He promised, however, not to interfere in 
the PPA issue, as such action would make responsible government at Cape Colony 
look ridiculous^
In conclusion, it seemed certain that guns reinforced rebelliousness and 
insolence in the Basutos and that the tribe offered a clear and present mili­
tary threat; therefore, the PPA was a test of loyalty. The Basutos had no 
sentimental attachment for their guns, and they disguised their disloyalty 
with pretended confusion and wanted a special exemption from the PPA.
Cape Colony, furthermore, would have risked danger and contempt from na­
tives by delaying the PPA, though the colony originally might have lengthened 
the time for disarmament to allow adequate time for explanation to the natives. 
The Government might have reimbursed natives for the purchase price of a gun, 
and Basutos might have been'.allowed to retain the assegai, an integral part of 
their culture. It was a sound idea to allow chiefs, who could help disarm the 
tribe, to keep guns. The colony took measures to avoid violent confrontation 
but did not prepare to meet resistance that was better to have been faced im­
mediately than later with self-reliant colonial military forces which had 
proved themselves capable in the past. Frere councilors had first-hand know­
ledge of the capabilities of natives armed with guns; ha and Sprigg never re- 
gretted the PPA, though the former was overconfident. As the Home Government 
questioned the PPA, British officers might have helped investigate conditions 
for disarmament.
^Hansard, 3rd ser., Vol. 254 (1880), 1108, Mr. Grant Duff speaking, 
July 22, 1880.
39
BASUTQ OPPOSITION TO DISARMAMENT AND THE RESPONSE OF THE CAPE PARLIAMENT
Cape Colony was in a better position than the Home Government to react to
Basuto feelings about the PPA. Chief Letsie sent to the Cape Parliament peti-
65
tions opposing disarmament, which were presented on May 14, 1880. The Basutos 
in their first application expressed sadness at the intimations of their mis­
conduct. The natives professed obadience to Christianity and protective colo­
nial laws and recalled their submission to Government demands at every yearly 
pitso. They could not understand the reason for their disarmament, because 
arms by themselves seemed harmless. Neighboring tribes would think Basutos 
had offended the Government and, because the Queen allegedly lost prestige 
from the PPA, might fear to seek British protection. The petition promised 
that tribal guns, which had aided the Queen against Morosi andiihtf Zulus, would 
never endanger the Crown. The natives sensed disgrace and even ventured that 
their disarmament resulted because they were black^ They feared virtual sla­
very under the P P A ^  In addition, a subordinate petition protested an alleged
68
confiscation of Quthing on the grounds that Wodehouse had defined exactly the
69
limits of Basutoland to include the Baphuti lands.
The Grahamstown Journal (Cape Colony) indicated that an educated native 
leader, Chief Tsekelo, had originated the first petition, which also reflected 
the sentiments of his royal brothers that thsir power was being eroded. Tse-
^Theal, South Africa, XI, 50.
.S_.PL , (1880), LI, 559-62, Petition of Basuto chiefs and people to
Frere.
^ ^J3.S_. JP., (1881), LXVI, 166-67, Petition of Letsie . . . House Assembly. 
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kelo and others wanted a national Basuto assembly and accused the Government 
of failing to provide the Basutos with the means needed to express their com­
plaints and opinions in parliamentary style. The tribe wanted reform without 
loss of reverence for and obedience to the chiefsi*"*
Governor Frere, in the Government recoilment, believed that the natives 
seemed more prone to emotion than reasonP* Griffith had blasted a similar pe­
tition he had received in 1879 as
. . . the most impertinent and insolent letter ha had ever read, and 
if he had been in the office when it was brought he would have thrown 
it back in the faces of the bearers of it, and kicked them out of the 
office. Those who had written and signed it were . . . rebels, who 
had insulted the Queen*s Government.
72Griffith now planned to tighten the lax rule in Basutoland.
Chief Letsie, in further native reaction, gathered representatives from
every part of his .country for a delegation to Cape Town. He gave Griffith a
list of names and asked advice and recommendations for delegation members.
7 JThough Secretary for Native Affairs Ayliffe consented to the scheme, Undersec-
74retary Bright informed Letsie that a delegation could not secure advantages. 
The paramount chief then bewailed the alleged deprivation of his right to com­
plain to the Crown and thought that Cape Colony must await a royal judgement 
75
of the PPA. Griffith replied that the petitions would not alter the situation
^Th e  Timas (London), January 1, 1B79, p. 5; Edwin Smith argues that 
Adolphe Mabille inspired, if not actually wrote, the Basuto petitions, Smith, 
The Mabilles of Basutoland, p. 255.
* (1880), LI, 557, ltr. Frere to Hicks-Beach, March 2, 1880.
72The Times (London), January 1, 1879, p. 5.
73B.S.£., (1881), LXVI,. 245, ltr. Griffith to Ayliffe, April 11, 1880; 
Ibid.. 245, ltr. Letsie to Griffith, April 11, 1880.
^ Ibid., 237, ltr. Bright to Griffith, March 31, 188G.
~^*Ibid., 248, ltr. Letsie to Griffith, April 11, 1880.
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and that the magistrates did not have to await a reply from the Queen or the 
76
Cape Government. The paramount chief then said that the short time given in 
which to surrender his guns frightened him and that the Basutos were demonstra­
ting good faith by their willingness to send a group to Cape Town instead of 
fleeing to the mountains. Letsie later told Assistant Magistrate Davies of 
Thaba Bosigo District that the Government was deliberately, but in vain, at­
tempting to make the Basutos appear rebels. Davies thought that the tribe
would send a delegation, even at the risk of losing compensation for withheld
77guns.
Discourse did take place between the delegation and Cape Government.
Seven Basutos led by a Pastor Cochet from the Paris Evangelical 5ociety left
78 79
for Cape Town on April 29, 1B80. Sprigg met with the deputation and, while
80
restricting its activities, granted a one-month extension for the surrender of 
arms. Cochet, acting as interpreter, thought the delay not only would have a 
beneficial effect on the disarmament efforts of the chiefs but also would mean 
that the Cape Parliament would take time to discuss the issue. Frere met with 
the delegation and held several lengthy conversations with Cochet, who men­
tioned nothing of alarrn?^
The colony acted magnanimously in the face of the obstinacy in Basuto-
82
land. One recalcitrant chief, David Masupha (Infra, illust., p. 227>'P1*^ )>
^ I b i d ., 245-46, ltr. Griffith to Letsie, April 16, 1880.
^ I b i d ., 250-51, ltr. Davies to Griffith, April 23, 1880.
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led the dissidents who ordered the tribe to keep its guns until the delegation
83returned. Griffith carried out his instructions amidst a worsening situation
84and reported that the sons of Chief Letsie had joined Masupha. Letsie sought
anothar deadline continuance so that the deputation could return and report to
the tribe. The Chief Magistrate also thought that the prescribed period was
too short to collect the Basuto guns and that another extension of time seemed 
85
feasible. The ministry again extended the date of disarmament, from June 21
to July 12, to enable the Basuto deputation to return and divulge the procee- 
86
dings. M ’tho, a chief councilor to Letsie, and Cochet were confident that the
87
tribe would obey the PPA if given more time.
Colonel Griffith, in assessment, was angered at the petitions because 
they bypassed his authority and reeked of cunning. The Basutos had ample 
channels to voice grievances and realized that tribal petitions and a delega­
tion did not constitute customary protests and that the Queen and British 
Parliament had only indirect control over the tribe. To allow the delegation 
to report its activities before a disarmament deadline was prudent, because
go
* P* 242. David Masupha: The third son of Hashesh, Masupha 
was a disobedient heir. When Moshesh died, Letsie could not move to the capi­
tal at Thaba Bosigo, because Masupha had usurped the mountain. Involved in 
numerous quarrels with neighboring clans, Masupha defied the colonial Govern­
ment continuously. The Times printed that Masupha had once tortured a horsa 
thief by squeezing the man's head between two poles. The chief, after agree­
ing to a cease-fire in the War of 1865, had massacred a fores of Bastards and 
had carried off their women, The Times (London), October 28, 1880, p. 4.
, (1881), LXVI, 167-68, ltr. Frere to Kimberley, June 29, 1880.
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, (1881), LXVI, 186, ltr. Frere to Ministers.
the tribe would listen to its own members.
The Cape Parliament, aside from Basuto protests, heatedly debated the al­
ready operative PPA application in the spring and summer of 1080. The discus­
sion was the longest in Cape parliamentary history, with 45 of the 67 Assembly 
members paiticipating. The Prime Minister, believes Edwin Smith, purposely 
wanted to observe the PPA in Basutoland before Parliament convened. Sprigg 
announced in the House Assembly that he had never believed the Basutos willing 
to surrender their arms, because the tribe for years had prepared to rebel by 
purchasing the best guns and ammunition.
Both the negrophiles led by Saul Solomon and the Afrikaner faction led by
Jan Hofmeyr, as expected, carried on vigorous opposition in the House Assembly 
83
to the PPA. 5olomon alleged thct Letsie had exceeded his authority by disar­
ming before tha delegation returned and that Masupha had acted constitutionally
89
according to tribal law. Opposition observers thought Sir Gordon had urged
Frere to proclaim the PPA before Parliament met, because that body reluctantly
would veto a law already effected. The people then would have to suffer the
90consequences of a policy which they did not originate or sanction. The major­
ity of the Assembly, declared Thomas Fuller, believed that this unwarranted 
PPA application was dictatorial and unconstitutional, because no emergency had 
arisen. The Government had spent a large amount of funds unauthorized by Par­
liament and had assumed a policy which required great consideration by the 
legislature?^*
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Cecil Rhodes, on ;\pril 19, in his first speech in the Cape Parliament,
condemned the PPA but nevertheless supported the Prime Minister* He argued
that the PPA was unjust and that its enactment would cause war, because B isuto
laborers at the diamond fields planned to forcibly resist the act. The member
compared the situation to the Sepoy Mutiny, in which greased cartridges imme—
92
diately caused the outbreak. The loyal Basutos, asserted Bhodes, were purpose- 
93
ly out of turn disarmed of guns valued as modern status symbols. He warned of
wasting millions in toying with serious native problems and objected to sub-
94jection of natives to the vacillation of successive Cape Governments. The
member drew praise from the Assembly by criticizing the Sprigg policy of not
95warning in advance the natives of new laws such as the PPA. There seemed
little in the PPA concerned with the Basuto right to defend themselves against
the Orange Free Stats. Officials, said Rhodes, would realize soon that better-
armed natives injured each other less while they defended themselves better
against Boer and Portuguese marauders. He praised the Sprigg Government,
96
however, for its work in preventing guns from reaching natives. Despite other 
members charging the Prime Minister with slavish humiliation to the Basutos, 
Rhodes supported the Sprigg gestures if they meant to preserve peace. The
91The3l, South Africa, XI, 59.
92
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93Sir Thomas E. Fuller, Cecil _J. Rhodes (London: Longmans Green and Co., 
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tribe, by rejecting such accommodation, would show its desire to fight.
Stuart Cloete believes that Rhodes was motivated to gamble the labor sup­
ply in his diamond fields against the certainty of war. Rhodes then would 
magnify the danger from natives armed with guns and later would start a con­
flict in which he could escape blame for massacring spear-carrying natives
with well-armed troops. He would be able afterwards to consolidate the terri-
98
tory north of the Limpopo River for himself.
After three weeks of debate, the Capa Parliament, by a 37-28 vote, ap-
99
proved the application of the PPA to Basutoland, thus supporting the Prime 
Minister, who had already hurriedly effected the PPA application as a result 
of his pa3t experience with natives and because the situation needed immediate 
attention.
THE FRENCH MISSIONARIES OPPOSE THE DISARMAMENT POLICY
Cecil Rhodes was not alone in facing impugnation of his position. William 
Greswell reflected in 1885 on the circumstance of the Paris Evangelical So- 
ciety^in its favorite locale, Basutoland. It was difficult for a missionary
97Vindex, Cecil Rhodes, pp. 33-35; Millin, Rhodes, p. 221.
98
Stuart Cloete, Against These Three (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 
1945), p. 263.
□ g
, (1881), LXVI, 207-08, ltr. Griffith to Ayliffe, July 14, 18B0.
^^Paris Evangelical Society (frequently referred to in the following 
text as PE5): The order entered 3asutoland in 1833 it the request of Moshesh, 
but six years elapsed before the first baptism occurred. Intertribal warfare 
halted the beginning of a formal church until 1860. In 1866, the victorious 
Free State expelled the mission from Basutoland for abetting the Basutos, but 
the British allowed it to return in 1868. By 1871, 1,831 natives had conver­
ted, and from the next year the Government cooperated with the mission to
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in a foreign land to preach only abstract religious dogma; usually, he advised 
the native leader nearby, who sought him as a confidential adviser, especially 
on external affairs. Missionaries who held political power presented a novel 
and confusing problem. Their guiding principle was self-protection, as their 
safety depended on their toleration by the natives. Basutos, however, were 
generally unresponsive to preaching^^
With its influence, the PES in 1879 and 1880 condemned before the Colo­
nial Office the ''reckless" disarmament policy being pursued on the frontiers 
of Cape Colony. The Government, indicated the community, was making no dis­
tinction between loyal and hostile tribes, although a previous Basuto Chief 
Magistrate had said that the PPA would apply to only rebel tribes. One mis­
sionary wrote Kimberley that the Basutos since February, 1879, had felt shocked
and unhappy at the prospect of disarmament, because guns cost the natives much 
102money. The society alleged that the governor had issued no PPA proclamation
103
for Basutoland, thus making the disarmament illegal. Now only by terrifying
the natives with armed force or allowing them to become demoralized could Cape
104Colony maintain order. The prestige of the British Government was at stake,
105
and the PES feared its own position compromised by the PPA. The PPA shocked
educate the tribe; thus, the church expanded rapidly, R. K. Orchard, The High 
Commission Territories of South Africa (London: World Dominion Press, 1951),
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the native sense of justice ana was premature, and compensation for confiscated 
Basuto guns and assegais arrived slowly. Delays caused the natives to mistrust 
the Government^^ut, educated to loyalty, they did not contemplate hostilities.
Though the Basutos feared disarmament like other tribes, the PES nevertheless
. 107
had urged them to disarm before the PPA reached them.
The Colonial Office replied that Sir Bartle Frere had taken great care to
disarm the Basutos. The society, remarked Secretary Hicks-Beach, misunderstood 
the policy adopted for the security of both Europeans and blacks in Cape Colony.
The PPA was not intended to punish disloyalty and provided for the award of
- . . .  108 
fair compensation.
Abolphe Mabille was the most vociferous PES critic of the PPA and defender
of French mission activities. He was on his way to France when he read a
Sprigg speech extremely hostile to the French mission. Mabille reported that
Chief Magistrate Griffith had once praised French care for the religious and
secular needs of the Basutos and had hoped that Mabille could explain the PPA
to the tribe and advise Letsie. The missionaries, insisted Mabille, alone
taught the law to the blacks, who all other Europeans allegedly despised. The
pastor told Letsie that, as chief, he possessed definite rights as a British
subject and that he could petition or send a delegation to protest the PPA.
Mabille did not oppose the PPA but favored a prohibitive gun tax which, he
109argued, would accomplish disarmament within six to eight years. However, ha
^^B>5>P.», (1880), LI, 553, ltr. Chesson to Colonial Office, May 14, 1879.
P_., (1881), LXVI, 702, 704, ltr. PES to Kimberley, December 9, 1880,
108B.S.JP., (X6S0), LI, 552, ltr. Colonial Office to APS, April 17, 1879. 
109
_8.l5.iP., (1081), LXVI, 169-70, ltr. Mabille to 5prigg, June 22, 1880.
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supposedly exhorted the natives not to refuse the PPA or fight the Government, 
warning that resistance would cause their dispersion. Mabille considered 
warnings of the PPA to the Basutos as weak and juvenile and asserted that all 
the magistrates, traders, and missionaries in Basutoland opposed the PPA, des­
pite the intransigence of the Sprigg ministry. Ironically, pagan tribesmen 
accused Mabille of assisting the PPA, while the Christians defended him. He 
thought that his society, though blamed for meddling, had a right to express 
political opinions'!'^ The rapid application of the PPA before parliamentary 
consideration of the Basuto petitions alarmed Mabille. The tribe, now calmed
in belief that their supplications would receive contemplation^would become
112deeply discontented, according to Letsie.
The pastor, furthermore, in his tirade against Prime Minister Sprigg, 
accused Sir Gordon of purposely silencing Cape parliamentary opposition, ig­
noring Basuto rights, discouraging petitions or a delegation, and instead ru­
ling the tribe tyrannically. The evangelist warned that Sprigg, desiring a 
Basuto rebellion in order to confiscate native land, alone was responsible for
consequent Basuto actions. Liberality to and proper means of redress for the
113
tribe, Mabille said, could have stabilized European influence.
Mabille, moreover, raised the constitutional question of the right of 
Cape Colony to legislate for Basutoland, whose inhabitants, he thought, had 
not consented to colonial rule or known of it until 1879 when Letsie viewed
■^^Smith, The Mabilles of Basutoland, pp. 250-51, 245, 254.
» (1881), LXVI, 261, ltr. Griffith to Sprigg, April 4, 1880.
^ ^ Ibid., 223, ltr. Mabille to Frere.
113
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the documents. Smith surprisingly argues that Mr. Herbert, permanent British 
Undersecretary at the Colonial Office, admitted to Mabille that Basutoland 
never was transferred officially or publicly to colonial jurisdiction^^ The 
Cape Parliament, declared Governor Frere, enacted all the laws for Basutoland, 
the High Commissioner had no authority there, and Letsie knew that Griffith 
received instructions from the colonial Secretary for Native Affairs'}^
Adolphe Mabille, in his efforts, received initial succor from his supe­
rior but alienated the Cape Government. Sprigg told Griffith that a delay in 
printing the PPA would hurt the Government efforts. The pastor refused to 
print the PPA on the mission press as ha had all other Government documents 
relating to Basutoland, yet he contended that Griffith thanked him for past 
assistance and for valuable service among the Sasutas^^ The Chief Magistrate, 
in reality, fumed at the Mabille refusal, reproached the PES, and complained
to the Government, which inquired if the views of the evangelist reflected the
117
total french community feeling in Basutoland. As the Chief Magistrate could
not dissuade Mabille, officials printed the act at Bloemfontein, Orange Free 
118
State. Sprigg believed that Mabille had insulted the Government by refusing
119to translate and print the PPA, allowing the gloating Boers the duties. The 
PES severely offended the colony by printing only Government documents which
114
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agreed with the views of the mission; therefore, the Government sent its own
press to Basutoland^^ L. Duvoisin, the chairman of the PES, confirmed and
approved the actions of Mabille and feared that the Basutos might think that
121Mabille was aiding the "obnoxious and subversive” PPA. A PES conference at 
122Morija, nonetheless, advised Mabille to leave the country, ostensibly for a 
vacation, but more likely in order to assure his escape from Government chas­
tisement^^
More general condemnation of the PES followed. Secretary for Native Af­
fairs Ayliffe castigated the society for not supporting the Government. The 
PES knew that Cape Colony spent funds to administer Basuto laws, to protect 
and improve native life, and to support missionaries who did not unsettle the
natives. The French mission by not instructing natives to obey the law caused
124danger and much delay in recovery of arms. Cecil Headlam, a modern historian,
125alleges that the French mission urged the Basutos to keep their guns, and, al­
legedly, these missionaries gave Basutos superior arms so that chiefs would 
126heed the PES. The mission, said Frere, also opposed colonial administration
127
and did the most to stir British and Basuto public opinion against the PPA.
The society considered its members above the law, and Mabille traveled to
1 2 0B-5.P.t (1881), LXVI, 247-48, ltr. Bright to Griffith, May 7, 1880.
121
Ibid., 247, ltr. L. Duvoisin to Griffith, April 10, 1880.
122Morija: French Protestant missionaries in Basutoland used this town as 
thair headquarters. Founded in 1833, it3-name derives from the Biblical 
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Europe to raise money for Basuto dissidents.
Frere graphically exposed the Cape parliamentary Opposition and the omi-
nouss ignorance of the PE5 position. He insisted that the vain Basutos depen-
129
ded too much on the PE5, which knew little of colonial laws. Mr. Cochet was
surprised to find the Basutos not under the personal direction of Queen Victoria
or the High Commissioner, and, according to Frere, he should have consulted
130
with advisers, not opponents, of the governor. Others presumed that the Chief
Magistrate ruled the Basutos. Residing in remote missions, the French had
131
little notion of the effects of political change. The PES also did not rea-
132lize the real reasons why the tribe wanted to retain guns. Espousing the PES
rationale, the Opposition blasted the Government through the prass to an ex-
133
cited colonial populace. 5ir Bartle observed that, "The amount of sedition 
preached by their £$asutgJT friends, from Saul Solomon at Sea Point up to the 
reverend Frenchmen on the skirts of the Drakensburg is enough to inflame a 
much less excitable population.” The blame for hostilities, warned the gover­
nor, would lie less with colonial ministers and Basuto3 than with the instiga­
tors of insurrection. Frere continued that the Government knew best how to 
handle natives, who must obey.
Sir Gordon 5prigg likewise understood as Frere. He charged with ’’infan- 
tilism" persons who disagreed with his policy and added,
1
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But there can be little doubt that if it had not been for the sympathy 
shown to the insurgent party by the Aborigines Protection Society and 
the British Parliament clique who were working with it, by the Cape 
Opposition, and lastly, by Lord Kimberley, there would been no
serious resistance to the disarmament, and no Basuto ’war.
G. Tylden, the "father" of Basuto historians, in defense of the PES,
thought it unjustified to think that these missionaries encouraged Basuto re- 
136sistance. John X. Merriman argued that the mission could not aid a tyrannized
137
population without incurring censure for spreading sedition.
The PES, in final appraisal, having already aggravated the adaptation to 
annexation, provoked the Basutos to ignore Cape Colony sovereignty. The so­
ciety, prone to exaggeration, spread sedition; its entire conduct was uncon­
scionable. The PE5 acted brazenly in opposing the PPA in order to protect its 
investment and influence the tribe. Though Cape Colony had assisted the PES 
in the past, the mission obstructed the law which it urged the natives to 
disobey. Treasonous society actions induced violence and nurtured rebellious­
ness; the mission suffered from acute tunnel vision not to see Basutos arming 
for war. Mabille misrepresented Europeans, especially officials, in Basuto­
land, and advised the tribe in the use of tainted legal procedures. Solomon 
and his cronies in Parliament undermined an essential and ticklish Government 
effort and together with the PES bolstered Basuto intransigence.
135
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CHAPTER III
THE THREATENING TEMPEST
THE BRITISH PARLIAMENT DEBATES THE PEACE PRESERVATION ACT
As ths crisis deepened, concern over the PPA intensified in and outside 
Basutoland. French mission arguments found concurrence among members of the 
British House of Commons as early as February, 1880. Joseph Chamberlain at 
that time denounced the ac^ and complained that Prime Minister 5prigg prema­
turely had told Chief Letsie that the Queen and British people desired Basuto 
2
disarmament. R. W. Fowler and Lyulph Stanley asked that London quickly in­
vestigate the PPA and said that Frere was too severe in ordering disarmament
of the Basutos, because these loyal and satisfied natives were vulnerable to
3
aggression by hostile Free State tribes. Griffith, said Sir Wilfrid Lawson 
months later, believed that the PPA would lead to war and might tend to en­
courage hostilities by other tribes. Mr. Grant Duff considered the PPA a 
serious error and believed that Cape Colony was ignoring British warnings and 
advice. Guns in native hands caused uneasiness, because Natal, he noted, had 
passed ten laws against native use or possession of guns, and the Orange Free 
State also maintained severe restrictions. The 500 whites in Basutoland jus­
tifiably felt uncomfortable among 128,000 blacks. Loyal Basutos, however, 
seeing white overlords everywhere armed, would naturally attempt to retain
^Smith, The Mabilles of Basutoland, p. 275.
^Hansard, 3rd ser., Vol. 250 (1880), 1195, Mr. Chamberlain speaking, 
February 23, 1880.
3
Hansard, 3rd ser., Vol. 252 (1880), 451, 453-54, Mr. Fowler and Mr. 




guns. The Earl of Belmore indicated that, though the Basutos must disarm just 
as their loyal neighbors in Natal, the selected time and procedure of - the PPA 
was regrettable”?
Mr. Donald Currie, in defense of the PPA, countered that Cape Colony only 
protected itself by initiating a plan on the frontier which it thought neces# 
sary and that the Basutos could not claim an exemption from disarmament. Bri­
tain, he continued, must reinforce responsible government at Cape Town and not 
interfere with the PPA, because a majority in the Cape Parliament supported 
the measure. Sir George Balfour added that disarmament prevented war and that 
numerous factors induced the natives to accept the PPA^
Prime Minister William Gladstone, moreovar, declared that the PPA appli­
cation had progressed toe far for the Home Government whan first in office to 
consider it. He thought that the act did not forcibly deprive natives of guns 
but ended the practice of habitually carrying weapons. Similar to the English 
act of disarmament, tha PPA seemed conducive to the peace and prosperity of 
Basutoland and did not imply tribal disloyalty. Britain, furthermore, had pre­
viously urged disarmament in all Cape territory? and the Liberal Government
could not interfere with Home Rule in a colony when Gladstone was about to
8
propose the same rule for Ireland.
Members of the British Parliament opposed to the PPA, in conclusion, did
^Hansard, 3rd ser., Vol. 257 (1881), 1068, 1084-86, Sir Wilfrid Lawson 
and Mr. Grant Duff speaking, January 20, 1881.
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not understand the true Basuto turbulence, because they had insufficient facts 
to judge well the circumstances, and they misrepresented colonial officials. 
Kimberley mistakenly made unofficial personal statements on the PPA at the same 
time that Prime Minister Gladstone decided that government policy would not 
interfere with the act.
HEIGHTENED BA5UTQ RESISTANCE TO DISARMAMENT
Controversy outside Basutoland did not equal the intensified response 
among the tribe. Adamant in his position and views, Chief Magistrate Griffith 
encouraged the tribe to employ constitutional means to reverse the PPA but con­
sidered it dangerous policy to allow Basutos to abuse these privileges which 
they did not understand. Government by magistrate would become stagnant if tha 
Basutos did not comply with the PPA because of their appeal to the British 
Parliament. The Chief Magistrate reported that the bewildered natives suspec­
ted the magistrates who enforced disarmament. Paradoxically, the natives re­
sisted disarmament, because they sow no stringfentAenforcement of the PPA. 
Tribesmen, who in the past had fled to magistrates for protection and advice,
now supported powerful chiefs who disobeyed the PPA. Colonel Griffith could
9not protect loyal natives and angrily said that the policy of moral force, 
which he unwillingly accepted as the method to govern Basutoland, had dissolved? 
The Chief Magistrate, nevertheless, obeyed his orders but deplored the strain 
on the Basutos and the loss of his admirable reputation among the natives ac-
93.S.P., (1881), LXVI, 249, ltr. Griffith to Bright, April 27, 1880.
De Kiewiet, The Imperial Factor, p. 267.
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quired during thirty-two years in the Queen’s serviced
Governor Frere, regarding his interpretation of the progression of the
PPA application, replied that it was Griffith who partly caused the negative
results of the PPA, because, though the Chief Magistrate protested that the
Cape Government gave him no security, actually he influenced the disarmament
date and effect. Cape Town promised the irate Griffith a leave of absence
after the Basuto crisis had ended. Future plans, indicated Frere, also called
for a commission on Basutoland to impress the Cape Parliament by dealing with
discontented natives, forfeited land, overcrowding, and by ascertaining what
12was actually traditional or merely feigned as traditional by the tribe. Sir 
Bartle ordered the Basuto police not to provoke incidents by seizing guns un­
less by Government commanci^and urged the issuance of gun licenses to trusted 
14natives.
The discordant Chief Masupha, during colonial alarm, began outright diso­
bedience. Fingo Chief Mpoba had collected all the guns in his village for 
relinquishment. Masupha dispatched 300-400 men who surprised the hamlet on 
the morning these Fingos were to surrender their weapons. A son of Masupha 
led the marauders and bullied a meeting of neighborhood natives into not sur­
rendering their guns until the Cape Government answered the Basuto petitions. 
Magistrate Charles Harland Bell of Leribe District scolded Masupha for calling 
an armed meeting of.his own clan without authorization; the chief answered 
disrespectfully and tried to justify the gathering. It was not unlike Masupha
11]0.5L.P., (1801), LXVI, 229-30, ltr. Griffith to Bright, January 26, 1880. 
12
Ibid., 195-97, ltr. Frere on Griffith dispatches, July 6 and 7, 1890.
13
Ibid., 187, ltr. Frere to Kimberley, July 20, 1880.
14
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to frighten natives and disobey his magistrate while the country was unstable.
He thought that by distracting the Government he could regain his waning power.
15Magistrate Bell asked Griffith to reprimand Masupha, who also had obstructed 
collection of ths hut tax ^
Colonel Griffith, in further Government reprobation, accused Masupha of 
misconstruing the role of a chief under the Cape Government; a chief had to ob­
tain permission to hold an armed assembly. Chief Masupha, who had fabricated 
reasons for refusing disarmament and had intimidated tribesmen, incurred res­
ponsibility for future troubled Undersecretary Bright considered it foolhardy
JL8to allow Masupha to carry arms. He accused the chief of fomenting violence and
threatened to arrest him if he again dispatched an armed force without autho-
19rization, because chiefs inciting rebellion were subject to deposition. Sprigg
20stopped Government allowances to Masupha in abeyance of improved conduct, and
21Letsie scolded his half-brother and told him to apologize.
Prime Minister Sprigg, acting against Basuto truculence, remarked that the
22tribe understood the new July deadline for the PPA. He thought that Letsie
promoted dangerous delay by insistently using every constitutional means to
stop the PPA. Sir Gordon informed Letsie that the C3pe Parliament had sanc-
23tioned the PPA and that the chief was listening to misguiding counsel. Sprigg
~^Ibid., 231-32, ltr. Bell to Griffith, February 3, 1880.
3.6
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17
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18
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announced that his ministry would enforce the PPA, and he gave Griffith the
right to ask for primed military forces to support the Government and loyal
24Basutos against the chiefs.
25
Chief Magistrate Charles Brownlee in Griqualand Cast District (Infra, map,
p. 230 , PI. XVI ), commenting on his convictions and on agitation in other
areas, reported that Basuto agents arrived in his district to muster support
26to resist the PPA. He believed that Masupha ddv.ised Letsie, who, in April, 
1880, had sent two envoys to other tribes, who all gave adherence to the dis­
sident Basuto stand on disarmament. Basuto Chiefs Sofonia and George had 
disarmed, but most chiefs and the majority of the tribe at least disliked the 
PPA. Compensation of less than half the value of a gun nurtured native anger. 
Brownlee thought that the PPA, if enforceable, was the best method to obtain
peace; still, Cape Colony until then had disarmed only loyal tribes like the
27
Gaikas, who voluntarily had abandoned their rebel chiefs, and the Fingos.
Magistrate John Austen, moreover, in still-turbulent Quthing District, 
reported that all chiefs in his area except the Tembu Chief Tyali had offered
23
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24
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to surrender their guns, but they feared the warlike in the district* While 
they asked if they might register and retain their guns to protect their live­
stock, Tyali insisted that he kept guns of Chief Letsie by his order, and he
28
would not surrender the arms without his permission. The colonial Secretary
for Native Affairs requested Austen to investigate Tyali and to gather evi-
29dence to convict the chief of treachery in the Morosi Rebellion* Letsie re­
ceived consent for a pitso on March 12 in order to inform natives in Quthing 
30
of his feelings. E. Ayliff, acting magistrate at Quthing, had registered and
returned guns to loyal natives, because Griffith had warned Austen of danger,
31
but Undersecretary Bright then ordered Ayliff to stop returning guns. The Home 
Government did not want natives armed in Quthing, because colonial troops would 
protect thenu^
To illustrate how well colonial officials informed Letsie and other
anxious Basutos to no avail about the PPA, Assistant Magistrate Davies of
Thaba Bosigo District gave chiefs and headmen in his area copies of the PPA in
Sesuto and held a meeting at the village of Letsie to discuss the act. Basuto
33
tribesmen anxiously attended. The recalcitrant Lerothodi excused himself but 
sent a delegate, and most other chiefs attended. Magistrate Arthur Barkly, 
convening the meeting on April 20, 1880, recalled the motives for disarmament
, (1881), LXVI, 238, ltr. Austen to Griffith, March 3, 1880.
^ I b i d ., 241-42, ltr. Bright to Griffith, April 3, 1880; Chief Tyali had 
planned to attack in the rear the first colonial forces that crossed the Telle 
River, then assault the troop camp at Palmietfontein, Ibid., 239, Mofetudi to 
Austen.
30
Ibid., 259, ltr. Griffith to 5prigg, February 28, 1880.
^ I b i d ,, 241, ltr. Bright to Griffith, April 29, 1880.
^ Ibid.. 241, ltr. Bright to Griffith, March 31, 1880.
"^Ibid., 250, ltr. Davies to Griffith, April 23, 1880.
60
and said that the Queen would not likely interfere in the matter. Barkly read 
and explained the PPA, for which he offered no hope of alteration or revoca­
tion. He did not sway the natives, who accepted volatile suggestions from 
dissidents and stalled3^
Some magistrates, moreover, offered explanations for native hesitancy 
about the PPA. Bell considered moral force useless in his circumstances. 
Several loyal Basutos asked him at Berea village what protection the Govern­
ment would offer them if their chiefs abused them. Tribesmen would obey the 
PPA if Cape Colony used more than moral force to protect them. Natives, who 
rather would risk loss of compensation than risk being "eaten up,n henceforth 
waited for orders from a chief to surrender guns, and several natives asked
to retain their guns until Chief Letsie, the only visible authority, acted.
35
Masupha resisted, and some neighboring headmen followed his example. Magis­
trate William Henry Surmon of Cornet Sprui^District held a native meeting on
April 20 to explain the PPA. He acquired the impression that all would follow
37Letsie, who would wait to act until the delegation returned from Cape Town.
Chief Letsie thought that all loyal natives would simultaneously disarm with
38him and that a divided tribe could not function. Basutos, believed Barkly, 
disliked the PPA just as much as their chiefs did, though people would have 
surrendered guns if the chiefs had not gained back some of their old power 
over the tribe.
Magistrate Barkly, noting the hesitancy quickening into native turbulence,
3 ^Ibid., 251-52, ltr. Barkly to Griffith, April 26, 1880.
3 5 Ibid.. 253, ltr* Bell to Griffith, April 29, 1880.
36Spruit: a small river, dry for periods, then subject to sudden floods.
3 73.S.P., (1081), LXVI, 254, ltr. Surmon to Griffith, April 30, 1800.
38
5mith, The Mabilles of Basutoland, p. 261.
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supported a delay in the PPA. Chief Lerothodi loved warfare and refused to
give up his arms. When Barkly called another pitso to investigate strife in
the Mafeteng area, Lerothodi led hundreds of charging mounted natives all
39screaming war crias into Mafeteng town. Nearby chiefs insisted Uiat Basuto
40
servants of Barkly quit their jobs.
Regarding the tribal debate over the PPA at the July 3 pitso of Letsie at 
41
Thaba Bosigo, Mphoma, reflecting the attitude of the wary, asked Griffith to
intercede on behalf of the tribe against the PPA, and Ramatseatsana wanted
someone to travel to England to make representation against the act. Lerothodi
reiterated that Basutos had not sought to unite with Natal because of the gun
laws there and that by tradition Basutos chorished their arms. Khomaleburn
suggested the pitso vote on the PPA just as the Cape Parliament, and Mama
Letsie voiced anger, because the Basuto delegation had not been allowed to
speak in Parliament. Mapeshoane never heard of a tribe becoming prosperous
after disarmament, and Letsumi superstitiously contended that guns must embody
some odious aura. Masupha argued that natives could desert a chief who acted
unjustly and that 5prigg had promised him that Basutos could surrender their
arms when they felt ready. Conversely, the Basuto delegation to Cape Town,
42
echoing different sentiments, advised disarming. Chief Jonathan Molappo sur-
39
Mafeteng: the name of this district headquarters in southwest Basuto­
land means place of unmarried women, Rosenthal, ed., Encyclopedia, p. 310.
40
Barkly, Among Boers and Basutos, pp. 143-44.
41
Thaba Bosigo: a great fortified mountain and an object of Basuto pil­
grimages, because French-Swiss missionaries had buried Moshesh here, Poultney 
3igelow, Pt. V, "The Last of a Great Black Nation,” Harperfs New Monthly Maga­
zine , Dec. 1896-May, 1897', p. 634.
42
j-L'A-Ji-Ii*.§.•» P* 189. Jonathan Molappo: Successor to his father Molappo 
in 1880, Jonathan aided Natal in 1873 against Langalibalele and helped capture 
him. He served with Cape Colony against Morosi and in the Basuto Rebellion. 
Frequently fighting his brother Joel, Jonathan periodically fled to the Orange 
Free State but was ultimately victorious.
rendered his guns as his father had instructed and followed Letsie, because the 
latter was the paramount Chief, and because peace had brought prosperity. 
5ofonia Moshesh reminded his fellows that guns had not helped to fight the 
Boers, Tsekelo Moshesh rebuked the treasonous talk of others and said that 
the tribe had exhausted every legal means of redress. Letsie told his people 
to disarm if they still followed him and asked for a document promising the 
tribe the same quality of life after disarmament. The Queen, replied Griffith, 
unfortunately had seen bloodshed in other armed tribes, such as the Zulus and 
Galekas, tribes crushed because they held guns; therefore, he accepted respon­
sibility for future harm done to the disarmed tribe. He, however, noted that
the Basutos cleverly concealed their feelings when expressing themselves and
43that the tribe opposed giving up weapons and did not intend to.
i
Lagden, in further contemplation of Basuto behavior, suggests that per­
haps the tribesmen honestly could not understand constitutional alterations 
which superseded promises made in the past, Letsie, however, so perfidiously 
conducted himself that the Government trusted him while he encouraged resis­
tance to the PPA. His treachery so disoriented the tribe that numerous loyal
' 44
natives surrendered their guns without his permission. The confusion of other
Basutos turned to anger, and the subsequent demoralization in Basutoland ne-
45
cessitated the use of troops.
Basutoland, said Griffith, also suffered from external threats. Some 
white agitators against the PPA, one a correspondent for the Cape Argus, slinked
43B.5.P., (1881), LXVI, 207-13, ltr. Griffith to Bright, July 14, 1880; 
cf., Theal, South Africa, XI, 59; Ibid., 186, ltr. Griffith to Sprigg, June 
29, 18B0.
44
Lagden, The Basutos, II, 509, 511.
45
De Kiewiet, ^he Imperial Factor, pp. 266-67.
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46 47into Basutoland. Gunrunners from surrounding areas flocked to the country,
48
and all gun traders actively opposed the PPA. Griffith complained that Free
State burghers freely sold guns and ammunition to the Basutos and rumored that
49
Cape Colony could not muster an army. Orange Free State law, replied Johannes 
Brand, president of that country, forbade selling arms and ammunition to a na­
tive without a special order from the president, and he promised to prosecute 
transgressors of this law^
The Basutos, to be sure, clearly conceived the PPA and realized that Grif­
fith had appealed their case to the limit and that they had lost their appeal. 
Moral force was worthless in enforcement, as some natives would not voluntarily 
disarm; thus, dissidents gathered allies. Weak Letsie countenanced rebellion 
and deceived his own tribe into mistrusting the Government. Lerothodi was on 
the verge of rebellion, and Masupha ignored fair warning for his misbehavior. 
One cannot blame Basutos for disbelieving that the Sprigg ministry would pro­
tect them after disarmament, because the Cape Government' could not assist them 
during this period. Magistrates rightly suggested that loyal natives retain 
guns. Colonial troops might have entered the country by July, 1880, at the re­
quest of Griffith, to demonstrate tapchiefs and tribesmen the will and ability 
of Cape Colony to enforce the PPA. Frere might have acted more decisively, 
and a commission to investigate tribal unrest should have inspected Basutoland 
before the PPA application. Colonial officials did not make known the alar­
ming events soon enough, especially to the British Parliament.
46 ^
J3.S..P., (1881), LXVI, 258, ltr. Griffith to 5prigg, January 26, 1880.
47
Tylden, The Rise of the Basuto. p. 137.
4B
> (1880), LI, 591, ltr. Frere to Hicks-Beach, April 15, 1880.
49
B.5a P., (1881), LXVI, 221, ltr. Griffith to Sprigg, August 7, 1880.
50Ibid., 265, ltr. President Johannes Brand to Frere.
0A5UTQ MILITIA AND POLICE
64
ThB agitation by dissident Basutos called attention to the inadequate pro­
tection given loyal natives and colonial officials in Basutoland. The 1877
annexation of the Transvaal to the British Empire had caused the too thin de-
51ployment of the already inadequate South African Imperial garrisons. Governor
Frere later alleged that London was purposely maintaining only enough soldiers
in Cape Colony to defend Cape Town, Simons Bay, and Table Bay. As British
troops would not aid in frontier defense, it was more imperative to disarm the 
52
Basutos. Sir George Grey instead regretted that, whenever war began between 
colonists and natives, it was almost impossible to exclude British troops from 
the fighting^
Various notions, therefore, unfolded for an effective Bssuto defense
54force. Prime Minister Gladstone supported the initiation of a Basuto militia,
and Kimberley agreed that a native force would demonstrate colonial trust for
55the Basutos and colonial protection for native land. ihe Earl of Belmore en­
visioned a Basuto yeomanry to accustom the tribe to regard the ownership of 
guns as a privilege allowed only to the militia which was raised to defend its 
environs. The Cape Parliament might sanction the operation, after which this 
yeomanry might help colonial troops maintain order^ 5prigg, at the 1879 pitso,
51
Tylden, The Rise of the Basuto, p. 129.
52
Frere, ’’The Basutos . . .  Cape 6f Good Hope,” pp. 185-86, 188.
53
Grey, ’’South Africa,” p. 936.
54
Hansard, 3rd ser., Vol. 252 (1880), 458, Mr. Gladstone speaking, May 
25, 1880.
^ I b i d ., 645, Mr. Grant Duff speaking, May 28, 1880.
5^Hansard, 3rd ser., Vol. 259 (1881), 1790-91, The Earl of Belmore spea­
king, March 24, 1881.
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57had offered his idea for a native militia. He announced that Basutos could
serve the Cape Government in a militia but would have to surrender their own 
58
guns. Frere authorized Griffith to license, arm, and equip a Basuto militia.
The existing Basuto enforcement agency, the police force, exhibited a
59dismal image, and the governor ordered the number of police increased. The
police numbered 111 men, of which the officers were sons of chiefs, and the
magistrate of each district raised one contingent. Magistrate Bell in 1873 had
alleged that the police were submissive to the chiefs^and another official in
1874 had advised against arming Basuto police with breechloaders or Snider
rifles from the magistracies, because disloyal chiefs easily could steal these
gunsf^ Bell in June, I860, complained that his police were only partially
equipped with guns and ammunition, that some of the guns were damaged, and that
62his force was not in readiness. Magistrate Surmon had no Snider ammunition
63
for his police and urgently asked for same. Griffith never warned Governor 
Frere of the inferior condition of the police until Sir Bartle asked the Chief 
Magistrate to acknowledge arms needs, destinations for police arms shipments, 
and conditions of police weapons in all Basutoland districts. Frere ordered 
the police to block interference with Government officials and traders or Ba­
sutos who surrendered arms^
, (1880), LI, 565, ltr. Bright, February 26, 1880.
, (1881), LXVI, 161-62, ltr. Sprigg, April 9, 1880.
59Ibid., 187, ltr. Frere to Ministers.
.^Tylden, The Rise of the Basuto, p. 232.
^Theal, South Africa, XI, 54.
62J3LS.FL , (1881), LXVI, 193, ltr. Bell to Griffith, June 12, 1800.
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A native militia, after all, was complimentary, but militiamen and police­
men had to prove their reliability. The tribe then would perceive guns in 
their proper perspective. Though Griffith previously might have adequately 
equipped and strengthened the police, it might have been unwilling to enforce 
the PPA.
CHAPTER IV
THE BASUTO CIVIL WAR
CAUSES OF THE CIVIL WAR AND LATER REBELLION
The causes of the Basuto struggle stemmed from accumulated tribal opposi­
tion to European rule and influence and reaction to adverse situations for 
which the tribe held Europeans responsible. Governor Frere desired to enforce 
the British land tenure system in Basutoland, thus, lessening the power of 
hereditary chiefs and, contrary to their wishes, making it possible for indi­
viduals to buy and receive title to land. After the suppression of tribal 
land communism, whites and blacks were to live together with equal rights and 
opportunities for social and political success!’ A British law passed in 1880 
recognized individual rights of property in Basutoland. Thus, each tribesman 
owned the property upon which his house and kraa? stood?
Sir Bartle and others offered additional reasons for the rebelliousness 
of the Basuto chiefs. While the Cape Government, for the benefit of the en­
tire tribal group, was slowly limiting the power of clan chiefs , Chiefs Masupha,
Ramanslla, and Joel were, in fact, becoming more unruly under restraints
4
placed on them by the magistrates. The chiefs for many years had thought that 
European magistrates and European law undermined them. Chief Sofonia believed 
that Basutos must obey colonial laws and that, as witchcraft and superstition
^Frere, *'The Basutos . . .  Cape of Good Hope,1' pp. 195-96.
2
Kraal: A South African Bantu village with enclosures for livestock, 
Rosenthal, ed., Encyclopedia, p. 279.
3B.,5.£., (1881), LXVI, 174, Cape Argus reporting on Mr. Qrpen speaking in 
the June 30, 1880, House Assembly session.
4
Theal, South Africa. XI, 54.
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5were obnoxious influences, the chiefs would soon be superfluous. Masupha led 
the reactionary party favoring independence and expulsion of whites from Basu­
toland and supporting the right to raid for cattle^ which was a major source 
of wealth to B&sutos. Before 1868, natives acquired cattle by tribal warfare, 
cattle raids, and outright looting. The chiefs took all booty, kept some cat­
tle for themselves, and distributed the remainder to the leaders of the raid 
7and others. These dissident Basutos used European plows and guns but refused
to accept British social or political institutions. Discordant chiefs ruled
absolutely, confiscated cattle from opponents, and consigned wives and chil-
8
dren of their adversaries to slavery in their kraals. Rebellious Basutos wan­
ted no magistrate or hut tax. The chiefs and their close comrades, declared
Magistrate Barkly, always had opposed colonial rule but never had won the
9
people to support : the?n until the disarmament issue.
An internal factor which sharpened hostility to Cape Colony rule was 
tribal dissension caused by resentment within the ruling family of the tribe. 
There were three branches in the family of Chief Moshesh (Infra, p. 239 ♦ PI.
XXV ). The first and foremost branch consisted of, among others, Chiefs Let- 
sie, Masupha, Lerothodi, Alexander Letsie, Bereng Letsie, and Mama Letsie. A 
second part of the family exerted little influence over the tribe. The third 
branch included Chiefs Jonathan, Joel, Nehemiah, Putsane, Sofonia, George, 
and Tsekelo. The entire first branch was disaffected from the others, although
5Greswell, Our South African Empire, II, 78-79.
g
Frere, "The Basutos . . .  Cape of Good Hope," p. 180.
^Ashton, The Basuto, p. 172.
0 Q
Frere, "The Basutos . . . Cape of Good Hope,” p. 195*
g
Barkly, Among Boers and Basutos, p . 148.
Paramount Chief Letsie allied himself ostensibly with the third group, most of 
whom were Loyalists* His brothers jealously feared that his desertion would 
establish primacy for the third branch of the family^ According to Stevens, 
several chiefs sought to gain independence from supreme tribal authority by 
starting a civil warl^
One member of the British House of Commons, speaking in reference to 
other reasons for anti-European belligerency, supported the theory that the 
tribe had rebelled because of an unresolved and legitimate grievance* Grif­
fith, he said, warned to no avail that, although complaints included the ap­
propriation of 112,500 in Basuto tax revenues, the attempted confiscation of 
Quthing, and the doubling of the hut tax, it was the PPA which actually ignited 
the outbreak. Basuto hostilities, contended another member, resulted from the 
protective reaction borne out of the fear that the tribe would undergo mili­
tary conquest as had been the case with the Zulus^ V" O ?
The Cape Colony annexation of Basutoland, in reflection, had invalidated 
the Napier proclamation concerning tribal land (Supra, p. 5, n. 23), and the 
Government should have installed to paramountcy the champions of Europeaniza­
tion in the third branch as soon as the first branch became seditious.
Major reasons for the Basuto Civil War and Rebellion, in summation, in­
cluded the erosion of chiefly power under the influence of European law, the 
imposition of magistrates, the forced halt to cattle raiding, the dissident 
desire for independence and explusion of all whites, the royal family quarrel,
.S_,JP., (1881), LXVI, 306, Cape Times, August 25, 1880; cf., Vindex, 
Cecil Rhodes, p. 46.
^Stevens, Lesotho. etc*, p. 27.
"^ Hansard, 3rd ser., Vol. 257 (1881), 1066-67, Sir Wilfrid Lawson and Mr. 
Fowler speaking, January 20, 1881; Molteno, Molteno, II, 424.
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and the effects of the Zulu campaign. Minor causes were the opposition to the 
hut tax, land hunger, drought, non-receipt of Quthing, colonial supervision of 
the Basuto treasury, chiefly opposition to native labor in the diamond fields 
and in other employment under whites, and incitement from French Protestant 
missionaries. A too rapid doubling of the hut tax, unfair compensation for 
guns, and confiscation of cherished assegais constituted the only valid Basuto 
grievances. Objection to the PPA was, as a whale, merely an eacuse and cata­
lyst for disaffection.
THE BASUTO CIVIL MAR, JUNE-SEPTEMBER 1880
In June, 1880, dissident Basuto elements took advantage of grievances to
initiate a bitter civil war in their country. Relatives assailed each other,
and family and clan quarrels erupted openly and violently. Basutos themselves
named the Loyalists Matiketa, the chosen people, and the rebels f'iabelete, the 
13wild people. Chief Magistrate Griffith reported that Loyalist chiefs were re-
14ceiving threats of punishment for supporting the Cape Government, and one loyal
15headman feared murder by his own clan. Heathens and Christians, declared As­
sistant Magistrate Davies, intended to attack his residency and murder all who 
had disarmed. Some Loyalists feared fleeing to Maseru, because they would 
thereby risk death as informers^ Rebels shot at other natives for no apparent
13
Smith, The Mabilles of Basutoland, p. 271.
^^•SLP.• , (1881), LXVI, 169, Itr. Griffith to Sprigg, n.d.j., r. June 25,
1BBU.
1 5 Ibid., 188, ltr. Griffith to Ayliffe, June 28, 1880.
^^Ibid., 172, ltr. Davies to Griffith, June 21, 1880.
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17reason.
G. Tylden;. asserts that, as civil affairs in Berea District deteriorated,
10the death of Loyalist Chief Molappo strengthened the rebels, as did the fact
that, locally, only natives working in Government service and those from the
19clan of Jonathan surrendered their weapons. Rebel Chief Joel, the second son
of Molappo, did not surrender his arms, and some natives under his brother
20Jonathan who would not disarm joined Masupha. As Jonathan and Joel began figh­
ting in Leribe District for paramountcy in their clan, Masupha arid Joel easily 
drove Loyalists out of the area and plundered homes. Most of the refugees fled
to Masaru and begged protection from Colonel Griffith, who obliged and forti- 
21fied the town.
Magistrate Bell, as the magistrates initially responded to this premedi­
tated rebel plotting, told of natives in the Berea and Leribe Districts plea­
ding for the return of their guns to protect themselves from a threatened at­
tack, but he refused the requests pending verification of the intimidation.
He promised to return guns to Chief Jonathan upon verification that Masupha in­
tended to kill this Loyalist chief, who considered himself the legitimate suc­
cessor to his deceased father. Chiefs meanwhile coerced tribesmen to disobey
22the PPA. Masupha had bought gunpowder, and his sons hoarded guns. He grazed
^ I b i d ., 175, Cape Argus reporting on Mr. Orpen speaking in the June 30,
1880, House Assembly session. 
18
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Tyldsn, The Rise of the Basuto, p. 142.
Theal, South Africa, XI, 60.
20
B.S^.P., (1881), LXVI, 271, ltr. Beli to Griffith, July 10, 1880.
21
Theal, South Africa, XI, 60; cf., Neil Orpen, Prince Alfredfs Guard 
1856-1966 (Cape Town: Books of Africa, Ltd., 1967), p. 27.
22a.5_.£., (1881), LXVI, 271, ltr. Bell to Griffith, July 10, 1880; Ibid.. 
184, ltr. Bell to Griffith, June 25, 1880.
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his cavalry horses in preparation for future comba^and planned to attiick the
Oerea magistracy and two Loyalist villages* The rebels, seeking to capture the
24surrendered guns at the magistracy, intended to face colonial troops. .Chiefs
Lerothodi, Moletsane, Putsane,- Joel, Khetise, Smith, and Chopo planned to join 
25
Masupha. Bell finally ordered £oyal Chief Matsla to remain armed temporarily
26in order to prevent Joel from intimidating others. Magistrate Surmon, however,
27was unable to safeguard Loyalists or to stifle dissidents in his district.
Magistrate Barkly, in addition, faced the stalwart defiance of Lerothodi,
who ordered the murder of tribesmen who gave up their guns, and who commanded
20the rebels to keep under their supervision guns in Loyalist villages. After 
Magistrate Barkly charged Lerothodi with transgression of the PPA, the chief 
answered seditiously, boldly challenged the Cape Government to wrest his guns, 
and ordered his clan to shoot policemen or Government officials who attempted 
to seize arms, Lerothodi did not want civil war, thought Barkly, but was de­
fying Cape Colony only to postpone the PPA, The magistrate told the Loyalists
29to rely on Government protection and condemned the menacing intimidation.
The sole Government official who acted decisively in the initial turmoil 
was Colonel Griffith. To protect whites and Loyalists until troops arrived, 
he requested the shipment of Snider carbines and ammunition to Maseru and asked
23
Ibid., 1B5, ltr. Lefuyane to Bell, June 25, 1880.
24
Ibid., 185, ltr. Umahasle to Bell, June 26, I860.
25
Ibid., 185, ltr. Lefuyane to Bell, June 25, 1880.
^ I b i d ., 271, ltr. Bell to Griffith, July 10, 1880.
27
Ibid., 191, ltr. Surmon to Griffith, June 24, 1880; Ibid.. 191, Mpusi 
before Surmon, June 24, 1880; Ibid.. 191-92, ltr. Surmon to Griffith, June 28, 
1880.
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Ibid., 190, Masinyane before Barkly, June 25, 1880.
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permission to muster 200 local whitest The Chief Magistrate housed refugees
from different parts of Thaba Bosigo District and some recently rearmed Fingos,
31
who had lost cattle to rebels. Rebels, related Griffith on July 20, were at-
32
tacking Loyalists in all districts.
Active among the rebel faction, meanwhile, some sons of the ineffectual
Letsie ambushed a cart full of surrendered guns belonging to their father.
33
After Letsie summoned two of his Loyalist sons to aid him, his rebel offspring
34
promised to kill anyone who attempted to surrender the guns. His sons Bereng,
Mama, his brother-in-law Ramanella, and numerous other truculent chiefs opposed
the PPA. Letsie then said that tribesmen would think him insincere if he gave 
35up his arms and, maintaining that he could not find anyone to transport his
36
weapons, only pretended to disarm and surrendered only three guns by July 13,
37one day after the PPA deadline. The Chief Magistrate admitted that trie autho­
rity of Letsie was gone and that the entire country was anarchic.
Energetic Masupha, offering outrageous excuses for his true intentions, 
planned to silently resist the PPA until either troops supported the magistrates
or the police searched for weapons, then, together with his forces, proposed to
30
rebel, plunder trading stares, and kill whites. Masupha, remarked natives,
^°Ibid., 103, ltr. Griffith to Ayliffe, June 29, 1880.
31Ibid., 198-99, Cape Argus reporting on Sprigg speaking in the July 24, 
1880, House Assembly session; Orpen, Prince Alfred*s Guard 1856-1966, p. 27.
32B.S.P., (1881), LXVI, 197, ltr. Brand to Sprigg, July 20, 1880.
*^Ibid., 206-07, Motemekoane Mchela before Maitin, July 8 , 1B8Q; cf., 
Orpen, Prince Alfred*s Guard 1856-1966, p. 27.
34
S.5.P., (1881), LXVI, 172, ltr. Griffith to Ayliffe, June 23, 1880.
35
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36Barkly, Among Boers and Basutos, p. 142.
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39purposely precipitated war involving the whole country. As this time seemed
to him the last opportunity to expel the whites, the chief planned to massacre
40
all Christian missionaries and magistrates. On the PPA deadline date, Magis­
trate Bell, who had received only 103 Basuto guns, sent his chief constable to 
remind Masupha of the deadline and the consequences for disobedience. The re­
bel whined that Cape Colony had not provided him enough time and that the tribe
was not accustomed to observe precise dates. Masupha kept armed retainers at
41
his village for protection against arrest and, though his efforts to retain
power for the chiefs had failed so far, held pitsos to encourage obedience to
the chiefs. Magistrate Bell described Masupha as arbitrary and whimsical, a
42man who disclaimed subordination to colonial authority.
Magistrate Surmon later in the summer desperately needed assistance for
himself and Loyalists in the similarly deteriorating predicament in Cornet 
. . 43
Spruit District. Loyalist Moshiangala in July attended a rebel pitso, where
several speakers criticized him for surrendering his guns, another assailed
him for inviting an Anglican missionary to the area without permission from
rebel Chief P'loletsane, and the assemblage prohibited this Loyalist from farming.
44Moshiangala upon his return home found that his clan had fled to the mountains.
Rebels "arrested" one native for giving up hi3 guns without permission from
45Chief Moletsane; some of the abductors wanted to kill him. Surmon reported
39
Ibid.. 189, ltr. Griffith to Ayliffe, June 29, 1880.
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46
further that rebels had waylaid some refugees and that local insurgents had
seized cattle and other property of Loyalists. The magistrate, desiring im—
47mediate protection, had few police to protect Loyalists who were flocking to
his station and wanted to enlist 30 European volunteers or secure 30 CMR from
48 .
Palmietfontein until large numbers of troops arrived. insurgents who guarded
the border in strength would not allow white messengers to pass. For Surmon
to move Loyalist cattle to the Free State without a skirmish was now impossible,
and, in August, he urgently requested the aicl^of 500 Fingos in order to pro-
50
tect Loyalists and his post. He reported that every chief in his district,
except those of the Baphutis, had joined the rebels, who sent their own women,
51
children, and cattle to refuges in the mountains.
Magistrate Barkly, also preparing for hostilities at his post, told coun-
52cilors of Letsie that he would defend himself if attacked. The outbreaks in
53
his district he thought only temporary and was optimistic. The magistrate had
fl
inadequate arms and ammunition but, with eight Europeans, sixteen native po­
lice, and some Loyalists, could repel at least one attack on his station. To
54
bolster his defenses, he called for the CMR, and Government officials alerted
46
Ibid., 283, ltr. Surmon to Griffith, July 26, 1880.
47 Ibid., 281, ltr. Surmon to Griffith, July 17, 1880.
48
Ibid., 200, ltr. Surmon to Sprigg, July 25, 1880.
49 Ibid., 217, ltr. Surmon to Sprigg, n.d., r. August 2, 1880.
50
Ibid., 307, Cape Times, September 1, 1880.
Ibid.t 299-300, ltr. Surmon, August 2, 1880.
52 Ibid., 199, Cape Argus reporting on Sprigg speaking in the July 24, 
1880, House Assembly session.
53 Ibid., 215, Cape Argus reporting on Sprigg speaking in the July 28, 
1S8Q, House Assembly session.
54
Ibid., 199, ltr. Barkly to Sprigg, July 24, 1880.
76
\
elements of the CMY. Barkly received new armaments and some Boer reinforce-
55 56
ments from Wepener, just across the border.
The colonial House Assembly, meanwhile deliberated on the Basuto civil 
strife. Prime Minister Sprigg considered a small armed incursion into Basuto­
land dangerous, as it might excite the numerous rebels or spell disaster, and 
without immediately sending troops into Basutoland, wanted both Lerothodi and 
Masupha arrested. While not wanting to unnecessarily alarm the Assembly, 5ir 
Gordon feared that he might have to spend funds for war before the next ses­
sion. Opposition member J. X. Merriman asked that House members be allowed 
to voice their opinions on the expenditure needed to crush a Basuto uprising, 
and Saul Solomon quickly requested assurance for a vote on funding for hosti­
lities^
The rebels all the while continued their hostile activities. Lerothodi,
soon to be a victim of a setback, harbored Loyalist cattle, and most natives
50
in Thaba Bosigo District sent their cattle to the mountains as he directed. 
Having promised to confer with his magistrate, drunken Lerothodi unsuccessfully 
asked the belligerent warriors filling his village to accompany him on his 
visit. Upon his arrival, he offered to hand back the Loyalist cattle only if 
Barkly returned guns to some rebels. Later, as malcontents did surround Mafa- 
teng, Lerothodi planned to attack the town, but most supporters deserted him.
A majority of the natives in 7haba Bosigo District opposed and fortified their
55Wepener: a town in the eastern Orange Free State named after Commandant 
Louw Wepener, who led the Boer attack on Thaba Bosigo in the War of 1865, 
Rosenthal, ed., Encyclopedia, p. 576.
- s
jB.S_.P., (18.81), LXVI, 199, ltr. Civil Commissioner Aliwal North to 
Sprigg, n.d., r. July 25, 1880.
57 Ibid.. 214-15, Cape Argus reporting on Sprigg speaking in the July 28, 
1880, House Assembly session.
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villages against the rebels. Lerothodi then begrudgingly gava up most of his
stolen cattle to Barkly, who distributed them to their owners and told Lero-
59thodi to disband his 150 warriors in order to satisfy the Government. Peace
would come, replied the chief, only if he could harm Loyalists^but he warned
Masupha that stealing cattle forced natives to the Government sidef^
Masupha and son3 of Letsie were the major agitators. Griffith appealed
to Masupha that women and children of rebel clans would suffer in a war and
offered the insurgent chief one last chance to return Loyalist property and
surrender guilty persons before formally declaring him a rebel liable for 
62punishment. Masupha, thereupon, seized cattle in Thaba Bosigo District, es-
63pecially from Basuto policemen. Colonel Griffith later acknowledged that
64Masupha, joined by rebel Baphuti remnants, would fight to the death. Letsie 
stopped an attack by his sons Alexander and Bereng on the Loyalists at Maseru 
village. Alexander, frustrated, announced his submission, but Masupha ordered 
him to kill more Loyalists. Chief Koadi Makhobalo, his village full of rebel 
spies, pledged himself to Masupha for safety. Bereng asked Koadi to help for­
tify Masitisi Mountain and attack George Moshesh; then Alexander requested 
Koadi to help oppose European troops about to cross the Little Caledon River 
(a false alarm)^According to Assistant Magistrate Davies, only a large force 
could manage the arrest of Bereng, who burned his court summons and did not
^ Ibid.. 277-78, ltr. Barkly to Griffith, July 25, 1880.
60Earkly, Among Boers and Basutos. p. 147.
^ " 4 3 . P^ ., (1881), LXVI, 272, Moleko before Maitin, July 22, 1880, 
62
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64 Ibid., 218, ltr. Griffith to Sprigg, August 1, 1880.
^^Ibid., 279-80, Koadi Makhobalo before Davies, July 27, 1880.
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66
appear to answer charges made by Griffith.
The Chief Magistrate, in the face of this stubbornness, issued orders in
July for the somewhat undependable Letsie to seize the cattle stolen by Bereng
67
and to arrest this son and other rebels who had molested Loyalists. Letsie 
only recovered the stolen cattlef^insisting that it was not the proper time to 
arrest Bereng and other r e b e l s T h e  chief, nevertheless, forced five rebel 
chiefs to reimburse Loyalists for damages, to restore all stolen property, and 
to remove sentinels from the border!^ Magistrate Surmon soon was able to re­
ceive armaments!^ Letsie also received orders to swiftly occupy Thaba Bosigo
and prevent the rebels from holding it; otherwise, Griffith would not guaran—
72tee the stability of Basutoland or the safety of Letsie. The Chief Magistrate
thought him too cowardly to occupy Thaba Bosigo, even though the Government
would assist and assume all responsibility for methods the chief used to cur- 
73
tail rebellion. If the majority supported the paramount chief at a pitso at
Thaba Bosigo, conjectured Griffith, the fortifications there would vanish;
74
otherwise, troops would have to help arrest both Masupha and Lerothodi.
The combative, offensive posture of Masupha also influenced Chief Magis­
trate Griffith. Masupha contended that Loyalists deserved punishment for gi-
75ving up arms without permission and that, as a chief, he could seize cattle.
66
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267, ltr. Surmon to Sprigg, August 11, 188D.
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79
Masupha said that a circular from Letsie, which called for expulsion from their
76
villages of all natives who did not surrender their guns upon command, was cir­
culated at Thaba Bosigo in violation of tribal custom and that the actions of 
the paramount chief were untraditional. By claiming Thaba Bosigo, the sacred 
tribal mountain, Masupha angered Letsie. The rebel chief, though supposedly 
only repairing the mountain fortress, at first refused to allow Griffith to 
attend the pitso there and escorted him out of the village below. Later re­
ceiving the consent of the evasive Masupha to ascend the mountain by the only
path, Colonel Griffith at every bend found a stone wall and at the top found
77battlements two layers thick and a clear water spring. The Chief Magistrate, 
after examining the fortress, definitely wanted troops committed. Though Ma­
supha had threatened to fight Letsie unless the paramount chief came alone,
yg
Letsie had induced Jonathan and other loyal chiefs to accompany him.
Letsie at the August pitso appeared powerless beside and just as deceit­
ful as Masupha, Jonathan attempted to persuade Masupha to behave, but thB 
rebel feared transportation to Robben Islan<iPeventually!P Secretary Ayliffe 
conveyed orders to Masupha, who would not have to face execution, to surrender 
himself to Letsie. According to his rank in the tribe, each rebel with Masu-
75
Ibid., 285, Cape Argus reporting on messages of Griffith, August 6 , 8 , 
1 1 , 1880.
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77 Ibid., 285-86, Cape Argus reporting on messages of Griffith, August 6 ,
8 , 1 1 , 1880.
^ I h i d ., 221, ltr. Griffith to Sprigg, August 7, 1880.
79Robben Island: an island in Table Bay comprising about three square 
miles, where political prisoners and the incurably sick resided, Rosenthal,
ed.,-Encyclopedia, p. 437.
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E.S_.jP., (1881), LXVI, 268, Telegram from Webster Special Correspondent 
in Basutoland, August 10, 13, 1880.
80
pha would pay a fine, and Letsie would surrender all documents found with the
rebels. If Masupha balked, the paramount chief would hold the mountain until 
81
the CMR arrived. Letsie stalled for time and, if the Government did not force
an arrest, which would strain too much his authority, promised to fine Masu-
82pha, but natives present doubted his sincerity. The rebel chiefs, continued
Chief Letsie, feared punishment, and, preferring to settle matters by himself,
83
he asked Cape Town not to exile Masupha, who vowed to hand back all stolen
B4
cattle only if Letsie announced opposition to the PPA.
After the pitso, the rebels briefly restricted Letsia to Thaba Bosigo in
05
order to use his name to stir rebellion. Pleading inability to coerce Masupha,
the paramount chief wanted to leave the mountain to bring back a stronger
86
force. Griffith ordered him to remain and send for more warriors but after-
Q7
wards allowed him to decide if it was wise to remain. Letsie, returning to
his village, whined that his tribe did not support him and voiced fear that
88
Masupha would kill or imprison him. The paramount chief, nevertheless, told
his sons of his intentions to alienate the whites against each other, because
Britain did not sympathize with the PPA, and because the act had become a
89
partisan issue in the Cape Parliament.
Magistrate Barkly, who decided that Letsie was too unreliable to control
^ I b i d ., 269, ltr. Ayliffe to Griffith, August 13, 1880.
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81
the situation, thought troops might bolster him. If Letsie defected, however,
the civil war would spread, though troops on the Free State border could soon 
90
clear the rebels. While the Letsie clan believed its chief fooling the Go­
vernment until fully prepared to rebel, Barkly disbelieved this rumor but 
thought timid Letsie must take stronger measures against the rebels. The ma­
gistrate doubted that the paramount chief would arrest Lerothodi, who would 
only apologize and repeat his crimes; thus, Barkly hoped to arm loyal natives 
and with Letsie surround and render Lerothodi impotent.
Arthur Barkly at the same time advised on colonial military strategy. 
Sprigg did not want to defend isolated posts like Mafeteng, but Barkly argued
I
that the town was a haven for refugee traders and Loyalists, on the main road, 
in open country, and an excellent base for military operations in western Ba­
sutoland. Masitisi Mountain, recently fortified by rebels, was only a one- 
day journey from Mafeteng and was vulnerable to attack by troops from that 
side and from the Maseru direction. The Fraser store, only one and a half 
miles from Mafeteng, needed protection, because the employees there were mili­
tarily useless except for escort duty. The magistrate advised against sending 
troops into Cornet Spruit District from Quthing, because the road from Path- 
lalla to Mohales Hoek exhibited a number of configurations where a small force 
could hold off numerous troops; instead, soldiers from Mafeteng could relieve
Surmon. Colonial troops, according to Barkly, would have to invest Thaba Bo-
91 srgo.
Besides magistrates and Loyalists, Basutoland traders faced intimidation 
in the Basuto Civil W^r. At a' secret pitso of Masupha, who had decided to
90
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attack trading posts, Chief Bereng Letsie also designed to assault the posts
92
in order to steal goods to outfit his clan. Assistant Magistrate Davies re­
ported that one trader, having received threats to abandon his store, asked 
for protection and permission to withdraw to Maseru if danger increased. The
merchant saw grain transported by rebels from the Telle River via Roman Hoek
93
to the Maluti Mountains for stockpiling. A close friend to the Basutos was
Samuel Brummage, a trader at Korokoro. The nearest chief, Koadi Makhobalo,
told Brummage that he feared assassination by other chiefs if he surrendered
94hxs gun arid that the Brummage store was in danger. In July, another trader,
Mr. Trower, and his helpers encountered harassment and thievery from Alexander
Letsie and his clan while attempting to remove goods from the abandoned Brum-
95mage shop to Maseru and hence never transferred the merchandise.
Jonathan Molappo, in reaction to this menace, ordered his clan to tidy 
the Brummage store and carry off the remaining goods for safekeeping. He ap­
pealed for Cape Colony to strictly enforce its rule over Basutoland?^ For ap­
prehending the looters of the Brummage shop, Griffith thanked Letsie, and he 
told the chief to levy fines to secure compensation for Brummage. The Chief
Magistrate intended to arrest and send to Maseru for punishment the chiefs who
97xnstxgated the Korokoro trouble and who received stolen merchandise.
Traders, nevertheless, considered themselves in a precarious position by
92
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98remaining in Basutoland, and some fled to the Orange Free State. Griffith,
prepared for the worst, noted that most traders had surrendered their arms and
99were at the mercy of the insurgents. Magistrate 5urmon asked if whites in
Cornet Spruit District might retain their arms secretly until restoration of
peace. Traders in the district wanted to keep their guns^as the Government
refused to compensate shopowners for losses. Surmon, asking merchants not to
remove their goods immediately, called for more rifles and ammunition in order
to arm the traders and loyal natives with h i n u ^  Basutoland merchants wanted
military security, because they were losing income from diminishing business,
and feared that troops would not relieve them soon. Eventually, traders used
their remaining arms to defend Cape sovereignty in Basutoland, though they did
102not relish risking their lives and losing profits in a thankless duty.
As disaffection spilled over the Basuto border, Magistrate Austen in Qu- 
thing, unable to stifle rebel activity and the beguiler Letsie, urged rein­
forcement of the troop camps at Palmietfontein and Fort Hartley to hearten 
Loyalists. Because local rebels threatened to kill first natives who had ai­
ded against Morosi and who subsequently had surrendered their weapons, Loya-
103
lists fled to the Masitisi station. Thereafter, Lerothodi commanded Quthing
104
natives to join him in Basutoland or lose their cattle. Magistrate Austen in
98
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105August noted that rebels preponderated in his district and guarded the drifts
on its borders. Loyalists would fight back if supported, he said, but if the
106
rebels gained the first advantage, the rebellion would grow. The magistrate
advised a large military offensive, because rebels were inciting the Herschel
District fingos and the Tembus^and Letsie had asked the Pondos^to help him
109
obstruct the PPA and rebel.
No natives, wrote Chief Magistrate Brownlee of Griqualand East, helped 
him enforce the PPA among Basutos residing there. Rebels intimidated loyal 
Basutos living here into insurgency. Brownlee at Matatiele held a meeting and 
hinted that Governor Frere would no ; longer apply the PPA to Basutos in Gri­
qualand if they disarmed voluntarily^^
The Orange Free State tookstrinaent measures as it again unfortunately 
became subjected to Basuto annoyances as rebels hounded Loyalists into Boer 
territory. Across the frontier, Chief George Moshesh led 2,000 cattle, and 
President Johannes Brancl^allowed these refugees to remain until colonial troops
105
Drifts: Glaciers formed these stratified or unstratified deposits of 
clay, sand, gravel, and boulders in river beds.
, (1881), LXVI, 295, ltr. Austen to Ayliffe, August 5, 1880.
^ ^Ibid.. 297, ltr. Austen to Ayliffe, August 24, 1880.
IQ 3
Pondos: Suffering severely from Zulu incursions, this tribe almost be­
came Zulu vassals. After the Xhosa tribe disintegrated, the Pondos, though 
primitive and factious, remained the only independent tribe in the Eastern 
Cape Province. Umquikela became paramount chief in 1867 and showed much hos­
tility toward Cape Colony; therefore, Frere withdrew recognition of the leader­
ship of this chief in 1878, Rosenthal, ed., encyclopedia, pp. 397-98.
109
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^^Brownlee, Basuto War, p. 8 .
A.jB., I, 111-13, 115. Johannes Brand: Elected to the Cape Parlia­
ment in 1854, Brand in 1864 was unanimously elected President of the Orange 
Free State and subsequently was re-elected four times. Though the ominous and 
unresolved Basuto affairs in the 1880’s damaged the rural Free State economy, 
Brand stymied the Wodehouse attempts to use the Boer-Basuto wars as an excuse 
to subjugate the Boers to Britain. The president balked at joining a British
85
arrived, but only after consultation with Griffith, who admitted inability to
112
protect the Loyalists. Governor Frere belatedly sanctioned the Loyalist
flight, their disarmament by the Boers after crossing the Free State border,
Loyalist occupancy wherever farmers allowed, Loyalist payment for grazing, and
113
their subjection to Free State law. Rebels in August twice unsuccessfully 
attempted to steal cattle which Loyalists were escorting from Mafeteng to 
Korsberg in the Orange Free State. The Republic then refused to admit these 
Loyalists^^or the Free State, argued the irritated Boer Executive Council, had 
no room for the refugees, who burdened the citizens. President Brand tried 
to avoid placement of military forces on the Basuto border. Volunteer Free 
State cavalry posted in Basutoland might incite border Basutos, endanger Qoer 
farms, and force the Boer Government to ring with troops the Basuto frontier 
from the Grange River up to HarrisrnithT^rnstead, field cornets^enforced pass 
rules to keBp cut rebels^^
The limited benefits of rearming harassed Loyalists became apparent.
After the Berea police warned one Hlubi. tribesman that Masupha would attack
South African confederation until London promoted justice for Boers in the 
diamond fields, yet, at the same time, Brand obstructed Afrikaner nationalism. 
In 1881,the provocative attitude of the rebel Basutos and the desire of Bri­
tain to abandon this tribe revived in Brand his previous apprehension about 
the tribe. Anarchy in Basutoland caused frequent border violations; thus, in 
late 1883, Brand pressured the Imperial Government to once again administer 
Basutoland.
112
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^*Vield cornets: These Boer military officials raised commando units and 
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gistrates, Rosenthal, ed., Encyclopedia, p. 167.
117±L-rL*£.* > (1881), LXVI, 267, ltr. Barkly to Sprigg, August 11, 1880.
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him, he and his party, rearmed, drove back 600 rebel raiders but lost their
tangible property and themselves fled. A Boer justice of the peace settled
118
some of the refugee group at Ladybrand. One rearmed headman in the Berea
District lo3t his cattle but with his party escaped from an ambush on the way 
119to Maseru. Although Leriba District Loyalists received 600 surrendered guns
120
to protect themselves, rebels attacking their villages beat and threatened
these tribesmen. Some of these natives with the cattle of Molappo then joined 
121Masupha. The Chief Magistrate finally ordered Magistrate Bell to fall back
on Maseru, because roaming rebel marauders were murdering armed Loyalists in
122the northern districts. Bell instead constructed a defense and asked for
123arms, ammunition, and a 50-man infantry garrison.
Concerning Loyalist views and counteractions in the Civil War, Chief Koadi
indicated that only troops could save the Loyalists, some of whom already were
wavering. Troops in Basutoland, long overdue, would induce natives to desert
the rebel chiefs, who would then surrender, whereas colonial apathy allowed
124
rebels time to fortify strongholds* Another tribesman advised the Government,
to move in trained troops, not volunteers, and warned of Loyalist desertions
125should Cape Colony not dispatch soldiers. As Chief Sofonia and his followers 
feared to travel because of the rebels, he threatened to go into hiding if
^ ^Ibid., 289-90, Tukuny before Bell, July 23, 1880.
1 1 9Ibid., 290, Mokhitle before Bell, July 27, 1880.
120
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126
Cape Town did not commit troops. A compromise settlement, indicated other
127
Loyalists, would not insure their safe return home. By giving intelligence
and exposing insurgent weak points to the Government, Loyalists hamstrung re- 
228
bels. One Loyalist advised Griffith of the rebel fortifications at Thaba
Bosigo and helped the Government supply fortified trading posts until forced
129 _to flee because of threats. One Loyalist chief with a turopean bodyguard
confiscated rebel farms^"3^  Rebel leaders themselves, according to Chief Tse- 
kelo, had no specific goal, and cold, hunger, and guilty consciences supposedly 
dominated at Thaba Bosigo. The distressed rebels feared to plow fields or 
sleep in their own villages, and captured cattle had insufficient fodder at 
the sacred mountain. Tsekelo asked for colonial troops in each district, re­
quested ammunition for Loyalists, and warned that rebels must receive cautious
131and generous treatment. Therefore, Governor Frere, unable to estimate how
132many Basutos supported the rebels, recommended clemency for the insurgents.
One angry Loyalist told Sir Bartle to relay to the London Government that Capa
Colony must delay the evil PPA for two years, as by that time, rebel power.
would have dissipated. He added that Basutos would not fight their brethren
133
in behalf of Cape Colony.
126
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While one of these brethren, Masupha, remained obstinate, other rebels
also persisted. This chief demanded the return of the guns that other chiefs
134
had surrendered without his permission. He, as an example to others, refused
135
to give up Loyalist stock and killed some in front of Letsie. Lerothodi ab-
136ducted three policemen and incarcerated them at Thaba Bosigo. Another rebel
chief declined to return Loyalist cattle, saying that he would lose his own in
. ,137reprisal.
13 8
The Northern Post at Aliwal North, in editorial reaction to the outbreak, 
wrote,
It is painful to see the helpless and ineffective way in which the Go­
vernment is allowing the control of affairs to slip out of their hands.
The utterly feeble and ineffective mariner in which affairs have been 
conducted hitherto is bringing the colony into contempt and ridicule 
and daily adding to the jj^portions of the difficulties which must be 
coped with in Basutoland.
Asking the disarmed to calm the dissidents, complained the Cape Argus, was not
realistic. The Cape Times, however, asserted that Letsie would disarm and
. 140
stressed that this chief, by occupying Thaba Bosigo, had confirmed his loyalty.
It was evident, after all, that Cape Colony was defaulting on its respon­
sibility under the Second Treaty of Aliwal North (1869) to protect the Orange 
Free State from Basuto harassment. Governor Frere needed to deal with the re-
134
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northern Cape Colony border, Rosenthal, ed., encyclopedia, p. 14.
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bels harshly, and Prime Minister Sprigg, in view of the serious predicament, 
should have arranged for funding to support a large mobilization and early 
war. The dissatisfied magistrates, who fortunately took precautions, could 
not alone halt rebel aggression or protect Loyalists. Surmon either should 
have risked his position with his available forces or evacuated. Barkly, who 
falsely encouraged Loyalists, did not realize that Lerothodi negotiated in 
bad faith and wanted the paramountcy through civil war. Reliance on Letsie, 
whose actions encouraged rebellion, was misplaced by the magistrate. The pre­
dicament of traders further indicated the need for troops in Basutoland. 
Griffith could have evacuated trading posts which contained supplies valuable 
to the rebels, but he had no force available to stop the looting. The Cape 
Government should have paid total compensation for losses to merchants who 
stayed on, as they helped defend colonial authority.
Further, the Loyalists bore the disadvantage of having undergone disarma­
ment. They did not fight continuously or very successfully, were not dedica­
ted, were not united under leaders^and.could not protect their magistrates. 
Some loyal natives excused and underestimated the rebels and wanted the colony 
to handle all the protective fighting, however, others fought gallantly to 
uphold colonial law.
The rebels, on the other hand, envisioned specific goals in the civil 
war and, despite ample time and opportunity to surrender, instead fomented 
insurrection along the entire Cape frontier. Large, powerful, and victorious 
were the mobilizing rebel forces. Masupha, falsely accusing Letsie while ta­
king advantage of him as a symbolic stooge, attempted to usurp tribal authori­
ty and would not alter his stand, because he spoke from a strong position.
Only to overthrow his brother Jonathan did Joel, who Masupha manipulated, turn
rebal. Letsie fooled Griffith, because, while probably trying with loyal 
chiefs to mollify Masupha, he could not protect Loyalists* conspired with Ma­
supha at Thaba Bosigo, and had no intention to coerce the chief or hold the 
mountain and dismantle its fortifications. Realizing the rebels to be domi­
nant, the paramount chief only superficially placated the Government and 
feigned loyalty by symbolic actions. He was a traitor; Frere should have de­
posed him.
SPRIGS EXAMINES CONDITIONS IN BASUTOLAND
Sir Gordon Sprigg, initiating one final effort to avoid military confron­
tation, asked Joseph Orpen, Commandant Frederick Schermbrucker^and Brigadier-
General Charles Mansfield Clarke^flommandant-General of Cape colonial forces,
143to accompany him to Maseru to restore order. Sprigg also sought the help of
144
the Orange Free State in preserving the peace. While the party left Cape 
Town, the rebel Basutos were gaining strength. The sight of the Prime Minister 
traveling with no armed escort heartened insurgents; Greswell believes that
* P* 330. Frederick Schermbrucker: a soldier and later Cape 
Colony cabinet minister. Born in 5chweinfurt-on-Main, Germany, he was invited 
to Caps Colony in 1867 with military settlers. In the East Cape Province, he 
quickly assumed prominence and entered Parliament in 1868. In 1875, he moved 
to the Orange Free State and edited the Bloemfontein Express. He became a 
member of the Legislative Council at Cape Town in 1082.
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and in the Zulu War and became Deputy Adjutant-General in Ireland from 1886- 
88 and at headquarters from 1892-93. He later assumed the post of governor 
at Malta from 19Q3-07.
1 4 3Theal, 5outh Africa, XI, 60-61; cf., B_.S_.Py, (1881), LXVI, 270, ltr. 
Frere to Kimoerley, August 24, 1880.
■*44B.b.P., (1881), LXVI, 265, ltr. Frere to Brand, August 10, 1880.
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600 to 1,000 soldiers should have accompanied Sprigg.
Some Loyalists, falsifying the situation, sought to shackle colonial re­
lief against the powerful rebels. At a pitso at Maseru on August 25, 1880, 
Sprigg spoke with Tsekelo, Sofonia, and Mtsane, all Loyalist sons of Moshesh. 
Timidity by the colony, said Tsekelo, would endanger negotiations with insur­
gents i^yet he warned the Government to act only by proclamation, because, if 
Cape Colony employed troops, the tribe would think the rebels had a legitimate 
grievance. Other chiefs counseled Government patience, use of no unnecessary 
force, and agreement not to take guns forcibly from villages, as this last ac­
tion might precipitate a conflict. Aware that younger chiefs prized arms, 
Tsekelo feigned ignorance when told that chiefs had ordered their men to hoard 
guns, yet Lerothodi and Bereng previously had visited the diamond fields and 
had urged their men to buy arms. Other Loyalists considered the PPA a pretext 
for rebellion and asked Sprigg if Basutos who left their homeland might keep 
their arms.
Tsekelo continued that he had stopped the migration of the people in his. 
ward, who, because of fear, had almost,joined Masupha to help fortify Thaba 
Bosigo. Natives atop the mountain, who he considered as mere criminals, ru­
mored that, if Sprigg wanted peace, he must offer amnesty to all, remove the 
magistrates, and allow Letsie to collect the hut tax. Tsekelo thought the re­
bels weakening, and natives stopped sending grain to feed workers at Thaba 
Bosigo. At public meetings, however, chiefs still feared to speak honestly. 
Chief Sofonia alone believed that the rebels would rejoice if not restrained 
and that amnesty for them and no compensation for Loyalists would allow insur­
gents to steal all Loyalist cattle after Sprigg departed^4**
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At Morija ^4?hief Letsie, further hindering colonial action, verbally cir-
148
cumvented Sprigg and stalled until Griffith arrived. The paramount chief
complimented Sir Gordon for traveling without an armed escort and, alleging
149
that brandy caused the unrest, asked why the Prime P4inister allowed the illegal
importation of liquor into Basutoland. Sprigg in turn asked Letsie why other
chiefs had surrendered no guns, why rebels built fortifications, and why loyal
natives lost their cattle. Continually changing the subject from the PPA, the
chief grumbled that the tribe did not recognize his paramountcy, that his son
Lerothodi was insane from brandy, but finally announced that in two years the
Basutos would readily give up their arms.
Chief Letsie, furthermore, excused and would not adjudicate the criminal
conduct of Masupha. Masupha, fearful of punishment, might not attend 33
planned, said Letsie, and as a madman was not responsible for his actions.
The paramount chief entreated that the Basutos were ignorant people and that
Sprigg must excuse their failings. Letsie humbly advised Sir Gordon to visit
Masupha at Thaba Bosigo. As the: .Prime-- Minister hesitated to go there without
an armed force, Letsie, guaranteeing safety to the company*, offered an escort
for courtesy and laughed that Sprigg feared a drunk. Sir Gordon then asked
150the chief to pacify the Cornat Spruit District.
Sprigg on August 30 next met with George Moshesh, now returned from the 
Free 5tate, to discuss how to weaken the belligerent but apprehensive rebels.
1463.S.P., (1881), LXVI, 317-19, Cape Times account of pitso at Maseru, 
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In Berea District, Boers sold brandy without licenses, Ibid., 319, Cape Times 
account of pitso at Maseru, August 25, 1880.
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Insurgents had fortified and supplied three mountains. Masupha perched atop 
Thaba Bosigo, Bereng atop Masitisi, and Lerothodi atop Kola. Though Letsie 
had stopped three assaults by Masupha against Chief George, the approximately 
100 followers of George, feeling abandoned by the Government, began deserting. 
Chief Masupha, learned the Prime Minister, refusing to meet Sprigg at Thaba 
Bosigo, had not traveled to the pitso at Morija, because he feared his trea­
cherous assassination, similar to an episode in the past (Supra, p. 42 , n. 82 ), 
and CMR occupation of his fortress. The CMR units camped on the Orange Free 
State border reassured numerous Loyalists.
Chief George, in addition, indicated other preferences and views. He 
supported the 5prigg suggestion of placing 2,000 troops on the Basuta frontier 
but advised only the arrest and punishment by magistrates of the rebel leaders; 
Loyalists could return and receive compensation. The Prime Minister next in­
quired what reaction would occur if the CMR crossed into Basutoland and 2,000 
Zulus entered from Natal. The rebels would fight but eventually flee to the 
mountains, replied George, and the Zulus would seize all rebel cattle. There 
were approximately 4,000 insurgents, and-numerous crestfallen tribssmen, be- . 
cause they would not desert their chiefs, turned rebel. George said that scores 
of Loyalists, who outnumbered rebels, would help against Masupha if Letsie 
availed himself; sons of the paramount chief then might desert Masupha, who 
announced that Letsie only feigned loyalty and instigated him. As numbers in 
the Masupha clan wanted to and their insurgency, the introduction of a large 
military force could induce throngs to desert this rebel chief, and officials, 
declared George, could not collect the hut tax that year or the next if rebels 
remained armed. He explained that the PPA perhaps did not cause the civil war 
but that Masupha used the act to excite Lerothodi, Moletsane, Putsane. Smith, 
and Bereng. Basutos hoarded guns, because they wanted protection against in-
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vasion from the Orange free State, an wham they expected to wreak vengeance 
should Cape Colony eventually fight the Boers.
Disarmament, continued George, was not the sole reason for disaffection, 
as the rebels detested all European authority and would resist coercion in the 
face of eventual defeat, freedom from the magistrates and the & 1  hut tax, 
which allegedly impoverished numerous tribesmen with several huts, elated in­
surgents. George confessed that prophetesses undermined the Government by
vilifying whites and the British army and by urging punishment for whites and
151natives in Basutoland who aided colonial authorities.
Concerning the safety of the Prime Minister during his visit, Masupha an-
152nouncsd that the killing of Sprigg would aid the rebel cause, and, if someone
murdered Sprigg, declared a prophetess, rebels could drive all the whites out
of Basutoland. Sir Gordon had received threats not to attend the Maseru pitso,
but the insurgents did not attack the Prime Minister because of expectations
153
that he would not travel through rebel-controlled territory.
Joseph Orpen, after: the pitsos, brought Sprigg a letter from Letsie, still,
the rebel vindicator, saying that the rebel chiefs acknowledged their crimes
and begged for mercy; thus, the Prime Minister proposed the punishment of hos- 
154tiles by fines. Rebels obtained for themselves the intercession of Chief
Letsie, who had recommended fines and professed that the PPA, which he now de-
155clared would always defy realization, caused the furor.
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The Prime Minister, contemplating his evaluations, then traveled to Leribe
District to restore order. The PPA, he adamantly asserted, had not caused the
civil war; Orpen and Griffith agreed that the rebel leaders had as prime objec-
156
tives independence and the expulsion of whites. The Prime Minister on his way 
home spoke with the Fraser brothers, prominent Basutoland traders, then pre­
paring to fortify their main store. Sir Gordon scoffed at their warning that
rebellion was inevitable7 ^^owever, he believed that only a large force could
158
check the rebels and support Loyalists.
Newspapers hinged final appraisal of the Sprigg visit on future contin­
gencies. The Eastern Province Herald (Cape Colony), though censuring him for
bagging for psace, otherwise lauded Sir Gordon and urged the crushing of Masu-
159
pha before his position improved. The Pall Mall Gazette (London) admitted 
that if the mission resulted in the submission of rebel leaders, the Prime 
Minister might avoid parliamentary trouble^^ If the Sprigg journey seemed to 
his opponents at: Caper Town and in England a sincere: effort to avoid war, an­
nounced another tabloid,, he would have*rdismissed the sinister motive- attributed
/■ . . . 161 * . . ; . V- ■ v F  V -. ■: ’ - ■ -- ■' >to his mission.
In retrospect, Sir Gordon should have requested an escort of versatile 
colonial troops at the pitsos to impress upon rebels and Loyalists alike the 
intent and capability of Cape Colony. Sprigg took with him people who could 
correctly assess the crisis and propose solutions, and, through^excellent ad-
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vice given by traders and Chief Sofonia, he received sufficient reasons why 
and assurances that troops would help restore order but still did not realize 
the grave situation. As the Government had a moral obligation to protect 
Loyalists with troops, Sir Gordon should have ignored Chiefs Letsie, Tsekelo, 
George, and othsrs who belittled the rebel threat, backed down, and wanted the 
Government to do likewise.
THE RECALL OF GOVERNOR FRERE
Prime Minister Sprigg alone did not meet obstructions, as Governor Frere
had found his own policies condemned. Prime Minister Gladstone recalled the
governor in May, 1880, because the position of Frere on the affairs of South
<Xo2Africa conflicted with that of the Home Government. Frere was condemned be­
cause of his alleged design for an unjust and unprovoked Zulu War^lulu wax
disasters, the failure of confederation, and the Liberal Party search for peace
' 164 ' ’ "
at whatever price- in South Africa. Numerous people wanted to relieve Sir '
Bartle^oscause of his involvement in iocai.party politics in support of Sprigg^
Godfrey Lagden says that the governor, had he remained, might have concluded
167
the Basuto war victoriously and quickly.
Frere, his performance frustrated, complained that people for partisan
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^~*Pall Mall Gazette (London), August 3, 1880, p. 4.
i66 Ibid., August 11, 1880, p. 4.
^Lagden, The Basutos, II, 514.
purposes spread numerous rumors in England regarding the Basuto civil strife. 
Troublemakers told the Basutos that he was a tyrant and that his recall illus­
trated British governmental reprobation of his Basuto policy. While Britain, 
insisted Sir Bartle, could support the PPA, or, if it disapprqvad of the act, 
could forbid subsequently required military action against the Basutos, the de­
liberations of the Home Government convinced the colonists that the Crown was 
shirking its military prerogative, thus leaving Cape Colony to act on its own 
responsibility"^^ Sprigg would agree to London disallowing armed action against 
the rebels, because, constitutionally, Queen Victoria as Commander-in-Chief 
commanded colonial troops^"^
The Colonial (iffice, in addition, mistakenly excoriated Sir Bartle after 
he had left Cape Town in the autumn following the outbreak of the rebellion. 
Kimberley blared that, "It is inconceivable that a Governor of Sir Bartle 
Frsre's undoubted abilities could lend his support to such blunderings /colo­
nial military intervention in Basutalanq/ as he appears to have d o n e , " ^  The 
secretary hypocrized the following year: by admitting; that the Sprigg ministry 
could rightfully combat the; Basutos,. because, though the natives were subjects'
^ (1881), LXVI, 163, ltr. Frere to Kimberley, May 30, 1880.
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170Martineau, Frere, II, 383.
^^Tylden, The Rise of the Basuto, p. 144. Major-General Sir Henry Clif­
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arrived. Ibid. . Dictionary of National Biography (London: 1931), IV, 522.
Sir Henry Clifford: Clifford, born ..n Dorsetshire, England, came to 5outb Afri­
ca with an army commission and fought the Gaikas and Boers in the 1840*s. He 
received the Victoria Cross in the Crimea, fought in China in 1857-58, and, 
as he knew much about Bantu warfare, easily supervised all field communications 
in the Zulu campaign of 1679.
172of the Queen, responsible ministers at Cape Town administered the tribe.
It is evident, in conclusion, that the Gladstone ministry either should 
have announced formally its concurrence with Cape decisions or pressured their 
revocation; Kimberley instead crippled official British credibility. 5ome 
parties encouraged Basuto insurgents and undermined Sir Bartle, while some 
British citizens falsified the Basuto crisis.
CAPE COLONY MOBILIZES FOR WAR
In regard to the background on colonial mobilization, the Cape Government 
in Parliament never formally declared a state of rebellion in Basutoland. 
Preparations for war began, and Tylden alleges that Griffith anxiously awaited 
rebel armed resistance in order to start the war,
Theal, in the certainty of belligerent rebel intent, considers the rebel­
lion the M. . .. most formidable attempt ever made by natives in South Africa 
to throw off European supremacy. . . .  It. was only British power that the na— " 
tives had any respect for.” The rebels, says Tylden, could mass 23,000 mounted
warriors, though each unit would not fight outside its own ward except on
173
raids. Lerothodi built schantzen atop Hasitisi Mountain, which guarded on the
south and we9t tha village of his father. Cooperation from other rebellious
j 74tribes, however, disappeared after an initial accord.
It is controvertible if the Sprigg ministry took decisive measures against
17?
Hansard, 3rd ser., Vol. 259 (1881), 1792, Earl of Kimberley speaking, 
March 24, 1881; cf., De Kiewiet, The Imperial Factor, p. 268.
173 Schantzen: three-sided ramparts on hillsides that guarded strategic 
habitats or military positions.
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the threat. The Government, according to the Pall Mall Gazette, so confident­
ly expected speedy rebel submission that it did not ask for a vote on military 
expenditures before Parliament adjourned, as Opposition leaders had asked 
(Supra, p. 76, n. 57), and for Sprigg to have sought consent for a Basuto war 
would have meant risking a reversal of the favorable vote on his policy in 
June. Tha ministry, argus3 the Gazette, though somewhat welcoming a war, ne­
vertheless failed to prepare for hostilities despite warnings from officials 
and missionaries^^ However, the CMR, by July 7 placed on emergency footing^^ 
had a directive to enter Basutoland and to garrison Maseru, Mafeteng, and 
Moh3les Hoek; 50 whites and 200 Fingos received orders to garrison the fort at 
Palmietfontein. The chiefs, believed Sprigg, would declare themselves after
the placement of CMR garrisons; then the ministry could determine the extent
177of rebellion, which Sir Gordon thought small. By July 27, 250 CMR had left
178
Queenstown for Aliwal North. From here they sped on to a Free State camp­
ground^'* •.
Sir George Colley, who Frere had succeeded as High Commissioner, adverse­
ly criticized the colonial military undertaking by pointing out the inept 
discipline and poor preparation of thB Cape military, the inevitability of a 
prolonged and difficult campaign, the vulnerable colonial lines of communica­
tion, and the disadvantage of fighting a mobile enemy who held fortifications 
in the remotest parts of Basutoland* Despite warnings, asserts De Kiewiet,
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the Cape Government held too insignificant the military strength of the rebels,
who had ample time to store cattle and food supplies in inaccessible country.
To intimidate the rebels and protect the Loyalists, Cape Town dispatched very
few soldiers instead of a large army, and there were too few skilled officers
2.80
to handle the inexperienced troops, who had inadequate arms and ammunition. 
Tylden contends that the warning of Wolseley (Supra, pp. 34-35, nn. 47-48), 
who had scanned intelligence reports, was extremely accurate but that Gover­
nor Frere did not allow this warning to alter arrangements, though both Frere
and Sprigg realized how inadequate and unprepared were colonial troops for
J.3X 182offensive warfare. Rebel chiefs noticed encouraging comments in newspapers.
A majority of the colonial press said that the Cape Government should not have
183
engaged the numerous and well-supplied Basutos with so few troops, and the 
Pall Mall Gazette predicted that Basuto military success would excite other 
tribes'!'84
Governor Frere, proceeding with his design to avoid confrontation but to
support magistrates, with the full, assent of Griffith moved a detachment of
50 CMR to Quthing, because Magistrate- Auaterr had complained that the CMR; al— •
ready in Quthing were insufficient to patrol the district and chase off rebels
and squatters^ 88 Frere advised against sending troops to (Maseru, because none
were camped within several days marching distance, and news of a march would 
186excite the rebels. Kimberley approved of Sir Bartle refraining from action
i an
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187which would increase tension and necessitate the use of more armed force*
Colonel Griffith, with that understanding, countered Letsie, who still 
shirked his duty. The paramount chief lied that neither had the rebels over­
powered him rior had he officially received orders to fight them. He begged
Griffith not to allow colonial troop3 into Basutoland because of the expense
2.83
involved to the tribe yet declared that old age prevented him from engaging in 
189
the civil war. Cape troops, replied Griffith, would not intervene unless
rebels ovarpawered the chief, or until Letsie asked assistance^Rowever, the
Chief Magistrate said repeatedly that troops would deter rebel chiefs and
their followersi^^
The progress of colonial troops suddenly halted. Through his country
192
President Brand allowed 300 CMR passage; the column marched to the west bank
of the Caledon River and waited at Jackman Drift for Griffith to order it 
193
across. Though Griffith rebuked Sprigg for intimating that magistracies
would have to suffer assaults before the advent of troops, the Chief Magis— ■ ,
trate refu3sd to take responsibility for-ordering troops across- the Caledon
River into Basutolandr despite-'the imnrinent rainy season threatening to make
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Threatened and unmistakable resistance came into focus as colonial troops
neared the border. Barkly feared investment, because ha had too few men to
guard the borderland his post, and now expected rebellion. Senile Chief
Moletsane nurssd a phobia that the colony would abuse him after disarmament^
and, over eighty years old and a Christian, joined the rebels, saying that the
196whites had long wanted and had now begun to exterminate the tribe- Rebel
scouting parties roamed the Basuto countryside and stopped or watched closely
magistracy messengers. Rebel earthworks at a drift in the Cornet Spruit
197
blocked the route by which Colonel Frederick Carrington was to relieve Magis­
trate Surmon from the Free Statet^ Rebel sympathizers, noted Surmon, barred
199the road from his post at Mohales Hoek to Quthing. The rebels doubled their
guards at all drifts as the CMR approached^and two regiments of Masupha,
which observed the CMR at the Free State border, had orders to engage troops
20 V
crossing the Caledon River. ..cBad weather and poor roads had delayed the two
202 ' ' 203
relief columns under CoionelsrBayly and Carrington. Of the 650 CMR, Bayly
Ibid. t, 268, 11r. Barkly to Spriggs Aug us t- 12L, .1880.
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Sir Frederick Carrington came to South Africa in 1875. He campaigned in Gri- 
qualand West, then against the Galekas in 1877, at which time he organized 
and commanded the Frontier Light Horse. As leader of the Transvaal Volun­
teers, he stormed the stronghold of the rebel chief Sekukuni. In the Basuto 
Rebellion, he commanded at Mafeteng and was seriously wounded. Carrington 
was principal commander in the Matabele Rebellion in 1896 and during the Se­
cond Anglo-Boer War led a Rhodesian force against the Transvaal from the north
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commanded the left wing, and Carrington beaded the right wing, which arrived 
at its destination in the Free State late in August. Henry Shervinton, re­
nowned adventurer and mercenary, led a third detachment of soldiers from Kok- 
stadt to Basutoland by way of Umtata, as the direct route afforded no fodder 
or wagon road. At Palmietfontein, these troops sighted rebel pickets keeping
2q,
vigil in rifle pits and behind stone walls lying along the opposite river bank.
Natal officials at the same time acted resolutely. After the Basuto Civil
War began, Natal colonists residing near the Drakensburg mountain passes
feared assault by rebel raiding parties; accordingly, the Natal police mobi-
205lized under the command of Major J. G. Dartnell.
Griffith, suggesting a final arrangement to avert engagement of troops, 
informed Letsie that colonial troops would garrison Maseru and Mafeteng to 
support the Loyalists. The magistrate would increase the number of native 
police patrolling the countryside, especially the border, to prevent intimida­
tion. Rebels, continued the Chief Magistrate, must appear in the magistrate 
courts, submit* to fines, and restore stolen- stack and goods to whites: and 
Loyalists. Though much would depend on Letsie farcing his tribe to disarm,
the Cape Government would reconcile itself with the rebel surrender of only
206some guns and would allow Loyalists to keep arms for protection.
Own Volunteer Rifles, In 1878, he commanded a detachment against the Korana 
tribe and the next year operated against Chief Morosi in the upper Orange River 
Valley. After a lengthy siege, he led the attack up Morosi*s Mountain to ter­
minate the campaign.
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In fair judgement, the longer Governor Frere postponed enforcement of 
colonial,laws, the more rebellious and prepared became the dissidents. Sprigg 
and Frere should have immediately dispatched troops across the frontier, and 




In September, 1880, the Basuto Civil War, now three months old, became 
enmeshed in the Basuto Rebellion^- Basuto rebels legally were liable to prose­
cution by the Cape Government, as they had defied both the central authority 
as well as their own tribal hierarchy. Because of colonial intervention, at 
this time it is necessary to end discussion about the civil war, which never­
theless continued to perpetuate itself during the much more alarming Basuto 
Rebellion. No official record dated the exact beginning and end of the rebel­
lion, but it is plausible to say that the war commenced on September b, 1880, 
when colonial troops first crossed into Basutoland, and terminated during 
July, 1881, when both sides began to observe a military armistice. The rebel­
lion did not require an:, earlier, date,...because the rebels..;did^ Jnjp.t.LCQmmitdr)vaxti.''.-
The material in the next few subchapters attempts to disprove some his­
torical allegations, concerns the actual combat during the Basuto Rebellion, 
indicates the major battles (most of which have no names), and discusses the 
strategy, tactics, armament, logistics, and military appraisal of both sides. 
The campaign fallowed a course of action in which colonial troops with limited 
range battled highly mobile rebel forces. Tracing the events of this war, the 
text attempts to follow cohesively chronological progression in distinct geo­
graphical areas. In 1880, no adequate map of Basutoland existed; thus, the 
few attendant maps show, perhaps inaccurately, only some of the terrain in the 
campaign area. Historians have always referred to the war, informally, as the 
Gun War, thus perpetuating the fallacy that the PPA entirely caused the con­
flict. The colonial forces, history also recorded falsely, failed miserably 
to win victory. From careful scrutinization of the story, one must note that 
a multitude of events in and surrounding this conflict bring to mind events 
which occurred in the 1964-71 phase of the "Vietnam action."
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violence against the Cape Town Government until troops entered Basutoland. The 
3asuto Civil War, amalgamating with the rebellion, recognizably began about 
June 1, 1880, and also terminated in July, 1881. The 18B1 armistice ended 
neither the tribal feuding nor rebel resistance, although the fighting there­
after degenerated into the customary Basuto factious quarreling and did not 
involve colonial troops.
The most serious initial combat involved the Carrington wing of the CMR 
as it'marched across the Caledon River towards Mafeteng to relieve Magistrate 
Barkly and his ZOO Basuto police. About 2 miles from Mafeteng, 600 Basuto 
cavalry under Lerothodi attacked the advance guard commanded by Henry Shervin­
ton, which warded off the hostiles until CMR reinforcements arrived. In their
subsequent defeat, the rebels lost 12 killed, and the troops, who sold the
2
captured enemy sheep and cattle for Government profit, suffered only 1 casual-
3
ty. Part of the Moletsane bataunq attacked at Lithleko's villgge some Loya-
4
lists who had previously surrendered their guns. The CMR, after encamping at 
Mafeteng, fought Chief Moletsane at Lithleko’s, killing 5 rebels.
~ Magistrate Barkly ^  in addition*-; actively participated in the^ initial, con-- 
frontation. He with others rode out to scout around and informed a CMR scout 
that the hostiles blocked the road ahead. The magistrate met with and re­
quested Lerothodi to go home and said that the CMR, unless attacked, would not 
molest the chief, but Lerothodi, insisting that he had sustained volleys, 
would not return home unless the CMR turned back. Darkly disclaimed responsi­
bility for the CP-AR advance and warned Lerothodi of defeat if the chief attemp-
2Shervinton, The Shervintons, pp. 61-62; cf,, Theal, South Africa, XI,
61.
^Bataunq: clan.
^Theal, South Africa, XI, 61.
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ted to halt the soldiers. The magistrate then ordered out the Basuto police 
as an advance guard with instructions not to fire first. The courageous po­
lice almost seized an entire rebel herd, but the enemy recouped most of the 
animals^
Colonel Carrington, moreover, gave insight into the first few days of
4
campaigning. Messengers from Lerothodi on the 13th advised him not to move 
into Basutoland, and during the colonial advance on Mafeteng, rebel cavalry 
shadowed the CMR flanks, front, and rear. Besides the 600 warriors with Lero­
thodi, 3,400 more hid in nearby hills. The Carrington troops by crossing a 
plain turned the flank of the rebel kopje on which stood Lerothodi and his 
warriors; then the CMR and police withstood a rebel onslaught and scattered 
it. The hostiles tried in vain to rally as they fled pursuit over 3 miles, a 
pursuit that initially sought to clear the road to Morija and Letsie.
The colonel, regarding further clashes, heard that rebels were attacking
Loyalists nearby at Rafshotosberg. The CMR chased these hostiles 13 miles to 
7
the nek of Maquaisberg,. killing 7. On the 14th, when a search—and-destroy 
patrol entered the village-of Martineng, one and a half miles from Mafeteng, 
to prevent rebels escaping with grain, enemy resistance collapsed, and sol­
diers confiscated 2 loads of grain after destroying the village. On the 15th, 
while 25 CMR attacked the kraal of Matsepe, Lsrothodi reinforced with 200 
warriors the rebels defending a schantzen there, thus forcing the colonials 
to retreat. Captain Shervinton and Barkly with their reinforcements eventually 
dislodged all the hostiles and burned insurgent villages nearby. Lerothodi
5
3. S . P., (1881), LXVI, 347-49, ltr. Barkly to Griffith, beptember 13,
1880; cf., Theal, bouth Africa, XI, 61.
^Kopje: a small hill, often covered by scrub, on the African veldt.
^Nek: a low point in a mountain range often used as a travel route.
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retained about 500 warriors at his fortified kraal; Moletsane resided close by 
with 800-900?
On September 17, in a narrow escape for Shervinton in a following combat,
9
1,200 rebels battled 70 CMR, killing 3 of them. As Shervinton with 40 CMR were 
searching for enemy grain at an empty kraal 2 miles from Mafeteng, rebels sud­
denly poured from the village of Lerothodi to cut them off, end about 800 
enemy cavalry surrounded the colonials in the kraal. 3oth Shervinton and the 
rebels received reinforcements, but 11 soldiers drove off the 800 hostiles to 
allow the Shervinton patrol to escape back to camp with no casualties. The 
rebels, who lost about 50 killed or wounded, fired indifferently, would not 
expose themselves to view, and always retreated when pressed"^ Later, Carring­
ton himself joined in counter-attacking the rebel flank.
Rebel advantages became apparent in this latest encounter. Shervinton 
noticed that the Basuto ponies were superior to the CHR mounts and that the 
enemy carried Martini-Henry and Westley-Richards rifles, better weapons than 
the Snider carbines used by colonial troops. The rebels could fire from po­
sitions outside the-ranges of Snider carbines, which were useless immediately 
after firing, and during this interval, reassured by the CMR indefensibility 
in close combat, could attack with assegais and battle axes. Prime Minister 
Sprigg, returning to Cape Town, witnessed this skirmish, and Shervinton told 
him of the mediocrity of colonial arms. Shervinton estimated at 40,000 the 
enemy forces, who at this time began to encircle and isolate Mafeteng, while 
only 13,000 colonials were being mobilized againstthem^
3_._P., (1881), LXVI, 356-57, ltr- Carrington to Assist. Adj.-Gen., 
September 6, 1880; Orpen, Prince Alfred*s Guard 1856-1966. p. 28.
» (1881), LXVI, 307, ltr. Clifford to Kimberley, September 20,
1880.
^ Ibid., 330, ltr. Clifford to Kimberley, September 20, 1880.
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On the morning of the 21st, the date of the first attack on Mafeteng, 
Captain Shervinton attempted to use a heliograp^he had constructed about 1 
mile from camp. Enemy cavalry attempted to capture colonial cattle and horses 
grazing near Shervinton, who barely escapedthe 7,000 rebels advancing on Mafe­
teng. Meanwhile, 136 CMR, wagon drivers, European volunteers, Basuto police, 
and a few Loyalists manned strong points in the town. The enemy attacked 
Mafeteng on all sides and swept off cattle and half the native police mounts; 
then they charged the nearby village of Loyalist Mohapi, losing about 10 in 
this assault. Though colonial gunfire halted two more rebel charges, 200-300
14 15
enemy crept within 50 yards of the post and received 600-700 reinforcements.
Shervinton with 25 men mounted up and dislodged from under a schantz 400 of
these rebels^who fired once at the charge and fled^ The tribesmen, indicates
Barkly, used foot-long iron hooks with 2 sharp points to drag off their casual- 
18
ties, although Tylden says that for this purpose every warrior possessed a
19long rawhide rope with a grappling hook on the end. iMumerous rebels on the
2022nd returned home, but large; units still occupied every hill, around Mafeteng.
^Shervinton, The Shervintons, pp. 64-66; cf., Orpen, Prince Alfred's 
Guard 1856-1966, p. 29.
12
Heliograph: a device for signalling by means of a movable mirror, which 
flashes beams of light to a distance.
13
Shervinton, The Shervintons, pp. 66-67.
.5^ .P_., (1881), LXVI, 370-71, ltr. Carrington to Assist. Adj.-Gen., 
September 22, 1880.
15Shervinton, The Shervintons, p. 67.
» (1881), LXVI, 371, ltr. Carrington to Assist. Adj.-Gen., Septem­
ber 22, 1880.
17
Sharvinton, The Shervintons, p. 67.
IS
Barkly, Among Boers and Uasutos, p. 205.
19Tylden, The Rise of the Basuto, p. 151.
20B_,S_.P_., (1881), LXVI, 371, ltr. Carrington to Assist. Adj.-Gen., Septem­
ber 22, 1880.
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The rebel chiefs, in this ignoble failure, refused to allow all their war­
riors to go home until Mafeteng fell. The insurgents had lost so heavily that 
they did not celebrate, as usual, after the battle, in which only 5 CMR had
been wounded, and became disenchanted. Letsie had lost 1 son in the last as- 
21
sault. The hostiles showed magnificent cowardice at Mafeteng, according to 
Barkly, and the famed Battle Axe3 Regiment of Lerothodi suffered inglorious 
ignominy.
In the aftermath at Mafeteng, Magistrate Barkly boasted that his forces
had killed about 100 rebels around the residency, and he placed wire and mines
22 23
around his station. Captured horses supplied replacement mounts. Lerothodi
offered a £.100 reward for the capture of Barkly.
Some warriors sent by impotent Letsie to protect Barkly instead joined
24
the rebels. The chief still proclaimed his loyalty and vowed that he would
25prevent from entering his ward the warriors of Lerothodi.
As colonial forces made progress without -Letsie elsewhere, on September
2 66, the north column under Colonel Bayly crossed into Basutoland. The force
moved to Maseru without incident and planned to march on to Mafeteng if Grif-
27fith could raise enough volunteers to defend his post, Bayly, with Commandant 
5chermbrucker as second in command, constructed an earthen fort and fortified
21Ibid., 342, ltr. Sprigg to Treasurer-General, September 27, 1880.
22Barkly, Among Boers and Basutos. pp. 155, 164, 187, 204, 191, 206, 170.
^J3.5..P.., (1881), LXVI, 356, ltr. Clarke to Sprigg, September 22, 1880.
24Barkly, Among Boers and Basutos. pp. 155, 191-92.
25B.S.P., (1881), LXVI, 347, ltr. Letsie to Griffith, September 14, 1880. 
26
Ibid., 327, ltr. Captain D. Hook to Ayliffe, September 17* 1880.
27




the buildings at Maseru.
To the north, meanwhile, Natal aided against insurgents. Rebels forced
Loyalist Chief Jonathan from his stronghold at Tsikoane Plateau in Leribe Dist-
29rict, and he took refuge with Magistrate Bell at Thlatsi Heights, where a regi-
30 _
msnt of Loyalist volunteers guarded him. Two hundred Natal Europeans engaged
by Cape Town marched to Ijelp Jonathan, who actively sought armed support.
Governor-General Colley of Natal permitted Cape Colony to raise a Natal native
31police force to serve Magistrate Bell. If rebels threatened Natal itself,
32Colley agreed to aid Cape Town by direct military intervention, a possibility 
which Aylward thought would delight the Cape Colony merchants and some politi­
cians who thought that subjugation was the only method to bring black tribes
into the "very questionable paradise that canteen-keepers and petty grocers
33
call civilization."
To the south, at beleaguered Mohales Hoek, Magistrate Surmon with some
whites and a few Loyalists defended his station against attacks and encirclement
34 '■ - ■
by rebels. The garrison during a rebel attack on the 20th drove 1,200 enemy
-35--'' 'L'
from the town and killed several^ chieLfs^^ On September, 25, over 1,500 rebels, 
attacked again but fled after suffering a few casualties. They falsely rumored
28Tylden, The Rise of the Basuto. p. 150.
29
Thlatsi Heights: site of the Leribe magistracy and a military fort erec­
ted in 1879. Rosenthal, ed., Encyclopedia, p. 294.
^Lagden, The Basutos, II, 521.
31
£[.!5.jP., (X881), LXVI, 342, ltr. Sprigg to Treasurer-General, n.d., r. 
September 26, 1880*
32<Ibid. , 308, ltr. Colley to Kimberley, September 26, 1880*
33
Aylward, " B a s u t o p .  340.
34Theal, South Africa, XI, b2.
3^
“’Barkly, Among Boers and Basutos, p. 195.
3 6
_B.Su_P«, (1881), LXVI, 432, ltr. Surmon to Clarke. October 16, 1880.
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37that Surmon was now "food for the crows."
Troops, in subsequent colonial defensive positions, by the end of Septem­
ber garrisoned enclaves. Approximately 650 native policemen and colonial
3 0
volunteers garrisoned Thlatsi Heights. The north column under Colonel Bayly, 
300 strong with some Basuto police, held Maseru; "Fighting Fred" Carrington se­
cured Mafeteng with 250 soldiers and some Loyalists. Magistrate Surmon defen­
ded Mohales Hoek with 12 whites and 80 blacks, and Austen with 100 police and
39
some loyal Baphutis and Tesnbus had fallen back from Quthing town to Masitisi.
Simultaneous rebellious outbreaks in Tembuland and Griqualand East threa-
40
tened to strain both Cape Town forces and finances. Magistrate Austen routed
ab out 600 rebels under Chief Tyali, who had attacked the Palmietfontein magis—
41tracy in Herschel District, and Magistrate D. Hook at this post wanted 100
Bantu stationed 10 miles below the town to protect Loyalists fleeing Basuto—
42land. Austen, after another skirmish with Tyali, promised that reinforcements
43
could crush the insurgent Tembus. Brownlee from Griqualand East reported that
undesirables were exaggerating the Basuto Rebellion and that natives were de—
44
monstrating strong-sympathy for the rebels. He wanted more troops if the
^ I b i d ., 327, ltr. Hook to Ayliffe, September 17, 18BQ.
^□rpen, Prince Alfred's Guard 1856-1966, p. 29.
^^ B_.5_.P_. , (1881), LXVI, 344, Memorandum of September 29, 1880.
40
Theal, 5outh Africa, XI, 62; cf., Orpen, Prince Alfred’s Guard 1856- 
1966. p. 29; cf., j3.J5.jP., (1881), LXVI, 345, ltr. Clarke to Herbert, September 
29, 1880.
J5._P. , (1881), LXVI, 334-35, ltr. Austen to Ayliffe, September 21, 
1880; cf., Ibid., 335, ltr. Austen to Ayliffe, September 22, 1880.
^ I b i d ., 332, ltr. Hook to Ayliffe, September 15, 1880; cf., Ibid., 333, 
ltr. Ayliffe to Hook, September 16, 1880.
43
Ibid., 354-55, ltr. Austen to Ayliffe, September 29, I860.
44
Ibid., 322, ltr. Brownlee to Ayliffe, September 13, 1880.
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45
situation there deteriorated, because Cape Colony had transferred all soldiers
46
from his district to Basutoland.
Problems arose in troop mobilization, for, while Cape ministers did not
want to specify a definite period of service for the CMR but wanted Clarke to
47
muster enough soldiers to keep 600 men in the field at all times, General 
Clarke desired at least 2,000 permanent white troops, with 700 CMR from this 
total at Maseru and Mafeteng. Six hundred yeomanry and 700 volunteers would 
constitute the remainder of the force. From each regiment, Clarke wanted to 
activate only a limited number of men, who would remain in the field perma­
nently, because, if he called out all the yeomanry at once, Boer burghers and
other unreliable soldiers would have to replace them at the end of a six-month 
48
term. Burghers constituted the only reserve force, though many officers raised
49additional white and Bantu units. Burghers, believed the general, were mili­
tarily useless, because, untrained and reluctant to mobilize, they would hamper
50 _ . .
a field force, and burgher anger at their mobilization, indicated Jan Hofmeyr,
made1 the- war unpopuXar- in^ the-rural: areas?,:'whose^ Boer-inhabitants discussed - '
51
ways to avoid military service. Clarke also, complained of regiments mustering
52far below strength, and the Opposition in the Cape Parliament alleged that only
45
Ibid., 327, ltr. Brownlee to Ayliffe, September 16, 1880; cf., Ibid., 
336, ltr. Brownlee to Ayliffe, September 23, 1890.
46
Brownlee, Basuto War, p. 9.
^j3.j5.P_., (1B81), 330, H. W. Pearson Minute, September 17, 1880,
48
Ibid., 323, ltr. Clarke to Acting Undercolonial Secretary, September 15,
1880.
49
Ibid., 345, ltr. Clarke to Herbert, September 29, 1880.
50Ibid., 353, ltr. Clarke to Sprigg, September 17, 1880.
Smith, The Mabilles of Basutoland, p. 273.
52
B.»S..P,», (1881), LXVI, 334, ltr. Clarke to Treasurer-General, September
21, 1880.
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53half the CMY mobilized because the other half existed only on paper. The volun-
54teer system worked badly, as it could not field men for more than 6 months.
-55
General Clarke now decided to revisit Basutoland.
Administrator Clifford, disagreeing with mobilization procedures, was
disappointed that Loyalists had not received immediate protection. He also
56regretted that military delays increased rebel armaments and numbers and indi-
57
cated that only a large army could prevent increased rebellion. From experience
in the Zulu War, he thought that all the CMR must serve for at least 6 months
58so that the Government could employ them strategically.
Shortly after this rebuke, in attempts to resolve the mobilization and
Loyalist predicament, Clarke and Schermbrucker recruited and equipped Loya-
59 60lists. Sprigg, acknowledging that the rebellion had reached large dimensions,
activated 3 regiments of yeomanry for 3 months service^and called for volun-
62teers for 6 months service, because he believed that only a large and staunch
63 " '
white force could quash the rebellion in 3 months. Sir Gordon, noting that the 
rebels*perhaps^ numbered ^ O O O ^ . w ^ t e ^ t o  p^claiRi: specific, areas;,for^ only Loya-»-
^ Pall Mall Gazette (London), October 28, 1880, p. 5.
54Greswell, Our South African Empire, II, 83.
^£3.^5.P.., (1881), LXVI, 345, ltr. Clarke to Herbert, September 29, 1880.
c/J
Ibid., 325, ltr. Clifford to Kimberley, September 20, 1880.
57
Ibid., 324, ltr. Clifford to Ministers, September 17, 1880.
58
Ibid., 338, ltr. Clifford to Ministers, September 18, 1880.
59
Theal, 5outh Africa, XI, 62.
60
B_.J5.Pv, (18B1), LXVI, 336, ltr. Sprigg to Clifford, September 22, 1880,
^ I b i d .. 339, ltr. Clarke to Treasurer-General.
6 2
□rpen, Prince Alfredfs Guard 1856-1966, p. 28.
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B .!5. f\ , (1881), LXVI, 329, ltr. Sprigg to Ayliffe, September 20, 1880.
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lists so that he could treat everyone outside these limits as rebels^
Despite the smoldering situation in the Transvaal, which alienated against
6 5
each other British and Boer colonists, Boars offered to help fight the rebels*
One Transvaal veteran of the War of 1065 proffered his services as a guide and
66
those of 200-300 other volunteers. The Basuto Rebellion, he declared, had
assumed proportions that the Cape Government neither expected nor could han-
67 68 
die. Though President Brand volunteered 30 men, Free 5tate farmers reluctant­
ly loaned horses to carry ammunition to Mafeteng^
It seems appropriate to examine the logistics, organization, armaments, 
tactics, and strategy of the insurgents against whom the above mobilization 
was directed. General Clarke thought that the rebel mountain positions, unless 
blanketed by artillery fire, were too strong to succumb to attack and that 
Thaba Bosigo was the strongest point!*"* These impregnable mountain fortresses, 
according to Greswell, were barriers to colonial victory!"*" The enemy had great 
difficulty in storing provisions, because they lacked a war treasury and com- 
misariat. From their enormous numbersr nevertheless, they sent out 3 or 4
times as many merr to turn back colonial; columns numbering over 1,000 men- that:
72ventured out beyond enclaves. Not even a wagon could cross the Basuto border
64 Ibid., 339-40, ltr. Sprigg to Clifford, September 17, 18B0.
^Greswell, Our South African Empire, II, 83-84.
° IL'jL-Z.* t (1881), LXVI, 349-50, ltr. P. £. Raaff to Owen Lanyon, Septem­
ber 20, 1880.
67
Ibid., 350, ltr. Raaff to Frere, n.d., r. September 28, 1880.
68
Ibid., 345, Troops in the field, September 25, 1880.
69
Barkly, Among Boers and Basutos, p. 172.
70
J3.5^ .P_., (1881), LXVI, 323, ltr. Clarke to Acting Undercolonial Secre­
tary, September 15, 1880.
^Greswell, Our South African Empire, II, 83.
72
Lagden, The Basutos, II, 522.
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without a heavy escort, and rebel cavalry continuously watched camps and supply' 
73
trains. A military correspondent for The Times reported that the insurgents
had no military organization, lacked discipline, and were negligently coura- 
74geous. Regardless of the actual outcome of the smallest combat, leaders al- -
75
way3 informed their warriors that they had battled victoriously. The Basutos,
however, could ingeniously entrench themselves and had evolved a distinct
76breed of small but strong horses adapted to mountainous country. When ths
natives had only assegais, contends.De Kiewiet, soldiers could pursua them,
capture their cattle, and burn their grain. With rifles, the Basutos stood 
77their ground. The rebels, who were bad shots and hardly ever used gun sights,
valued highly Westley-Richards rifles but still used assegais, deeply indented
79
shields (Infra, p. 228, PI. XII), and a battle axe called the koakoa. A 
warrior could throw this battle axe (the shank of its blade was riveted through 
a two-foot carved handle) up to 30 feet when it was impossible to grapple with 
an opponent.
Regarding the abilities of Basuto military leaders, j-erothodi was a vul­
gar, uneducated drunkard. ' An astute politician, he- had overcome all" his ene­
mies, and though an excellent rider, he used limited cavalry strategy. He 
succeeded in his primary aim to prevent colonial troops from occupying Morija, 
the village of his father and center for incitement of other tribes (also the
73Tylden, The Rise of the Basuto, p. 149.
74
The Times (London), October 18, 1880, p. 4.
75Tylden, The Rise of the Basuto, p. 150.
76
Theal, South Africa, IX, 81.
De Kiewiet, The Imperial Factor, p. 267.
78
The Times (London), October 18, 1880, p. 4.
79George VI. Stow, The Native Races of South Africa. (Cape Town: C. Sxruik, 
1964), p. 235.
117
headquarters of the PCS). Lerothodi, who fought whenever and wherever he wan­
ted, did not try to hold high ground in force but used a fluid defense which 
melted away from each colonial attack, only to counter-attack apparent weak 
spots. His force moved in a quasi-square formation around the colonials, 
shooting haphazardly and charging 2 or 3 times against selected points. Masu­
pha during the war never personally led 1 attack, although he besieged Maseru. 
In the north, Chief Joel was anxious to fight, and his brother Jonathan, a 
good tactician and cavalry leader, was the next ablest commander after Lero­
thodi.
In regard to the competence and popularity of colonial leaders, General 
Clarke, according to Tylden, was a better administrator than a commander. Al­
though an excellent leader in the Zulu War, and though his officers liked him, 
Clarke lost 2 chances at Mafeteng to seize the initiative from Lerothodi, and 
volunteers disliked the general. Carrington, next in command, had led the CMR 
against rebel natives since 1877 cut had achieved no notable victories. The 
troops worshipped this resourceful,_and very active officer, and the Cape Colony
QQ ' '
press befriended him. There was much discontent in military circles, however,
81at the appointment of Carrington to command his senior officer, Colonel Bayly.
During the Basuto campaign, ’’Fighting Fred” never lacked initiative and even
82during the armistices urged patrols to goad the enemy. Colonel Bayly, who had 
much political influence, refused to serve under Carrington or cooperate with 
Clarke and unfortunately chained half the CMR at Maseru during the entire war.
In observation of colonial logistics, strategy, and organization, further-
^Tylden, The Rise of the Basuto, pp. 226-27, 229, 147, 149, 148.
O T
Orpen, Prince Alfred’s Guard 1856-1966, p. 36.
82Louis Cohen, Reminiscences of Kimberley. (London: Bennett &. Co., 1911),
p. 431.
JL10
more, there was a shortage of experienced officers and reserve troops, and, 
as the rebellions grew, colonial forces spread themselves over too large an 
area. 5o many troops garrisoned Leribe, Maseru, and Mafeteng that the main
column at Mafeteng was never strong enough to capture Morija. At every strong-
03
hold, detachments formed a laager, surrounded by a sod wall and a trench.
CHR signallers in the Orange free State prepared heliograph stations, and
Clarke and Carrington used Wepener as a staging area to provision Mafeteng.
84
Horses dragged artillery slowly over muddy roads, and to ship victuals to the
front was laborious, as the nearest railhead was at Queenstown, 200 miles 
85
from Basutoland. Be Kiewiet believes that colonial campaigning progressed
06
slowly and that attacks on hills and rocky ground provad useless.
To the detriment of the troops, there was evidence of PCS sympathy with 
and helplessness in the midst of rebels. The french whined of both their de­
licate position and of misrepresentation by both sides, yet the rebels seemed 
to enjoy chatting intimately with the missionaries. Neither did these flun­
kies sustain injury nor-did their buildings, suffer damage, but on the other
gy *
hand, the Anglican missions sustained heavy destruction, and the Wesleyan .
88
stations implored military intervention. Insurgents fondly called Dr. Eugeha ; 
89Casalis "Letsie's Knife'* for helping the rebel wounded, and the pastor insis-
83
Laager: voortrekkers very successfully used this South African defense 
formation, which included a circle of wagons and thorn bushes. Rosenthal, ed., 
Encyclopedia, p. 285.
84
Tylden, The Rise of the Basuto, pp. 149-50.
85
Theal, South Africa, XI, 62.
86
De Kiewiet, The Imperial factor, p. 267.
Smith, The fiabilles of Basutoland, pp. 248-49, 272.
og
Hansard, 3rd ser., Vol. 257 (1881), 1068, Sir Wilfrid Lawson speaking, 
January 20, 1881.
89
il* > P* ^1. Eugene Casalis: Born in Segalis, France, Casalis
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ted that the colony exaggerated enemy casualties. When Masupha cordially in­
vited Mr. Duvoisin to examine his encampment in the Berea District, the mis­
sionary here expressed his views, but the natives only muttered in angry 
disagreement. The French were unable to prevent most of the Christians from 
joining the rebels, and at Morija, school children finished their exams and 
immediately embraced their guns and assegais. The schools closed, Christian 
congregations dispersed, and scores of loyal natives fled to the mountains.
Adolphe Mabille alleged that before he left Morija, he and local chiefs segre-
90gated the Loyalists in a refuge.
Governor Frere maintained that the struggle matched civilization against 
barbarism. Colonial troops perhaps might not end the rebellion, but the figh­
ting so far had shown that ten years of peace had not dissipated Basuto
91courage or dulled tribal skill in surprising colonial forces. Though some,
like Kimberley and Rhodes, opposed the war, the prospect of losing Basuto la-
92bor in their diamond fields, contended Frere, motivated these two men more
93than military necessity. The Cape Argus wrote that the colony had involved
94' '
itself in another costly and inglorious war, and tha Basutos, reported the-
Pall Mall Gazette, considered that the PPA was designed to instigate tribal
rebellion. According to the Gazette, Frere, even if he did not directly cause
began Protestant mission training in Paris in 1830. Arriving at Cape Colony 
in 1833, he found no missionaries in Basutoland. Chief Moshesh allowed the 
PES to build at Thaba Bosigo a station, later relocated at Morija. Casalis 
returned to Paris in 1858 to becoma director of the mission for a time.
90
Smith, The Mabilles of Basutoland, pp. 272-74, 282.
91Frere, "The Basutos . . . Cape of Good Hope,*' p. 194.
92Basil Williams, Cecil Rhodes (London: Constable and Co., Ltd., 1938),
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•the war, at least stirred bitter Basuto animosity, and supposedly, Prime Mini­
ster Sprigg thought the war would vitalize the patriotism and political inde-
-*95
pendence of Cape Colony. The paper insisted that, while Basuto magistrates 
had prepared for war, the rebels in the past had offered no resistance and now 
fought only defensively?**
Prime Minister Sprigg, in conclusion, mistakenly believed that he could 
end the war swiftly; he and his ministers mobilized too few men to cope with 
the succession of sudden rebellions. General Clarke justifiably did not want 
set a definite term of service; thus, troops could not untimely leave the 
battlefront. In the Cape armed forces, deficiencies of manpower in mbbiliza- 
tion and of other necessities, such as superior weaponry and swords, together 
with inefficient mobilization procedures, hampered the colonial effort. Little 
military cooperation between Cape Colony and Natal existed to meat contingent 
military situations. In order to damage rebel morale, troop3 should have 
attacked as early as possible Thaba Bosigo and Morija, respectively the mili­
tary and administrative capitals of Basutoland. By October, opposition to 
the colonial military response-could have resulted only from ulterior motives 
or from false information, as blatantly evidenced in the Pall Mall Gazette.
Chief Lerothodi, furthermore, sought to isolate his father from colonial 
influence. The hostiles, whose masses made dangerous long colonial pursuits, 
nevertheless did not employ their guns to the best advantage and lost every 
battle in September. In refutation of De Kiewiet, the rebels cowardly fled 
from Cape troops, and colonial attacks succeeded on difficult terrain. Re­
bels, in order to obtain allies and perpetuate aggression, fomented trouble
95
Pall Mall Gazette (London), November 8, 188D, pp. 2, 4.
*^*Ibid., September 29, 1880, p. 4.
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across their borders in Basuto clans and other tribes who thought it a good 
opportunity to rebel.
OCTOBER 1880
97On October 4, Colonel Southey evacuated Magistrate Surmon. With the 2nd 
CMR of 184 men, Southey had marched to support another detachment at 01fant 
Been in the Orange Free State, 8 miles from Mohales Hoek, where ha took over 
command of 313 additional men. The rebels did not appear as these troops 
crossed the Grange River, but 1 mile further on, the enemy at long range fired 
at the main force; the colonials then charged the hostiles and drove them 
back. The troops, upon reaching Mohales Hoek, loaded most of the Surmon pro­
perty and marched back within three-fourths of a mile of the river, where the
2nd CMY checked about 100 rebels attempting to occupy a village on high ground
98
overlooking the road. Only military necessity forced General Clarke to with-
■99
draw Surmon, who, with reinforcements, could have maintained his post.
Five thousand rebels under Masupha on October 10 attacked Maseru (Infra, 
p. 231 , PJ.XVII), where Colonel Bayly commanded 239 whites and Schermbrucker 
led 256 blacks^^ One hundred and thirty-eight whites, some police under 
George Moshssh, and some Loyalists defended the residency, and Chief Koadi 
with 154 warriors stood on a kopje between the residency and Trower’s store. 
Sofonia, Nehemiah, Tsekelo, and Rampa manned the courthouse with their war-
97Theal, South Africa, XI, o2.
93
J3. SiP.., (1881), LXVI, 398-99, ltr. Southey to Assist. Adj.-Gen., Octo­
ber 8, 1880.
99
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riors, and 46 men under Zitza Hoshesh and Mokhitle occupied the hospital. 
Matheus with 35 natives and 13 whites held Trower's store; Philemoni with 18 
warriors and 7 whites occupied Irvine’s store. At dawn, a picket reported a 
force of rebels approaching from the south-southeast. The enemy occupied 3 
kopjes in front of the residency, fashioned stone walls, and began shooting, 
while 3,000 others under Bereng, Mama, and Theko poured out from Lestatse’s 
village. From Berea Plateau on the east, 2,000 more hostiles, commanded by 
Lepogo and Martins, 2 sons of Masupha, marched towards Maseru; 1 column ap­
proached the CMR camp, and the other started firing rapidly at the residency 
and Koadi's kopje. From the Caledon River, 500 more rebels approached from 
the direction of the residency toward the old jail, opposite to and separated 
from Trower’s store by a creek, but Safonia halted this onslaught. An enemy 
band from Lestatse’s village, however, joined this rebel group, forcing Sofo- 
nia to retreat from the church to the courthouse. Koadi and 50 Loyalists, as 
ordered by Schermbrucker, started to take a ravine aboue the stream and to 
push the rebels towards- the church or Trower’s and the residency, but Les— 
tatse’s warriors menaced them, so Schermbrucker rescinded the order, trower 
abandoned the knoll above his house as the main attack began, and, when the 
enemy assailed Koadi's kopje, the Loyalists there retreated after using up 
all their reserve ammunition. Hand-to-hand combat occurred at Trower’s, and 
rebels charged within 20 yards of the residency fortifications, from where 
Basuto police recaptured a hill. Hostiles stole Trower’s livestock from his 
kraal and burned the church, school, police barracks, stable, and several 
homes, but the Maseru garrison drove the rebels back^^
» (1^81)» LXVI, 426-2B, ltr, Schermbrucker to Bayly, October
11, 1880.
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In further examination, a 12 lbr. gun probably prevented the hostiles 
during the entire day from attacking in masses, though the colonial force re­
tired to Port Gordon’!’^  Colonel Bayly, imitating from Rorke’s Drift^Ejurned
104the hospital buildings at dusk in order to illuminate the rebel positions.
While the enemy attempted to pull out the burning thatch on the hospital roof
105
so that they could use the place for shelter, a shell hit then squaraly.
Rebels attacked the Government House and feebly assaulted the fort, where the 
first volley from the defenders drove the assailants back. The hostiles 
burned the district surgeon’s house, some offices, and part of the Trower 
store; then they plundered the courthouse and stole some guns^^
Continuing, one defender reported that, as the enemy was firing heavily 
from behind the home of Griffith atop a kopje, he sent men into earthworks in 
front of the Irvins store. Then the rebels pinned down these men in a cross­
fire from the police camp, forcing them to retreat to the store yard. At
night, he regained the earthworks, killing about 40-60 rebels, built schantzen
107on each side, and fired on Trower’s kopje after Trower had fallen back.
Mr. A. 5idwell, from another perspective, commanded the unit at Trower’s 
store and at dawn had moved his men to Koadi’s kopje and also held a small 
outpost which commanded the road from the Caledon. The enemy, exposing them-
102J M ! ' » 380, ltr. Sprigg, October 13, 1880.
103 Rorke’s Drift: a battle during the Zulu War, in which a British de­
tachment of engineers resolutely held off hordes of enemy warriors and thus 
prevented a Zulu invasion of Cape Colony.
^ ^ Fall Mall Gazette (London), October 14, 1880, p. 4.
1 flS
B_. S_. ,P., (1881), LXVI, 425-26, ltr. Bayly to Assist. Adj.-Gen., Octo­
ber 13, 1880.
^ ^ Ifrid., 380, ltr. Sprigg, October 13, 1880.
~^^Ibid., 429, ltr. Hobson to Bailie, October 11, 1G80.
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selves by constantly changing positions, began shooting from a rocky hillside
position about 700 yards away from the colonial lines; others sneaked down
from the abandoned police camp and followed some sluits0? o the east. Then
120 rebels dashed from the right front to the right flank, sustaining numerous
volleys but capturing Trower’s kraal, from which they fired at the outflanked
109
and outnumbered colonials, who abandoned Koadi’s kopje. Before midnight, 
the rebels departed, leaving scores of dead, and Schermbrucker, who lost 2 
killed’j’^'was confident that the troops could hold Maseru^"1’
112
On October 25, rebels again unsuccessfully assaulted Maseru. The enemy 
entrenched themselves on rocks, dongas^in the school ruins, and on the Kloof14 
to the left of Fort Gordon. Bayly sent’out 20 CMR, 90 native troops, and 
some Loyalists^whodislodged 400—500 hostiles on the rocky ledges of the Ca­
ledon river bank and killed 20^&owever, not before the rebels had killed 2
117
whites and 1 Loyalist and had run off 45 horses and 42 cattle.
Near Mafeteng, in the meantime, the rebels, faring no better, assaulted 
the Fraser store at Diphering on the 4th. Carrington dispatched 50 CMR to the 
surrounding area to engage the enemy, and these troops with Barkly and his
10 8Sluits: deep ditches produced by heavy rains rushing through natural 
fissures.
109
B.SuP., (1883.), LXVI, 429-30, ltr. A. Sidwell to Bayly, October 11,
1880.
110
Theal, South Africa, XI, 62-63.
5_.jP., (1881), LXVI, 381, ltr. Schermbrucker, October 13, 1880.
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113Dongas: narrow, steep—sided ravines made by water erosion but usually




B_.o,.P.., (1881), LXVI, 664-65, ltr. Bayly to Assist. Adj.-Gsn., Octo­
ber 30, 1880.
^^Ibid., 418, ltr. 3ayly to Sprigg, October 26, 1880.
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native police, the Barkly Horse, fired on the rebels, who retreated. Lero- 
thodi with about 2C0 warriors then raced to cut off Barkly and his police ad­
vancing on the Fraser store, but the magistrate pushed them back. The next 
day, 2,500-3,000 rebels fired constantly at the store as their ranks increased, 
and Shervinton and 25 men for defensive purposes occupied the kopje opposite
Fraser’s. Carrington and Barkly with 25 soldiers prevented Lerothodi from
X X 8cutting off Shervinton, evacuated Fraser, and then withdrew.
The rebels next in vain again sought to overrun Mafeteng. Mr. Bradshaw
and 12 Basuto police, in a preventive measure, on the night of the 14th
sneaked up a hill behind Hogsback Ridge and destroyed enemy schantzen. Other
colonials mounted to charge 800-1,000 aroused rebels soon storming out of
Masiu’s hamlet but halted after they saw Lerothodi and his warriors on top of
Hogsback Ridge. From Mohapi’s village sprung 1,000 enemy warriors, and from
a kloof behind Mafeteng struck another 500 rebels, who attacked colonial
schantzen above the courthouse from Hogsback Ridge and below. The hostiles
after hesitating charged colonial trenches but lost 4-5 killed and retirecT^
120
to burn a trading post as revenge far the Carrington victory. Letsie secret­
ly encouraged the rebels and blamed Lerothodi for suffering heavy losses at 
Mafetengl^
The rebels, next reported Carrington, had moved toward the border to 
intercept General Clarke and the reinforcements which had assembled at
^*^Theai, South Africa, XI, 63.
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Wepener. The force included the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd CMY, the Kimberley Horse,
123
and two 7 lbr. guns. Captain Hunt*s Volunteers formed the rear guard, and 
the Grahamstown Volunteers (1st City Rifles), Port Elizabeth Volunteers 
(Prince_Alfred1s Guard ereafter abbreviated to PAQ7), and the Mohales Hoek 
contingent adjoined the left. The Cape Town Volunteers (Duke of Edinburgh’s 
Own Volunteer Rifles /hereafter abbreviated to DEOVR/) stood on the right 
flankl^ The troops included 101 officers, 1,495 whites, and 75 natives^'*
In the momentous battle of Kalabani that followed (Infra, p. 232, PI. XVIII 
), the force crossed the border and left the road to avoid ambush, where­
upon Lieutenant Cochran with two 7 lbrs. placed on hifcjh ground dispersed 
massed rebels towards the north-northeast. The road then turned sharply to 
the right and entered a short pass between Robatwani’s village and Kalabani 
Hill, which the CMR had occupied, and the wagons passed through single file 
and afterward resumed formation. Clarke sent Colonel Brabant with the 1st
CMY to probe eastward, where a rebel array charged the unit, and hand-to-hand 
126fighting erupted. Captain Dalgety dismounted his 120 men within 300 yards 
of a few of these enemy and advanced firing. One thousand hidden rebels 
charged him and 2 following CMY troops, and before the yeomanry could remount, 
300 rebels lad by Chief 5eiso sprung in among them, killing 36, mostly with 
assegais and battle axes. Carrington with part of his garrison sallied out
122
Ibid., 385, ltr. Sprigg, October 19, 1880.
123-bharvinton, The Shervintons, p. 70.
124Barkly, Among Boers and Basutos, p. 244; Grpen, Prince Alfred’s Guard 
1856-1966, p. 30.
125B.5..P., (1881), LXVI, 386, ltr. Clarke to bprigg, October 19, I860. 
126 Ibid., 435, ltr. Clarke to bprigg, October 2D, 1880; Grpen, Prince 
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127and scattered some of these rebels, and Captain Nettleton rallied the convoy 
and with the Dalgety unit helped drive back the enemy. The 2nd CMY under 
Colonel Southey then reinforced the crippled 1st Regiment, and together they
attacked a small village and killed about 40 fleeing rebels. The 3rd CMY
JL23
next joined the engagement. As the enemy appeared on both flanks, artillery
repelled their left. From the right, of 7*000-8,000 massed hostiles charged
300-400, but several volleys from the DE0VR stopped them. For 3 hours, the
PAG and 1st City Rifles fought off hostiles on the left. Nguebe Letsie and
his brother Bereng then led an unsuccessful charge against the 1st CMY.
Clarke, in the wake of Kalabani, said that swords were invaluable to all
129
mounted troops, asserted that his force was insufficient, and wanted Martini-
130
Henry rifles for his soldiers. Mrs. Barkly urged both Sprigg and rrere to
rapidly reinforce the troops, who always seamed numerically inadequate for
131their undertakings. The Pall Mall Gazette alleged that 100 soldiers had
been incapacitated at Kalabani and that Clarke had exaggerated the body count
132of 300 rebel warriors. Tylden adduces that the colonial forces were not 
accustomed to such casualties and that additional setbacks would lead to 
further parliamentary opposition to the war. The "victory" of Lerothodi at 
Kalabani, concludes Tylden, balanced his failure to take Mafeteng.
127Shervinton, *he Shervintons, pp. 70-71; Orpen, Prince Alfred’s Guard 
1856-1966, pp. 30, 32.
128B.i-.P. , (1881), LXVI, 435, ltr. Clarke to Sprigg, October 20, 1880; 
cf., Ibid., 386-88, ltr. Clarke to Sprigg, October 19, 1880; Orpen, Prince 
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Clarke, following his usual strategy, left Carrington with a force ina­
dequate to hold Mafeteng, kept open lines of communication with Wepener, and
133
assaulted the hordes of Lerothodi. He built a fort close to the Mafeteng
laager to house the garrison whenever his column returned to the bnrder for 
134
supplies, but only after sufficient reinforcements arrived did Clarke decide
135
to bolster the garrison.
The general, in his next move, though the rebels foiled a surprise at­
tack, decided to capture the village of Lerothodi atop a hill 3 miles from
136
Mafeteng (Infra, p.230 , PI.XV ). On October 22, about 1,000 colonials en­
gaged 6,000-8,000 rebels, and enemy prisoners later confirmed a body count of
137
about 600 dead from their force, which 5 sons of Letsie commanded. Colonial
troops climbed the foothills, burned a number of native huts, occupied a
plateau and village east of the Lerothodi harnlet, and, notwithstanding the
fire from thousands of enemy cavalry below, dragged their artillery up to the
plateau. On the colonial right, numerous hostiles by occupying a rocky gorge
precluded a colonial assault on the main village, and they also occupied an
adjacent donga, an obstacle that required clearing. The CMR dismounted and
with the DEGVR under Shervinton charged towards the right to seize the rebel 
JL38donga. A correspondent present at the battle thought it a miracle that a 
large number of soldiers were not killed in this charge, however, the onset
133Tylden, The Rise of the Basuto, p. 156.
134
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came swiftly. When the DEOVR seemed a bit hesitant, Shervinton cast off his
jacket, rolled up his shirt sleeves, drew his sword, and raced ahead. The
troops fallowed so fast that they jumped into the donga atop the rebels, and
1 exhiliarated soldier pursued and killed some of the panic-stricken rebel
horde. Shervinton with 200 infantry then attacked about 1,000 rebels, killed
over 100, and captured numerous enemy horses and 200 rifles, which the hos-
139
tiles fired clumsily. The PAG, in the first bayonet charge by a South Afri­
can volunteer unit, drove the enemy in another sector back over a ridge in 
hand-to-hand combat, killing many here and more in the upper gorge who were 
fleeing to krantzes^and Lerothodi's village^^ The escaping enemy offered ex­
cellent targets for artillery. A direct colonial assault then captured the
142village, killing about 31 more rebels. Thirty-one troopers were killed in 
143the battle. To hold the village of Lerothodi was impossible, because the
hostiles occupied hills on the right and left; thus, the colonials initiated
144
an orderly withdrawal. Barkly issued a Government proclamation which offered
145
protection to rebels who surrendered guns and ammunition. Several warriors 
of Moletsane after the battle fled to the Orange Free State to seek work.
General Clarke, in maneuvers after this battle, dispatched a search-and- 
destroy patrol to Maquaisberg (Moletsane's Mountain), Where Moletsane suppos-
139_ohervinton, The Shervintons, pp. 72-73; Barkly, Among Boers and Basu­
tos , pp. 240-41.
^ ^Krantzes: sheer cliffs.
141
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146edly hovered, and the unit saw few rebels and burned a village. On October
14730, General Clarke with 1,450 men left Mafeteng'to storm Maquaisberg again.
Nguebe, Mogela, and Zeko, all sons of Letsie, helped lead the opposing rebel
148 149
force, estimated at about 5,000. As the enemy grew too numerous, the colo-
150
nials retreated from the Moletsane hamlet wrth 8 dead. Moletsane, neverthe­
less, afterwards hastened to Thaba Bosigo, and most of his men, short of
151
ammunition, fled to the Maluti Mountains. During this battle, Shervinton
remained an duty for 19 consecutive hours. The rebels, he said, were very
active and fought every tine the troops marched out, whereas the colonial
152forces did little except make 7-day sorties to contact the hostiles.
Magistrate Bell, to the north in Leribe District, where the Molappo 
brothers were campaigning energetically, reported that Chief Jonathan had oc­
cupied a strong post at Thaba Patswa after driving away the warriors of Masu-
153
phaTwHo had fortified it. ; Near the end of the month, an attack by Chief
Joel on Thlotsi Heights miscarried, but ha successfully stole cattle from
Griffith going to the Free State. The Government, thought Bell, must offer
154a reward for the capture of Joal.
The rebellions outside Basutoland, meanwhile, hod assumed alarming pro­
portions, but colonial troops greatly diminished the threats. Magistrate
146
1 3 . P_., (1881), LXVI, 417, Summary of events in Basutoland since Oc­
tober 2.6, 27, and 28, 1880; Barkly, Among Boers and Basutos, pp. 252-53.
147
B...S.P_., (1881), LXVI, 419, ltr. Clarke to 5prigg, October 31, I860.
148
Ibid., 661-62, ltr. Clarke to Sprigg, November 1, 1080.
149
New York Times, November J, 1880, p. 2.
150
Theal, South Africa, XI, 63.
151
B.S..P., (1881), LXVI, 418, ltr. Clarke, October 28, 1880.
152Shervinton, The Shervintons, p. 74.
153
B_._5.P_., (1881), LXVI, 384, ltr. Sprigg, October 19, 1880.
154 Ibid., 450, Summary of events in Basutoland since November 2, 1880.
131
Austen in Quthing District was concerned about Basuto rebels in the lower part
155
of his district and the rebellion of Tyali, but troops soon flushed the de-
156moralized rebel Tembus from lower Quthing into mountainous country. Cape 
Town asked the factious Rondos to help vanquish the Basuto rebels. The neigh­
boring Pondo Chief Umhlonhlo, thought: Magistrate Hope at Qumbu, was unreli- 
able^Ind, as expected, the chief joined the instigating Basuto rabels^^
After Umhlonhlo cowardly killed Magistrate Hope, colonial troops defeated the 
159
rebel Rondos, and Clarke believed that Watal regular troops could check the
entire Pondo tribe^^ The most pernicious insurgent influence penetrated Gri-
JL 6i
qualand East District, where, on October 5, the Basutos around Matatiele re­
belled. Colonial forces faced 5,000 hostiles here and in Tembuland, and a
162rebel victory could increase the enemy ranks in these places to 10,000. The
rebel Basutos here had voiced no grievances but savagely slaughtered native 
163neighbors and almost murdered Chief Magistrate Brownlee for warning them 
against rebellion. The Natal Government and Natal traders delivered arms and
155
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ammunition to Brownlee, and Administrator George C. Strahan announced that
165
troops by the 19th had checked the Griqualand rebels.
On the other side of Basutoland during this month, Cape Colony and the
Orange Free State antagonized each other despite their good intentions.
Strahan desired friendly relations with the Free State, and he asked Brand to
166
halt the contraband trade, whereupon the president raplied that Free State
law punished severely persons who sold ;ammunition and guns to natives, and
he instructed the field cornets and other officials to strictly enforce the 
167
law. From Free State territory, Basuto hostiles captured 190 of Trowerfs 
168
cattle; at the end of the month, numerous rebels crossed into the Orange Free
169State at Jackman Drift, an act which facilitated their attacks in Basutoland. 
Boers, said rebel prisoners, offered them military intelligence7and with rene­
gade Englishmen sold them horses, guns, blankets, and liquor. On the positive 
side, President Brand refused Lerothodi permission to attack the troop camp
at Wepener, where the Bloemfontein Mission had erected a camp hospital for
171
the colonial wounded, and allowed 300 additional colonial troops to pass
through his country, wanting to know only by which corridor the contingents
172 173would travel so that he could inform the landdrosts of the route. Strahan,
164Brownlee, Basuto War, pp. 10-13, 26.
165
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however, did not inform Brand of the troop itinerary through the Free Stated74
As troops from the other Boer state, the Transvaal, volunteered for the
war, President Brand rejected the proposal of a Transvaaler to raise Free
State volunteers, because such action would endanger the border area and com-
175
pel ^he country to mobilize a large army. The British administrator at Pre­
toria volunteered loot-hungry Transvaal officers and other personnel for the 
176
campaign. Clarke recommended acceptance of these 300 Ferreira volunteers on 
the same terms as those issued by the Imperial Government during the Zulu
177War, because, at this time, he did not want to mobilize more regular units,
but Strahan, lying that Clarke deemed the proposal unnecessary, rejected the 
1T8Ferreira offer. Cape Colony, however, later accepted Transvaal volunteers
179on the same terms as with Natal.
'.As'Natal, meanwhile, offered more aid, Major Dartnell mobilized 100 
mounted natives from tribes along the border to W3tch the passes and upper 
borderland, and another 120 natives left to combat the rebels. Governor
Colley conferred with a dejected Brownlee and reinforced the Cape Colony post
JL 8 0
of Fort Harrison at 5t. John’s, because it was more accessible from Natal.
JL8JL
Strahan, in further mobilization, called up 2,000 burghers and purchased
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dispatched 900 reinforcements. The recruiting of volunteers was unsuccess­
ful, because employers would not assuredly rehire most men mobilized in volun­
teer units; therefore, some volunteers sent in drunken substitutes for mili­
tary duty. Cape Town wanted to field a large force to quickly stifle the re-
184
bellion.
In newspaper criticism of the combatants and their advocates, Reuters 
falsely reported the devastation of Maseru and the danger of annihilation for 
colonial troops besieged in enclaves, and the Pall Mall Gazette announced that 
the troops were losing the war. Much responsibility for the war, maintained 
the Daily Telegraph (London), resided with people and newspapers who advocated 
the rebel cause. This paper questioned how far the guardians of the insur­
gents could reconcile their interests with conduct that led to the massacre of 
Loyalists and their allies and to the destruction of Loyalist hamlets. All 
5auth Africa held these instigators and Opposition agitators in the Cape Par­
liament responsible for inciting the natives to resist European domination and
JL85
for starting rebellions that threatened the South African colonies.
In reflection, few troops often drove off numerous rebels, and the use­
ful artillery seemed indispensable. Colonial bravery, notably that of Sher­
vinton, unfortunately did not alter the imbalanced manpower ratio between the 
combatants, which precluded some colonial military action. Active Loyalists 
adequately demonstrated their bravery in October. Because of his anger at 
Cape Town handling of the crisis, the once active and much needed Colonel
^ ^ Ibid., 393-94, ltr. Sprigg, October 26, 1880.
184~
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Griffith now brooded in silence.
The rebels, moreover, continued to loss heavily in reckless attacks and 
in defense postures, and rebel morale must have suffered, because some hostiles 
quit the war. It was unconscionable that rebel sympathizers and others both 
instigated and heartened the hostiles, exaggerated enemy successes, and under­
estimated colonial accomplishments.
NOVEMBER 1BB0
Despite rumors from still undaunted rebels that they had killed all the
troops at Mafeteng, colonial forays from this post encountered repeated suc- 
186cess. Carrington sallied out on the 10th on a search-and-destroy mission
with 69 officers, 1,251 regulars, and three 7 lbr. guns. The troops moved on
Hermon, then to Tsakholo Lcske, where advance units scattered about 150 rebels
187
from some villages, and soldiers burned these hamlets on the 12th. Clarke
ordered Carrington to march through open country to Kolo Mountain to encourage
1.88
a battle, because there were not enough troops to search the mountains. 
Slashing over muddy terrain, soldiers found that the moisture made their Sni­
der ammunition jam. Troops on this march did not hold ground taken and always 
returned at night to their laager near Tsitsa*s Nek on the road from Mafeteng 
to Kolo. The enemy, as the colonials approached closely one day, pushed out 
a black bull on high ground as a signal for a mounted charge on 3 sides of the
166
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189 „colonial square. Carrington, thinking the hostiles hidden nearby in strength 
after initial skirmishes, had barely positioned some of his units when 2,000 
hostiles assaulted the colonial right, 800 the left, and 300-400 toward the 
front. The enemy charged fiercely, and only intense colonial rifle fire kept 
them from overrunning the rear guard. Artillery fire killed a dozen rebels 
and would have dispatched more if the enemy had not come so close to the colo­
nial ranks and if enemy shelter had been farther away. Their onslaught col­
lapsed, and the. hostiles retreated. Of 5,000 attacking rebels^over 60t?J^ cIied
192
along with 3 colonials, But the rebels could absorb such casualties and kept
193
Carrington permanently dependent on his laager. The colonel moved east
again to taunt the rebels into exposing themselves and then returned to Mafe-
194teng.
Magistrate Barkly, furthermore, burned 1 or 2 rebel villages near Mafe- 
195teng with Carrington, who conducted search-and-destroy operations against 
several more rebel villages. Massed at Kolo, 10,000 hostile warriors had 
altered their plan to massacre a Wepener convoy and attack Mafeteng, because 
Carrington had already defeated them and now occupied Hermon in order to
189
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cort the supply train. On November 16, because rebels again occupied and had
196
fortified Lerothodi's village, a search-and-destray patrol marched out under 
Carrington on the 21st, and troops captured the hamlet and drove off the re­
bels. Because the more numerous enemy continued to fire on them rapidly,
197however, the colonials soon fell back. On the 22nd, Colonel Brabant with
600 men and 2 guns sallied out from Mafeteng to contact the hostiles, shelled
5,000 who fled, and a few days later repelled 800 rebels who attacked his camp.
Continuing, Colonel Carrington moved out on the 28th with 1,200 men oh
198
a search-and-destroy operation. Following skirmishing all of that day at 
Boleka Ridge, a rebel night attack on Carrington failed. On the 30th, a 600- 
man column set out and engaged victoriously in several skirmishes with the 
trailing enemy. Later, at Tsitsa*s Nek, the soldiers successfully battled 
the hostiles, and a colonial detachment assaulted a nearby nek to destroy ene-> 
my villages. The rebels during these actions refused to charge or fight in 
the open and fired their ample ammunition at too long a range.
The troops, despite these successes, advanced no further because of in­
sufficient numbers to hold the ground. Colonel Carrington wanted 600 men to 
escort supplies from the Free State, 400 to garrison Mafeteng, additional
troops to form a mobile column, and at least 700 soldiers to maintain commu-
199nications between the column and Mafeteng.
In Leriba District, moreover, the colonial position became tenuous.
196
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Chief Joel attacked the Leribe magistracy with 600 warriors on the 8th**burned
the police barracks, and stole 30 horses and all the Loyalist cattle, but
troops repelled the assault and killed 17. Members of Jonathan’s clan fought 
200
only reluctantly. Enemy numbers increased under Chiefs Joel, Khetise, Kalsua,
201Lesuana, and Masupha until over 2,000 surrounded the residency. Magistrate
Bell, having predicted his encirclement, asked for the Kimberley Horse, the
202
Ferreira unit, and 2 howitzers in addition to the loyal Griqua West contin-
203gent already in the district. Chief Jonathan retired to fortified Thaba
Patswa, because his clan would not actively support him. After Joel, Rama—
nella, and another rebel chief later drove Jonathan from Tsikoane Mountain and
204
confiscated his cattle, the Loyalist with 260 stragglers fled to Thlotsi 
Heights, where Loyalists there and Chieftainess Senate’s clan nearby pledged 
support, though scores left the post to protect their families who resided 
elsewhere. On the 12th, the enemy again made a futile attack on the residen­
cy, aiming miserably, struck on all sides on the 14th and burned some houses, 
and the following day fired from schantzen at long range.
As reinforcement of Thlotsi Heights promoted more active maneuvering,
1B0 Kimberley Horse force-marched there from Maseru and cut through enemy 
lines. Part of this unit and a garrison detail under Bell later forced the
hostiles from entrenchments and flattened rebel schantzen. Chief Joel on the
205
20th lost numerous men in an attack from Bell, and the next day the Kimberley
JP., (1881), LXVI, 668, 'Summary of events in Basutoland since No­
vember 10, 1880. 
201
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206
Horse in another clash killed 30 more rebels. While Masupha, enraged that 
the Kimberley Horse had safely reached Thlotsi Heights, sent warriors to the 
Caledon Drift to stop further colonial reinforcements, a CMR unit on the.27th 
arrived at Ficksburg in the Orange Free State, where Bell requested it to
2Q7
await an escort by Captain Ferreira. Ferreira had reached Thlotsi Heights
on the 25th, after his Transvaal Horse, the escorting Kimberley Horse, and
208
Loyalists under Jonathan had driven back a 3-sided rebel attack.
Colonial success in neighboring Griqualand East withstood native unre­
liability. Brownlee, because he suspected that half his 100 enlisted Basutos 
were rebels, abandoned Matatiele. Loyal Basutos here continued to join the
hostiles because of threats and confiscation of Loyalist property, and nu-
209
merous Griquas were questionable Loyalists. The defeat of Chief Umhlonhlo,
besides other colonial military pressure, however, precluded the opportunity
210for rebel success in Griqualand East and quieted adjacent Bantu tribes.
President Brand, on the opposite Basuto border, further evidenced his
friendly neutrality towards Cape Colony, despite friction over troop passage.
He wrote that "irregularities" forced him to advise sending the Kimberley
Horse to Maseru instead of to Leribe, because he feared another rebel incur-
211sion if the Kimberley Horse traveled on his side of the Caledon River. Two 
weeks before, a detachment of the Kimberley Nstive Contingent, followed by
206 Ibid., 701, Summary of events reported since November 16, Basutoland.
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rebels, and without Free State sanction, had escorted arms and ammunition from
212
Maseru to Thaba M'chu. Administrator Strahan was unable to remedy this er-
ror^ut apologized for the transgression of this Griqua West unit and asked
Brand to permit passage for the Kimberley Horse to Leribe, as otherwise, Ma-
214
gistrate Bell and Chief 'Jonathan would be endangered. Colonel Griffith or-
215dered the Kimberley Horse to march through, regardless of circumstances. 
President Brand, unapprized of the Griffith command, allowed 200 Kimberley 
Horse passage from Maseru to Leribe, provided the landdrost of Ladybrand sanc­
tioned the route of march and the contingent avoided this town and Ficksburg,
and advised the detachment to pass through Madderpoort and to inform farmers
216
in advance where it proposed to camp. Masupha asked Brand for permission to
217purchase ammunition in the Free State. Becausa aiding the rebels violated
Free State law, the president refused this request and replied that he could
not correspond with Masupha except through Colonel Griffith, to whom he for-
218warded the Masupha letter and its reply.
By November 1, from additional mobilization to the rear, troops at the
219front numbered 673 infantry, 1,828 cavalry, and 1,585 natives. Strahan,
220
nevertheless^admitted that the rebels were winning. Magistrate Barkly for
221
himself requested additional soldiers and a large native contingent. The
212
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Opposition in the Cape Parliament derided the volunteer forces and scorned the
222burghers for allowing Governor Frere to mobilize them; the tyrannical colonial
methods used to procure soldiers for the war, added the Pall Mall Gazette,
223
caused discontent.
In appraisal of the November campaigning, colonial troops to their ad­
vantage systematically destroyed rebel supplies and shelter, and Cape Colony 
finally mobilized a considerable number of men. Faulty military reconnais­
sance, however, allowed rebels to mass secretly and charge without warning.
The enemy reoccupied destroyed but nevertheless strategic positions like the 
village of Lerothodi, because Cape troops could never secure these places. 
Basutoland Loyalists, it seemed, could fight effectively only with colonial 
support. It was impossible, however, to conceive how Strahan surmised that 
the rebels were winning, because they neither had won battles so far nor 
otherwise had severely worsted colonial troops. The Opposition in the Cape 
Parliament flirted with sedition by execrating the mobilization.
According to the Second Treaty of Aliwal North (1869), moreover, Presi-. 
dent Brand acted correctly in his dealings with Masupha. The president had 
every right to curtail or restrict to specific routes colonial troop move­
ments, because his countrymen were vulnerable to rebel harm, from which the 
British Government noticeably did not protect the Free State as provided for 
in the Aliwal treaty.
221Barkly, Among Boers and Basutos, p. 258.
222Greswell, Qur South African Empire, II, 91.
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DECEMBER 1880
As rebel masses continued to founder during colonial forays, on December 
1, 600 troops and 1 gun left Mafeteng on a search-and-destroy mission south­
east towards Thaba T ’soen. The troops clashed with 1,500 rebels at the top 
of a kopje, killed 4~5 in a skirmish there* chased the rest away, and held 
the hill even though surrounded by hostiles. Another rebel horde from the 
Kolo direction charged at the rear of the colonial camp, but a howitzer scat­
tered the onslaught. Carrington then withdrew with 2 killed, because his
224outnumbered troops were unable to take more enemy positions.
Continuing, after Carrington shifted his camp to near the strategic 
Tsitsa's village on the 5th, about 8,000 rebels under the command of Mama, 
Bereng, Seiso, Ramoroko, Lerothodi, Tsien, Masupha, and other chiefs appeared 
in a line from Tangesberg to Tsitsa’s Nek in front of the 410-man column, A 
colonial detachment carried Tsitsa’s Nek and after dark swept up a steep and 
strongly-schantzed hill in back of Tsitsa's hamlet. At dawn, Carrington di­
rected a frontal attack, and the soldiers soon cleared the fortified village, 
burned it, and killed a few fleeing rebels.
On December 4, Barkly, counseling on future strategy, arrived back at
Mafeteng from Wepener with reinforcements of 830 burghers and 100 men of the 
2252nd CMY. He advised the evacuation of troops from Leribe and Maseru and the 
concentration of all forces at Mafeteng, because there were too few soldiers. 
In a month or two, the necessary destruction of rebel crops would require nu-
224
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merous soldiers, as the harvest of enemy fields would provide 2 years of food
supplies, and,las without the yield, the has tiles would starve in 6 months.
The enemy strongholds, felt the magistrate, were too strong to allow capture 
226
at this time;
Colonel Carrington on the 6th, in further action, related that 030 bur­
ghers encamped at Dumas Lake had panicked and stampeded their mounts, allowing 
the rebels to catch about 50 horses. Colonel Brabant, on a search-and-destroy 
mission with 400 regulars and 300 burghers, passed Szariel Nek on December 8 
and later destroyed some enemy villages and crops at Tsakholo Lake, where he
clashed momentarily with a hostile force. The next day, a 300-mon burgher
227contingent patrolling near the border burned some rebel hamlets and skirmished 
with hostiles. On the 10th, about 8 miles from Mafeteng, Barkly fought with 
rebels at a nek all day. Of the 1,200 soldiers with him, 400 always guarded 
his camp. As the magistrate continued on patrol, 0,000 hostiles moved silent­
ly in front of hirru^
The Battle of Tangesberg on the 13th offered an example of the success 
of colonial formations. The advancing infantry formed a square, ready to 
march towards a ridge of low hills occupied by the rebels until artillery
drove them off. The Loyalists, followed by the CMR, mounted and charged the 
229enemy head on; at this point, 200 burghers disobeyed orders to join the 
charge. As Carrington and 485 infantry neared one hill, more than 5,000 re­
bels began stalking the rear and both flanks of the troops; therefore, the
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227
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hollow square with the horses in the middle fought its way through the enemy
for 1,500 yards. The square then turned to a rise on the right near Tsitsa*s
Nek, where the CMR, PAG, and part of the DEOVR in the front rushed up the
slope in formation, killing several warriors and scattering the enemy in all 
230directions. The hostiles never got closer than 150 yards to the square, and 
the chiefs with difficulty induced their men to charge into the withering 
fire. At the end of the battle, Carrington ordered the CMR, PAG, and DEOVR 
back from the hill and requested Colonel Brabant to abandon Azariel village 
and assist him.
Brabant, meanwhile, in contraction of the victory, had received orders 
to pass through Azariel Nek with 645 troops to near Pokwane Mountain in order 
to destroy the laagers of Mama and Bereng while Carrington passed by this 
mountain to draw the hostiles towards Boleka Ridge. Brabant subsequently was 
able to occupy only an insignificant hamlet 4 miles distant from the Tanges- 
berg battlefield, and 2,000 hostiles prevented his aiding Carrington, who 
then ordered the Azariel force back to its camp. The rebels, nevertheless, 
at Tangesbarg and Azariel suffered heavy losses, and their sporadic gunfire 
killed only 2 colonials.
On December 12, in Government activity to the north, Chief Jonathan evac­
uated his family to the free State, and Magistrate Bell enlisted 400 warriors
232of the chief in a native contingent. Colonial military operations in Leribe
233
District, indicates Tylden, had little effect on the course of the war.
230
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At this point in the hostilities, remote Chief Letsie and other chiefs
with a large neutral body of warriors congregated at Matsieng, where Letsie
promised to surrender himself if the colonials approached. Led by Lerothodi,
Mama, Bsreng, Ramoroko, Moletsane, and others, a hostile force of about 8,000,
234howevar, held the heights blocking the road to Morija and Matsieng,
As effectual armaments for their adversaries arrived by the end of the 
month, Martini-henry rifles reached the CMR and CMY, and the majority of the 
cavalry now carried revolvers. Most of the CMY possessed swords; another 
shipment for the CMR was due from England.
The CMR and its promoted new commander, in addition, received commenda­
tion. The CMR, wrote Carrington, was becoming a more proficient fighting 
force. The rebels nicknamed Shervinton the "scatterer of armies,” and General 
Clarke said that this hero, who later became adjutant to Carrington, had dis­
tinguished himself several times in Zululand.
In reflection on the adverse conduct of the CMR, scores of them deserted 
from Mafeteng, as the garrison was near the Free State border. Rebels killed 
numbers of deserters and took prisoner others. The fact that the CMR was the
only unit at the front which had to pay for its own food and shelter motivated 
235desertions; discontent also may have arisen from other reasons, such as bore- 
236dom. One man wrote The Times that his brother serving at Mafeteng had no 
revolver or sword, only a Snider carbine, and could not purchase a revolver 
on credit. The writer contended that the Government profited from the sale
233Tylden, The Rise of the Basuto, p. 161.
2343. S_. P ., (1881), LXVI, T44, Summary of events in Basutoland since De­
cember 14, 1800.
235Shervinton, The Shervintans, pp. 75-78; Orpen, Prince Alfredfs Guard 
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237of arms to its troops. Some of the CMR sneaked away because of indebted­
ness, and, as no extradition treaty existed with the Orange free State, some 
of them ran away by way of Bloemfontein.
In this period preceding the Transvaal outbreak of 1881, discontented 
burghers in the Cape North District were hostile to the Cape troops of Bri­
tish extraction. Mobilized Boer burghers had segregated themselves at Kala- 
bani into a separate contingent, of which numbers were generously paid sub­
stitutes for wealthy farmers^** These soldiers were tired of the war and
wanted to return home; they envisioned neither sudden victory nor an advan—
239
tage in losing more men and money in order to vanquish the Basutos.
Natal, more cooperative than these burghers, initiated limited counter­
action against the rebel threat. Officials thought that one rebel Basuto 
incursion against a native village was retribution for a Natal native expe­
dition against the rebels in October, because the hostiles wreaked the worst
240vengeance on these natives. Major Dartnell feared repetitive rebel incur­
sions from a rugged area between two ranges of the Drakensberg along the 
Natal border. Though Governor Colley dreaded that one enemy success might 
encourage more attacks and promised to guard the border in troubled sectors,
he refused to allow Dartnell to make a punitive raid into eastern Leribe, as
241
this act might draw Natal wholly into the war. Rebels later ambushed and
massacred some Natal native scouts, but as the police approached, the raiders
242
fled and did not cross the frontier again.
237The Times (London), January 6, 1881, p. 6.
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Examining colonial military efforts, by the end of the year, Cape Colony
had fielded 7,485 cavalry, 1,350 infantry, 9,320 Bantu, and 348 Hottentots
against the rebels* These troops had pacified only a small area outside the
magistracies and troop camps and had not permanently occupied the numerous 
243rebel strongholds, and successful punitive patrols, maintains Orpen, had
244
failed to bring victory. Administrator Strahan, ordered by London to remain
245
in the background and not interfere with Sprigg, advised that, so far, the
246colony had not at all diminished the rebellion.
In impartial judgement, colonial formations proved effective in defensive 
and offensive postures. Contrary to Theal, troops did capture for a time 
some secondary fortified rebel strongholds; notwithstanding Tylden, colonial 
victories in Leribe must have affected rebel military posture, and, in oppo­
sition to Strahan statements, rebellion had been lessened if for no other 
reason than by heavy enemy losses in manpower and sustenance. So many sol­
diers guarding supplies at encampments, however, subtracted from the number 
available for offensive forays. For burghers to resent Cape troops was na­
tural, as British soldiers garrisoned the Transvaal, though disobedience from 
burghers endangered fellow soldiers.
242
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Continued colonial victories, such as the hotly contested Battle of Twee-*
fontein near Mafeteng on January 7, did not daunt Lsrbthodi. Here, the left
side of the colonial camp hurled back an initial enemy charge, after which
hostile reinforcements massed near Tsitsa*s hill. Hundreds of hostiles
charged the colonial lines through an artillery barrage, fell back in the face
of the shellfire, and fired from long range. Colonial artillery and rifle
247
fire later blunted a third enemy charge on the right. Some CMY cut through
rebel lines and returned. Rebel cavalry, on the other hand, disoriented 400
burghers and stunted another CMY charge, and his cavalry, believed Lerothodi,
248with battle axes still could fight colonial infantry successfully. Troops
249
subsequently pursued the hostiles to Pokwane Ridge.
On January 10, there was a large skirmish near Mafeteng in which Shervin­
ton displayed heroism. A^ssarch-and-destroy column of 850 regulars and 350 
burghers under Brabant marched towards Lerothodi*s village. A burgher charge 
dislodged some harassing hostiles from a ridge. Near the Lerothodi hamlet, 
hostiles isolated and massacred a small number of 1st City Rifles, then cut 
out their hearts and gleefully devoured them. Opposite Thaba T*soen, a large 
group of rebels fired from behind a steep ledge. Brabant, failing to drive 
off the enemy with artillery and rifle fire, and noticing more Basutos near­
by, decided to storm the ledge. After other fruitless colonial attempts,
v
Shervinton with reinforcements sneaked up undetected towards the enemy and 
charged straight onto the krantz ledge so quickly that the hostiles had no
247
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time to mount up; multitudes leaped over the escarpment to escape, and the rest 
savagely defended themselves to the death. The colonial Martini-Henry rifles 
impressed the enemy, who lost 60 killed in the charge.
Warriors of Lerothodi, furthermore, once more foundered despite penetra­
ting the colonial ranks. After Shervinton on the 14th marched out of Pokwane 
camp with 960 men towards Thaba T*soen, an advance guard of burghers and native 
troops charged a kopje from which the rebels had fired on them. As the troops 
reached the crest, 2,000 hostile cavalry appeared; the advance guard raced back 
with 3,000-4,000 rebel cavalry close behind. A squad of CMR in a dismounted 
column turned aside part of the enemy charge. The Native Contingent attempted 
to stand with the 400 burghers, but the latter scampered off and allowed the 
rebels to charge into the native ranks and with assegais and battle axes to 
kill 26 natives and Commandant Erasmus during his attempt to rally his Boer 
troops. The enemy, their thrust finally blunted, raced to the left and right 
and on the colonial right again charged the column, which turned and shattered 
them. Some CMR, the 3rd CMY, the PAG, and part of the DEOVR for almost a mile 
advanced dismounted in a line to rout the rebels in the fiercest fight that 
Shervinton had ever witnessed. If the burghers had closed ranks, the hostiles
would have suffered more severely. The regular troops lost 16-'killedf^?he
251
burghers lost 22, and the hostile force of 5,000 suffered 80 killed.
One rebel, in the aftermath of the battle, surrendered at Mafeteng and 
said that his comrades were tired of the war and short of food and ammunition. 
Soundly defeated Lerothodi, he continued, had executed several warriors who
250
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had refused to fight further and also had caused disenchantment by butchering
252
cattle belonging to followers for sustenance.
On January 6, in enemy failure further north, a large rebel force sur­
rounded the magistracy at Thlotsi Heights and struck on all sides, but the
prepared defenses withstood the persistent attackers, who withdrew after kil-
253
ling 2 Loyalists.
Mixed fortunes, meanwhile, confronted colonial troops adjacent to Basu­
toland. As Magistrate Austen marched up the Orange River with 300 Fingos, 
the rebels repelled them on January 28 on Mokochamel Plateau south of Morosi's 
Mountain, killing Austen and 8 others. In the wake of this action, Chief
Letsie accepted cattle stolen from Austen, and genuine fear of invasion swept 
254
Cape Colony. On the 3rd, reported Chief Magistrate Brownlee, rebel Basutos
255attacked Matatisle unsuccessfully, and troops pursued the retreating hostiles.
Colonial forces at the end of January stalked 600 fleeing rebel Basutos and
258Baphutis over Cngeluk's Nek into the mountains south of the Orange River.
Curing January, burghers and others for various reasons deranged the
mobilization, and colonial forces dwindled in size. The Government Gazette
on January 12 listed 76 men, both yeomen and burghers, as absent without
257
leave, and Cape Town, to meet manpower deeds, enlisted some convicts. One 
group of burghers deserted from Maseru soon after arriving, others assigned
752
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258to relieve the Transvaal Horse at Leriba quit before arrival at the post, and 
burghers from Swellendam left the front because of a colonial non-looting
259policy and personal desire not to fight for an English ministry at Cape Town. 
One burgher unit which had fought excellently on January 10 complained of a 
false accusation of flight that day and threatened to declare its enlistment 
time expired and return home. Discipline was difficult to enforce, as regu­
lations forbade flogging and execution; thus, only 300 of the original 1,000 
burghers remained at the front^^ Although Undersecretary Duff in the British 
House of Commons announced that no information pointed to discontent in the
Transvaal as motivation for the flight^ihe Pall Mali Gazette condemned the
262burgher withdrawal as sympathy evinced for the Transvaal Boers. The burghers,
adds De Kiewiet, thought that they had not received a fair share of confis-
263
cated rebel grain and cattle. Theal says that the burghers questioned the
PPA, suffered by neglecting their regular employment, and in early February
left the war zone 500 strong with the sanction of their comrades, thus con-
264
vincing the rebels of governmental inability to suppress the rebellion.
Brookes contends that all the pleading of Theal does not excuse the numerous
265
burghers who acted cowardly and unpatriotic by absconding. One hundred and 
eighty-seven burghers who deserted from the Mafeteng force received six-month
258Tylden, The Rise of the Basuto, pp. 163-64.
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260
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266
prison sentences. Among the English-speaking troops, furthermore, the DEOVR
complained about its extended tour of duty without replacement as provided 
by law. The PAG term --of service having expired, most from this unit returned
u 267home.
Lerothodi, his brothers, Joel, and the chiefs following them, presenting 
another obstacle by still hawking pre-war nonsense, delivered a peace peti­
tion to Cape Town. Since 18b8, wrote the supplicants, they had tried to be 
good British subjects and now promised their loyalty, future good behavior, 
and defense of the Crown, and wanted the intercession of the Quean. oprigg 
allegedly had broken promises concerning the Quthing matter, the timing of
disarmament, and a strong Basuto constabulary. Now, fields lay desolate,
268
homes lay ruined, and women and children starved in the mountains. Letsie, 
who refused to sign the petition even though he still wanted British inter­
cession, asked 5trahan for advice and insisted that his sons and brothers had
269 270
been unprepared for and had not wanted a war. Sir Hercules Robinson, the
new Cape Governor, receiving the rebel document which beseeched him to inter­
cede for them and to relate their grievances to the Queen, found that, the hos-
Pall Mall Gazette (London), February 23, 1881, p. 6.
° Orpen, Prince Alfred's Guard 1856-1966, pp. 3B, 43.
3.j5.FL, (1881), LXVII: "The Affairs of Basutoland, •' 595-96, Petition 
to Strahan, January 10, 1881.
269
Ibid., 594, ltr. Letsie to Strahan, January 10, 1881.
^^5. , pp. 317-18. Sir Hercules Robinson: A cadet at Sandhurst,
Robinson was commissioned a lieutenant in 1844 but left the army two years 
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‘tiles had restated old arguments and, wanting to retain their guns, claimed
271
inability to fight the colony.
Robinson, in the setting for peace conditions, reported that his minis­
ters, while they doubted the integrity of the rebels and wanted a guarantee 
for peace before an armistice, had agreed to deliver the rebel petition to 
the Queen. The governor affirmed the disloyalty of the rebels, who, if sin­
cere now, would surrender their guns and submit to the Cape Government.
Robinson, with the assent of 5prigg and his cabinet, promised the hostiles
272generous terms within the law, and Kimberley agreed to this offer with minor 
273alterations. Most of the enemy leaders, belift/es Theal, wanted peace and were
274
willing to accept moderate terms but not disarmament.
Good colonial strategy, in circumspection, concentrated rebel forces by 
driving them into the Basutoland area, but Cape Colony fears of invasion sig­
nified that rebels still might take the initiative and that colonists doubted 
that their troops could protect the frontier. The English-speaking troops 
and the burghers, who were accustomed to fight for spoils, had some legiti­
mate grievances.
Their antagonists, the rebels, who merely flirted with peace, desired 
for British intervention to bypass Cape Town authority and would not pay the 
consequences for rebellion. Governor Robinson should not have offered lenient 
terms to the rebels, because such action compromised the Loyalists.
.P.*, (1881), LXVII, 593, ltr. Governor Sir Hercules Robinson to 
Kimberley, January 30, 1881.
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FEBRUARY 1681
Rebel obstinacy did not stop colonial persistence. Although colonial
forces, reported Magistrate Barkly, seemed to make little headway against the 
275rebels, General Clarke with 4,000 fresh troops was marching towards the front. 
On February 3, Carrington with a search-and-destroy column of 6bU men marched
2 y(j
to Pokwane Mountain and sighted 8,000 rebels, who refused to fight. Colonel
Bayly two days later inflicted severe losses on a large rebel force near Ma- 
277seru, and Carrington, with Shervinton in the lead, on February 13 captured
3oleka Ridge, a key point in a lengthy enemy defense line. After some of the
DEOVR, whose term of service had expired, had refused to march, CMY replaced
the obstinate. A colonial charge then surprised the sleeping enemy, who fled 
278
without fighting.
In the Battle of Ramadikwe on the 16th, furthermore, the enemy fervor 
counted for naught. Brabant, in order to reconnoiter a new camp location on 
the road to Morija, made a reconnaissance maneuver towards Boleka Ridge with 
570 men. Spotting the rebels, Shervinton dismounted the CMR and marched them 
ahead of the main column up a ridge in a hollow square with the horses in the 
center. As the entire column assembled in a square, about 300 rebel cavalry 
ferociously attacked the front of the square, 300 under Lerothodi the left, 
and 1,200-1,500 the right, but the CMR and CiMY dispersed those on the front 
and right, and the infantry on the left scattered others. The enemy attack 
advanced so furiously that some rebels became skewered on bayonets like ka-
275Barkly, Among Boers and Basutos, p. 260.
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babsf^lhus, some of the 30 hostiles killed in the attack kept their promise 
made before the battle that they would die among the green—jackets, referring 
to the PAG uniforms of green with red trim. The colonial howitzer demoralized
the rebels and forced them to abandon villages below Tangesberg to which they
» . ,280 had Tx6u *
The Carrington column, on the march towards Morija, in another tactical 
success captured on the 16th a fortified rebel position one and a half miles
long8£y surprising the enemy and thereby gained a base 6 miles ahead of the
282 283
previously occupied laager. The troops, having killed 100 hostiles, uhen
destroyed naarby rebel crops?8^
Tha clash of Transvaal Doers with Imperial troops in the First Doer War
affected the Basuto conflict, as the success of the Boers encouraged the re- 
285bels. Whereas Cape Colony considered prohibiting shipments of arms and ammu­
nition through Free State territory to prevent their theft for use by the 
Vaal 3oers^8^resident Brand probably would disallow further passage for colo­
nial troops through his territory to the Basuto war zone if the Orange Free
2qt
State allied with the rebellious TEansvaal.
The rebels, though still fighting, replied to the Robinson offer of me-
279Shervinton, The Shervintons, pp. 83-34; Orpen, Prince Alfred*s Guard 
1856-1966, pp. 44-45.
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diation; therefore, Colonel Griffith, as ordered, proclaimed an armistice from
288
February 18 through February 24. Thanking Sir Hercules for his generous 
terms, Lerothodi, Joel, Masupha, and Ramanella placed themselves under his 
direction but pleaded confusion over their proposed disarmament and submission 
to the Government. Though professing trust in Cape Town and hoping for an 
end to the war and a concrete peace, they fretted about land confiscation and 
deposition of chiefs, feared harsher terms should enforcement of the PPA con­
tinue, and asked to see immediately specific conditions to be-afforded them 
289
after disarmament.
Prime Minister Sprigg, in reaction to the enemy response, said that, b e ­
fore his further discussion of proposals, the rebels would have to unilateral-
290
ly submit to the Cape Government. Governor Robinson, still recommending 
leniency, also deemed the belated reply unsatisfactory, as the hostiles alle­
gedly wanted peace but refused to submit to the law until they learned speci-
291
fic peace conditions.
The Cups ministers, despite dissatisfaction with the rebel attitude, an­
nounced their eight conditions for peace. The terms ware as follows: 1) Rebel 
submission to colonial Government and law, 2) immediate surrender of all arms, 
3) amnesty awarded all except Masupha, Lerothodi, and Joel, who would stand 
trial but not risk execution, 4) payment of a fine, 5) no confiscation of Ba­
sutoland proper except appropriation of land for new residencies, 6} resolu­
tion of the Quthing question by the Cape Parliament, and 7) acceptance or re-
287Tylden, The Rise of the Basuto, p. 167.
288
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jection of these conditions within twenty-four hours after receipt by Lero­
thodi. Cape officials planned no further negotiations, and if the rebels did 
not accept the terms, hostilities would resume at the end of the armistice.
Finally, 8) if fighting did recur, the existent offer would be subject to
292
change.
Colonel Griffith, who indicated his views of and efforts in these pro­
ceedings, attempted to induce the rebels to accept the Robinson peace candi-
293tions, but the hostiles were too loyal to their chiefs to act independently.
To allow Lerothodi time to answer -the eight conditions, Griffith extended the
armistice from the 24th to the 26th, but the rebels, who welcomed the exten-
294sion of the armistice, gave no reply. The Chief Magistrate vowed to protect
Letsie, who apologized for the Lerothodi pretense of ignorance, if the chief
295
demonstrated his loyalty by coming to Maseru. The Robinson terms were much 
too lenient, thought Colonel Griffith, and he believed that the colony must 
punish the rebels before dispensing generous treatment, because the hostiles 
were barbarians, regarded as a sign of weakness tha mild terms which a civi­
lized government offered them, and thus acted accordingly. The Chief Magis­
trate prepared to enforce tha PPA with vigorous military action^^aving re­
ported that the rebels, who disclaimed defeat and would not disarm, believed 
the colony desperate for peace.
Governor Robinson, indicating the delicate position of his ministers and
292
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himself, had offered his services only after consulting his ministers and Kim­
berley and then had thought it best to act as only an arbitrator, because 
overt influence from his office might embarrass and anger his ministers, the 
Cape Parliament, and the entire colony. The sole reply of Lerothodi relieved 
Robinson of unconstitutional responsibility which would have involved him had 
the hostiles surrendered unconditionally, and tha ministers therefore accep­
ted total responsibility for terms. The governor believed that he could treat 
the hostiles more leniently than his ministers, who wanted to offer precise
peace conditions to avoid parliamentary and public blame for continuance of
297the war. The ministers doubted that the rebels would accept precise terms, 
though the eight-point peace program, agreed most knowledgeable Basuto offi­
cials, seemed a deterrent to future war and a guarantee for future prosperi- 
298
ty. Although Robinson attempted to cajole the ministers, they remained ada­
mant to satisfy the country and secure a lasting peace and thought a trial
for the three rebel leaders was necessary to protect Loyalists and future
299
rule over Basutoland.
Regarding the true enemy intent, Colonel Carrington reported the rebels
3 OQ
busily schantzing Bolak*a Ridge. The enemy fortified their positions and, 
pretending to negotiate until completion of the harvest, planned to fight 
indefinitely^^
General Clarke, in view of the posture of his foes during the armistice, 
revised his estimate to 8,000 soldiers, excluding garrison troops, needed in
297
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302
the war zone, yet colonial forces already stood prepared for a powerful and 
303
final offensive. The enemy abided in a worse situation than previously, yet 
the Pall Mall Gazette observed that perhaps Carrington was successful in some 
February operations only because the rebels believed the armistice was already 
in effect and did not resist^^ To the colonial headquarters camp near Mafe­
teng came Lerothodi and other enemy chiefs, and, as they conversed with
Colonel Brabant and other officers about the campaigning, Lerothodi admitted
305
that he could not stop the killing of wounded soldiers. Possibly during 
this interim, Mama Letsie, educated at Cape Town and once a Government clerk, 
invited Shervinton to his camp, where the officer drank champagne and met with 
Chief Letsie^^
The Transvaal war, in reflection, accentuated how tenuous was the basic 
logistical lifeline of Cape troops in Basutoland. The rebels still maintained 
high martial spirit in February but were desperate for victory. Their con­
fusion about disarmament and submission was nonexistent; if the hostiles had 
desired peace, they would have submitted. Cape ministers magnanimously pub­
lished fair, lenient, and specific peace terms but did not allow enough time 
for enemy deliberations.
MARCH 1881
In March, the enemy could still fight effectively when they wanted. A
302
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Carrington patrol on March 18 moved within 2,000 yards of rebel schantzen,
307
where the troops waited in vain for an enemy attack* On the 22nd, rapid
firing from artillery halted a rebel assaull^on a Clarke patrol between 3o-
leka Ridge and Tangesberg, but the general did not want to fight the enemy at
309close quarters while outflanked; thus, after 6 hours of fighting, the outcoms 
310
was indecisive. Two days later, about 600 hostiles attacked Mafeteng and
311stole 195 horses and 192 cattle. The enemy, reported the Pall Mall Gazette.
not only had halted the advance of colonial forces but also had stymied them
< ’
312by stealing horses and cattle.
Colonel Wavell, commander of Griqualand East troop3, despite optimistic 
battle reports and his opinion that the rebels were much overrated, was dis­
satisfied with his commander, General Clarke. The Brownlee force meanwhile
313drove Griqualand rebels into the uninhabited Drakensberg mountain range.
MALEVOLENT MEDDLING BY FRENCH MISSIONARIES
During the war, the Paris Evangelical Society missionaries in Basutoland, 
together with their English accomplices urging British intervention and fal­
sifying colonial conduct of the war, advised Secretary Kimberley that if the 
war continued, Basuto respect for Britain would vanish, and the rebels would
307
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flee to the mountains to start guerrilla warfare. A delay by London until
the end of the rebellion to dispatch a commission to inquire about Basuto
grievances, offer peace conditions, and grant amnesties would protract Basuto
alienation. The Loyalists, continued the PE5, disliked fighting "friends'*- and
relatives. Unless the British formed a native reserve, the colony would con-
314fiscate most of Basutoland. The Aborigines Protection Society, which apolo­
gized for interfering in colonial affairs, maintained that the Basutos were 
victims of brutal party politics^and it protested the inhuman treatment of 
the rebels and the alleged proposed confiscation of rebel land. The APS dis­
missed the reluctance of the Earl of Kimberley to intervene by its allegation
that there was sufficient reason for Imperial intercession at any time and
316
that everyone except political racketeers would welcome such action. James
A. Froude, noted commentator on South African affairs in this period, signed
with others a petition which contended that the Basutos did not want Cape
Colony rule and that the war aggravated tribal administration. Surmising that
the Sprigg ministry had caused the hostilities, he believed that the Basutos
were in danger of vanishing like other tribes, even though he admitted that
the militarily secure rebels outnumbered the troops, and he wanted British
317
rule for the tribe. Froude also introduced APS-favared pro-rebel legislation 
*to Kimberley, who answered that if London imposed itself at an inopportune 
time, Cape Colony in the future would refuse to axpend the funds necessary to 
govern Basutoland should it come under direct British control. Great Britain, 
more impartial and moderate than the colony, continued the secretary, must
314
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use its influence only at the proper time.
The miscreant Mabille, further justifying British intercession, declared 
that responsible government had limits, that numerous knowledgeable inhabi­
tants of the colony opposed the war, and that numerous soldiers fought only 
because of duty. The certainty of British intervention greatly pleased the 
pastor, because the Sprigg ministry would probably collapse, and because in­
tervention would justify rebel faith in London. After other rebel tribes
319
learned of British leniency, they would submit to peace terms.
Tha "Mabille Gang," moreover, descended on the British Government like a 
plague of locusts, because the pastor was determined to influence British 
officials and the public to end the war. Knowing well the position of rebel 
chiefs, he suggested that the APS lobby for this position in Parliament. Lon­
don overruled the idea of Mabille accompanying a Government commission on the 
Basutos to Cape Colony, whereupon the missionary distributed to churches in 
Prance and Switzerland a petition which supported the PCS, subsequently han­
ded the document with 24,000 signatures to Parliament, and next sent a memo­
rial to the House of Lords. To Lord Kimberley, the English branch of the 
Evangelical Alliance offered a statement in which Mabille asked if Great Bri­
tain would allow troops to crush and disperse the rebels, which was supposed-
320
ly the declared objective of the colonial commanders. The English society 
requested its Government to alleviate rebel grievances and to protect both 
Christian Loyalists and missionaries and their property, condemned the harsh­
ness of the war, and reminded London of the services that the missionaries
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321had brought to tha natives, services which the PE5 specified in education and 
322
religion. War was ravaging the Basutos and endangering the missionaries,
wrote the Swiss Evangelical Society; thus, this community pleaded for a peace
323
settlement as insurance for their missions.
The PES, itself supposedly in a hazardous position, proferred possible 
peace conditions. While these churches alleged that they remained in the war 
zone to aid Loyalists, find a refuge for the ill and elderly, preserve mission 
stations, some of which the hostiles burned, and solicit the natives to seek 
British protection and influence other tribes to do the same, the rebels sus­
pected pacific French advice, and colonists accused the clerics of endorsing 
the rebellion. Because of suffering to the missionaries, the Frenchmen plea­
ded for an end to the war, and they thought the Capa Government in a peace 
settlement must disallow land confiscation, seek only rebel submission and a 
tribal monetary and cattle fine, grant amnesties to all hostiles except per­
petrators of atrocities, and allow the High Commissioner and magistrates to
324
administer the country and register and tax Basuto guns.
The misled Mabille, in addition, deliberated on a rebel peace proposal 
in January, 1381. Tha pastor secured a safe-conduct pass for his emissary, 
who advised the rebels on formulating a peace offer. . As Mabille believed 
that the rebels had won almost every battle, he thought.tha hostiles must 
only promise not to fight the Queen, ask for complete amnesty for all, and
371
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seek identical living conditions as before the war. He told Letsie to per­
suade his sons to make peace; otherwise, troops would crush the paramount 
chief and the rebels'?^
The PE5, to assist these hostiles, audaciously requested the English Red 
Cross to send hospital supplies at British expense through the military lines
in Basutoland to the reprobate Oar. Casalis at Morija, who had directed other'
326relief supplies to the rebels. The PES, indicated Kimberley, must apply to
327the Cape Government for such a worthy endeavor.
The PES and other societies, in honest judgement, among their succession 
of errors might have consulted with colonial officials but instead waded into 
colonial partisanship and politics and insidiously spread their version of a 
colonial peace plan, together with Froude spread false rumors wnich enhanced 
the rebel cause, and interfered in Cape military affairs. The French mission­
aries could have evacuated if they felt endangered, their peace conditions 
were too permissive and presumptuous, and evangelical personnel compromised 
their status as resident aliens of Cape Colony by deprecating colonial action 
and by directly aiding the rebel forces with the sanction of Kimberley.
Adolphe Mabille, in addition, represented the rebel position and ignored 
the tenets of responsible government at Cape Town. His tunnel vision notion 
of campaign results was a feat, and his peace proposal was much too generous 
to the hostiles. He and other tittering toadies in clerical garb influenced 
the rebels to persevere for more favorable peace proposals, and the possible 
prolongation of hostilities was the most catastrophic result of PES meddling.
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CONTEMPLATION OF BRITISH MILITARY ASSISTANCE
165
A question vital to Cape Colony during the Basuto Civil War and Rebellion 
was that of active British aid in subjugation of the rebels. Administrator 
Clifford, reflecting official policy, in September, 1880, reported to Kimber­
ley that whatever dimensions the conflict might reach, he would not employ
328 '
Imperial troops. The British Government, replied tha secretary, concurred
329in that decision, and he later admonished The Times that no one in a Natal
330force raised by officers for the Basuto war possessed an Lnglish commission.
Administrator Strahan added that the Cape Government could and would suppress
331the rebels alone if allowed to decide the future government of Basutoland. 
Prime Minister Sprigg in November, 1880, announced the rapid response to mo­
bilization made by whites and blacks in the colony, which made the use of
33 2
British units unnecessary. South African colonists, commented the Pall Mall 
Gazette, always had tried to dispense with Imperial interference by declining 
to accept military aid against native attacks, and if the colony without Im­
perial forces could subdue the Basuto rebels, every colonist would agree that 
it was solely a colonial privilege to deal with the defeated hostiles. The
paper, however, thought it extremely doubtful that the colony could wage war
333
without British assistance.
Cape officials, in reality, sought British military aid, as they wanted
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assistance from Imperial officers while General Clarke was absent from mili­
tary headquarters, and Clifford asked permission to use Imperial officers on
334 33 5
the Basuto battlefront, whereupon Kimberley refused this last request. Cape
Town later requested the use of a Natal officer from a British garrison to
336
act as Assistant-Staff Officer under Clarke. Sprigg in December thanked
337
Crown agents for promptly filling large colonial orders for ammunition. ‘
Sir George Grey, who wanted to redirect the use of British power, cau­
tioned that, as the might of the Cape Government rested mostly on the support 
of British troops, the colonial ministers could not excuse themselves from 
responsibility to the Crown. British power, he added, supported the colo­
nials in a war which a majority of Englishmen thought unjustifiable and which 
dishonored Great Britain. Cape Colony, with British garrisons in reserve, 
sent more soldiers against the rebels than otherwise possible. Britain, be­
lieved Grey, must either stop colonial prosecution of the war or use Imperial
troops to quash the rebels quickly, whatever the cost, because, if the war
338
continued, the Basuto tribe might disintegrate.
Queen Victoria, in the significance of the eventual decision on British 
military succor, asked Kimberley why Imperial troops had not yet intervened 
against the rebels. Governor Frere, believed both the secretary and Glad­
stone, had biased the Queen, though Kimberley later informed the APS lobby­
ists that he could not refuse a heretofore unreceived request by Sir Gordon
334
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339Sprigg for Imperial troops. Though a few experienced officers would have
contributed invaluable service to the colony, asserts De Kiewiet, the British
Government did not offer troops, because Cape Colony had blocked South African
confederation. The Basuto conflict was the first colonial war since early
in the century in which the British Government helped .neither militarily nor 
340
financially. William Greswell and English Liberals both assert that Kimber­
ley and much of the English press opposed the war and that British reluctance
to help implied that, if the colonists could not fight their own battles, they
341could not handle responsible government. British failure to aid Cape Colony,
related one rebel prisoner, encouraged enemy resistance. The Cape Times
noted that the refusal by London to help fight tha rebels was tantamount to
342telling the frontier tribes to revolt then or never.
Colonial appropriation of a few Imperial officers, in conclusory judge­
ment, did not violate the policy announced by Kimberley, who, despite his 
assertions to the contrary, denied Imperial army personnel to Cape Town. 
British failure to offer moral and military support to Capa Colony convinced 
the rebels to seek more favorable consideration by prolonging the hostilities.
POTENTIAL BRITISH INTERVENTION IN THE CONFLICT
Having circumvented the military bolstering of Cape Colony, the Colonial
339
Clement Francis Goodfellow, Great Britain and South African Confeder­
ation 187D-1881 (Cape Town: Oxford University Press, 1966), p. 197.
340
De Kiewiet, The Imperial Factor, pp. 267-68.
“’^ G r e  swell, Qur South African Empire, II, 84-85; cf., Frere, "The Basu­
tos . . . Cape of Good Hope," p. 199.
^^Pall Mall Gazette (London), December 10, 1880, p. 3,
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Office refused to define for Cape Town the extent of the Imperial Government
role in the Basuto conflict. Cape Colony, insisted the Colonial Office,
forced war on itself, and Prime Minister Sprigg, believed the Earl of Kimber-
343
ley, was intent upon hostilities. Sir Gordon in September, 1880, had the
impression that Cape Town would be allowed to suppress the Basuto rebels
without British interference^^owever, Kimberley soon after said that the
Home Government would consider the program of the Cape ministry but could not
in advance agree to a settlement between the colony and the rebels because of
345
future contingencies. The next month, Kimberley commented that Cape Town 
would have much leverage in deciding the future government of Basutoland, 
condemned the rebels, and wished Sir Gordon a rapid victory, but warned Sprigg 
that London had considered the Basutos loyal until the application of the 
PPA, which ha thought had caused the outbreak. Kimberley, for fear of en­
couraging the enemy to resist measures stated publicly, refused to discuss
346
British intervention further at the time. Though one author indicates that
British concern perhaps signified London*s feeling of responsibility for the 
34.7tribe, Be Kiewiet believes further that Britain could not allow Cape Colony 
to wreak vengeance and that, in native policy, responsible government was 
subordinate to the Home Government. The Crown was disposed to aid in a peace 
settlement, Lord Kimberley told Governor Robinson, and certainly would if the 
Cape ministry imposed too savere terms, and further, if colonial military
^ ^ D e  Kiewiet, The Imperial Factor, p. 268.
344
_B.5^ iP., (1831), LXVI, 340, ltr. Sprigg to Clifford, September 17,
1880.
345
Ibid., 309-10, ltr. Kimberley to Strahan, September 30, 1880.
^ ^ Ibid., 363-64, ltr. Kimberley to Strahan, October 28, 1880. 
"^^Smith, The Mabilles of Basutoland, p. 278.
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action failed, Britain would reconsider Cape control over all native terri-
. . 348torres.
Sir Gordon, in rebuttal, in December, 1880, expounded his views on Bri­
tish interference. He condemned as encouraging rebelliousness and a victori­
ous attitude among rebels the English parliamentary declarations distributed 
in Cape Colony and circulated among the Basutos. After troops had crushed 
the rebellion, believed the Prime Minister, Britain would not interfere with 
the peace settlement in Basutoland, and, according to the Cape ministry, would 
give the necessary moral support to uphold law and order, because Cape Colony 
had freed Great Britain from the burdens of administering native territories 
in South Africa. The colony in the war was making large sacrifices in men,
property, and money, and understood that only Cape Town would conclude the
349
final peace ax'rangemant.
5ir George Grey, moreover, in attaching blame for the manner of British 
pressure, maintained that helpless Kimberley supervised Cape Colony too le­
niently and that, unable to prevent Cape Town administrators from acting
350
against his will, he heaped all responsibility on them. Sir Bartle Frere 
countered this adversary by remarking that the radical members of the Liberal 
Party who censured Fr.-re for participation in colonial politics ironically 
demanded the forcible intervention of the Home Government in order to suspend 
the colonial constitution and administer Basuto matters under the direction 
of the Secretary of State for Colonial Affairs. The radical Liberals by their 
abhorrent suggestion, asserted Frei'e, did not seek to uphold law or protect
348
De Kiewiet, The Imperial Factor, pp. 268-69.
349
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the lives and property of British subjects but only wanted to shield the re­
bels from just punishment. Upon receipt of responsible government, he con­
cluded, Cape Colony had reached a social and political state which made the
351slightest British jurisdiction inadvisable.
While Lord Kimberley, in clarification of prescribed procedures in March, 
1881, warned that London had some control in making peace, because acts that 
dealt with Basuto land, as all other land inhabited by natives under colonial 
jurisdiction, had to receive British endorsement, he acknowledged that it was 
impossible to carry on a government if the mother country constantly inter­
fered. Responsible government did not include control of native affairs un­
less indicated by provision, mentioned Viscount Bury, an English member of
352Parliament, and the High Commissioner normally administered native matters.
Prime Minister Gladstone declared that London would not suggest binding peace
conditions which Cape Town must offer the rebels but that the Home Government
. 353
would be a party to any armistice.
In condemnation of colonial presumptions and actions from the legisla­
tive branch of British Government, Sir George Campbell, in the House of Com­
mons, regretted that colonial troops systematically destroyed rebel property
354
and crops during the February armistice. Sir Wilfrid Lawson, another mem­
ber, in January, 1881, complained that Cape troops used dynamite charges 
against the rebels. He also vilified Cape Colony newspapers which reviled 
Lord Kimberley for denying Sprigg the right to distribute spoils to the colo-
351
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Hansard, 3rd ser., Vol. 259 (1831), 1794-97, Earl of Kimberley and 
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354Hansard, 3rd ser., Vol. 258 (1881), 1652, Sir George Campbell spea­
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nials after the war, a denial which dampened colonial fighting spirits. If 
the war went badly, believed colonists, Imperial troops would aid them; there­
fore, swift British mediation, according to Lawson, would save Britain from 
such danger and discredit and would protect the hostiles. R. W. Fowler be­
lieved that the Sprigg war policies would drive the Basutos back into savagery.
Other members, to the contrary, discussed the stipulations of British 
intercession and colonial responsibility. 5ir Wanry Holland, who had served 
in the Colonial Office, thought that the Basuto war was an internal colonial 
matter. To discuss the wisdom of British mediation while colonial soldiers 
courageously fought the rebels was pointless, surmised Holland, for he be­
lieved that the Imperial Government must intervene only if asked by the go­
vernor, or if the colony confiscated large areas of Basutoland for white 
settlement. In the latter evantuality, into Natal, the Orange Free State, 
and adjacent native lands would overflow Basutos in large droves. Mr. Donald 
Currie worried that news of British mediation would bolster the rebels and 
contended that the colony had not desired war. Cape Colony by itself still 
might end the war, said Mr. Grant Buff, the Undersecretary for Colonial Af­
fairs, and he could find no evidence that Cape Town would make a vindictive
settlement. Britain, he declared, could not appear the enemy of the white
355 man.
Greswell comments that the British reproach alienated colonists, who 
wanted to colonize some Basuto land, and bolstered the rebels, who hoped to 
retain all their territory. London gave the rebels moral support by refusing 
either to disavow the FPA immediately or to help the colony enfurce the mea-
Hansard, 3rd ser., Vol. 257 (1681), 1068-69, 1071-72, 1077-78, 1081, 
1085, 1087-88, 5ir Wilfrid Lawson, Mr. R. W. Fowler, Sir Henry Holland, Mr. 
Donald Currie, and Mr. Grant Duff speaking, January 20, 1881.
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sure and conclude the war successfully, and the hostiles therefore thought
relations between Britain and Cape Colony were antagonistic, and, well-informed
of British posture, continued to resist. If Kimberley had known this last
fact, contends Greswell, he would have muffled himself, and if the Home
Government had not hampered and aggravated Cape Colony, the colony would have
grown wealthier, the settlers grown more loyal to Britain, and the natives
become more peaceful?"^
There were, furthermore, several reasons why the 5prigg ministry resented
further British interference. Colonial Secretary Kimberley considered the
rebel peace petition important, urged Governor Robinson to pressure the Cape
357ministers towards a settlement and to arrange terms to end the conflict, and, 
as Kimbarley believed in January that the colony could not establish order 
soon in Basutoland, suggested that the friendly intervention of London could 
restore stability. As a British settlement depanded on as yet unknown fac­
tors but could resolve the war if the rebels placed themselves under British 
supervision, the secretary offered to arrange for a commission to recommend 
peace terms, even though he considered the direct intervention of the Crown
preferable, as the Basutos looked for advice to the office of High Commis- 
358sioner. Lord Kimberley in February regretted that Robinson had failed to
interfere in a Basuto peace accord and condemned the eight-point peace pro- 
359gram, out the colonial ministers, hoped the secretary, would mollify their
356
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conditions, especially in regard to rebel leaders. He furthermore announced
that Britain had neither contributed to nor promulgated the eight-point ulti-
361
tnatum offered the rebels. No Cape Town officials, announced Sprigg, ques­
tioned the right of the Imperial Government to instruct the governor to 
disapprove of colonial actions. The rebels, however, declared that they owed 
no allegiance to Cape Colony and intimated to the ministers that, because
London considered the terms too severe, hostile forces could receive better
362
terms by continuing to resist. The Cape Parliament promoted neither direct
British intervention nor formation of a British commission to recommend a
settlement; thus, Robinson, while he could try to influence peace terms, could
363
not deal directly with the hostiles. The colonial ministers complained to
364
Robinson of the British parliamentary rejection of their peace conditions and
believed a statement made in the House of Commons by Mr. Duff, which falsely
related a colonial ministry desire for the hostiles to make peace arrangements
365
with Governor Robinson, would make peace more unattainable. Although Gover­
nor Robinson and his ministers formally protested British objections to the
366eight points, objections that stiffened enemy resistance, the governor, ac­
cording to Duff, did not enjoy enough trust from the hostiles to make peace
3 60 Ibid., 598, ltr. Kimberley to Robinson, February 26, 1881.
3 61
Hansard, 3rd ser., Vol. 259 (1861), 330-31, Prime Minister Gladstone 
speaking, March 4, 1881.
362
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arrangements'?67 The Cape Government pleaded for understanding and shunned
criticism, because a dissolution of the Cape Town Parliament meant the elec-
\
tion of numerous Afrikaner members, who, angered over Cape policy in the
Transvaal war and allied with the Opposition, might alter the balance of power 
368
in Parliament. If the Sprigg cabinet fell, an Afrikaner ministry might ac-
369cede to power and make an unsatisfactory peace with the rebels.
Internal and external pressure, in conclusion, endangered the Sprigg 
ministry efforts to honorably end the war. Though shadowy British control 
over native policy provided legitimate leverage for intercession, the Colo­
nial Office used trickery in this jurisdictional presumption, because Cape 
Colony administered Basuto rule. The Colonial Office showed an unreasonable 
negative bias towards the Sprigg ministry, indiscreetly conducted its activi­
ties, and stabbed the valiant colonial troops in the back. Even if Kimberley 
did not intentionally support the rebel cause by continuing to discuss the 
war, he crippled Cape Town faith in the Colonial Office by intervening and 
seemed ready to appropriate Cape territory in the face of colonial military 
defeat or, an the other hand, steal away the colonial fruits of victory. It 
was conventional for colonial governments to confiscate land and other valu­
ables from a defeated tribal enemy and disperse the tribe. The secretary and 
British radical Liberals, by seeking to administer a peace settlement, rode 
roughshod over responsible government, which might have ended the war honor­
ably.
^67Hansard, 3rd ser., Vol. 260 (1881), 359, Mr. Buff speaking, March 31,
1881.
368
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CHAPTER VI
THE BASUTO RECONSTRUCTION
THE END OF THE WAR AND THE. ROBINSON AWARD
As the war staggered on to a close, further colonial military successes
did not impress everyone, and, although colonial forces beat back the rebels
from Leribe on April 10, killing 30-40 enemy while losing only 1 soldier^-
there was a complaint of lethargic, irresponsible, and stupid military maneu- 
2vering. In a:skirmish at Maseru, after Colonel Wavell had joined General
Clarke in offensive operations, the rebels lost heavily, and the colonials
3
suffered only 3 killed. During sporadic military action in May, colonial 
troops flushed out enemy caves in the Drakensberg.
In April, 1881, both combatants were experiencing mobilization problems. 
Only 3,000 colonial troops were stationed in Basutoland, 2,000 of them con­
scripts. In order to entice more volunteers to the front, to:enforcerthe "I, 
Commando and Levies Act, and to enable burghers to leave the front, Cape p'ar-
4
liamentary bills sought to raise infantry corps. In desperation, Cape Town
5
armed and promised loot to several thousand Bantu. Lerothoai also at this
6
time was having difficulty maintaining his warriors.
T^he Times (London), April 18, 1881, p. 6.
2
Tylden, The Rise of the Basuto, p. 169.
3
The Times (London), April 20, 1881, p. 5.
^Tylden, The Rise of the, jjasuto. p. 168; The Times (London), April 20, 
1881, p. 5.
^Fall Mall Gazette (London), April 21, 1881, p. 4.
^Tylden, The Rise of the Basuto, p. 168.
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During the next peace overture, Lerothodi ana the rest of the rebels, who 
refused to disperse unless the colonial army left Basutoland, were still occu­
pying Doleka Ridge and from there continued to besiege Magistrate Bell at 
Leribe! On April 9, a rebel delegation representing Chiefs Letsie, Lerothodi,
and Masupha met with Colonel Griffith at Maseru, and the latter two chiefs
8
promised to stop fighting but refused to surrender. Lerothodi, jealous of
Masupha, waited until April 17 and then submitted to Governor Robinson, or-
9dering his warriors to disarm and return home. While some rebels refused to 
scatter, they were not openly hostile to the troops and remained quietly in 
villages in the war zone to await action by Robinson.
The governor, promulgating another peace initiative and considering the 
alternative, drew up an award which he thought an honorable proposal that tes­
ted rebesl willingness to accept reasonable terms. Expediency meant announcing 
the award quickly, because, if the negotiations foundered and the rebellion 
continued, the enemy would never again have the opportunity to accept lenient 
terms. Also, it was necessary to learn immediately if rebels would reject the 
award, so that a mighty military endeavor could be mounted to crush them. The 
present military situation in Basutoland was shaky, and a continued campaign 
would mean moving the troops into winter quarters, resuming the fighting in 
the spring, and expending 3L several million moreP The Gprigg ministry now 
agreed that the governor must arbitrate immediately, with the provision for 
rebels to eventually surrender their weapons^and assumed responsibility for
P_. , (1081), LXVII, 615, ltr. Griffith to Robinson, April 26, 1881.
8
The Times (London), April 14, 1881, p. 6.
^Theal, South Africa, XI, 68.
5LJR. , (1881), LXVII, 616, ltr. Robinson to colonial ministers, April
27, 1381.
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12the award in the Capa Parliament. Lord Kimberley willingly sanctioned the new 
Robinson offerl^
Gn April 29, 1881, Governor Robinson offered the following award: 1) 
Disarmament. i he PPA would continue, however, a liberal interpretation of its 
provisions would apply to the issuance of licenses for the ownership and car­
rying of arms. Part of the annual license fees would help pay the interest 
on the colonial debt incurred from the rebellion. 2) Compensation. The rebel 
portion of the tribe would pay compensation to Loyalists for property illegal­
ly expropriated, restore land, pay for all losses and damages inflicted on 
Loyalists and traders, and return all government property captured during the 
rebellion. 3) Fines. The rebel section of the tribe would pay a fine of 
5,000 cattle. After the enemy had complied with these conditions, a colonial 
pledge would guarantee complete amnesty for all hostiles and no confiscation 
of territory^
Although the hostiles publicly accepted some terms, and the crisis seemed
passed, there were portents of future problems. The rebels paid part of the 
15cattle fine but refused to return expropriated land, land for which they were
waging a civil warf^they promised to surrender their guns but turned in only
a few muskets^ The reverend Mabille spoke against disarmament; Masupha com-
18
plained about repayment to Loyalists. Chief Letsie ordered Lerothodi to accept
^ Ibid., 617, ltr. Sprigg and colonial ministers to Robinson, April 29,
1881.
12
Ibid., 613, ltr. Robinson to Kimberley, April 30, 1881.
13
Ibid., 608-09, ltr. Kimberley to Robinson, April 6, 1881.
14 Ibid., 617-18, ltr. Robinson to colonial ministers, April 29, 1881.
15Tylden, The Rise of the Basuto, p. 169; Vindex maintains that, the re­
bels surrendered only scrawny cattle, Vindex, Cecil Rhodes, p. 47.
^ D e  Kiewiet, The Imperial Factor, p. 290.
17Walker, ed., South Africa, p. 491.
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all terms offered except disarmament. Cape Town, believed the yet belligerent
19hostiles, could not enforce the award provisions.
Cape parliamentary opposition to the Sprigg policy in Basutoland heralded
a change in government. Thomas Fuller was leading opposition to the native
20
policy of Sir Gordon Sprigg. His ally, Thomas bcanlen, who led the moderate
English faction in the House Assembly, was elected leader of the opposition 
21
party, the party which during the war had exaggerated rebel victories and 
22
colonial defeats. As Imperial Government favoritism towards the rebels an­
gered both Cape legislative houses, a strong legislative feeling arose to
disannex Basutoland. On May 9, Scanlen assumed the offices of Prime Minister
23and Attorney-General of Cape Colony, Johannes Wilhelmus 5auer became Secretary
for Native Affairs, J. C. Molteno accepted the post of Colonial Secretary, and
24 25Jan Hendrik Hofmeyr was designated minister-at-large.
18
Smith, The Mabilles of Basutoland, pp. 289-90.
19Tylden, The Rise of the Basuto, p. 169.
20 r-
A*A*A*A,:[i* » P* 330. Scanlen: Born at Cape Town, Thomas Scanlen became 
an attorney and represented Cradock in the Cape Parliament from 1870-96. He 
served as Prime Minister from 1881—84. Having become a legal adviser to the 
British South Africa Company in 1894, he soon after moved to Rhodesia, where 
he gained a post in the Executive Council in 1896 and was Acting-Administrator 
of Rhodesia in 1898 and from 1903-06.
21
Pall Mall Gazette (London), May 7, 1881, p. 3; Fuller, Rhodes, pp. 3-4.
22Frere, !rThe Basutos . . .  Cape of Good Hope,” p. 194.
23
» P> 329. Sauer: Johannes Sauer was born at Burghersdorp, 
Cape Colony. A lawyer at Aliwal North, he entered the Cape Parliament in 
1876. Although first a supporter of Sprigg, he served as Secretary for Native 
Affairs under Scanlen from 1881-84 and as Colonial Secretary under Cecil 
Rhodes; A resolute defender of non-whites, he considered himself a philoso­
phical radical. Sauer later was a member of both the National Convention of 
1908-09 and the Union Parliament and served as Minister for Native Affairs 
from 1910-13, Robertson, South Africa, p. 141.
24 * PP* 171-72. Hofmeyr: Born at Cape Town and educated at the 
South Africa College, Hofmeyr acquired fame as the editor of the Zuid Afrikaan 
newspaper, became a political champion of the farmer, and merged his own poli­
tical organization with the Afrikaner Bond, of which he became leader* His
179
There were a number of reasons underlying the collapse of the Sprigg mi­
nistry. Its attorney-general had resigned out of disgust for the repressive
26
Sprigg native policy, and his successor was regarded as being more underhanded
27
in native policy than the prime minister. Most legislators believed that the
ministry was growing apathetic, and, early in May, the Opposition in tha House
2 9Assembly voted against supply appropriations to troops at the front. Sir 
Gordon, on the other hand, had directed the entire Basuto war by himself, cal­
ling out troops and personally raising money. Colonial military failure, be­
lieved the Pall Mall Gazette, had rendered unjustifiable the Sprigg snubbing
29of Parliament during the war. ueveral members of the Sprigg party no longer
30
voted with their leader, thus reversing his majority, and the prime minister
31
received a vote of censure on May 4.
Among presumptions of the new ministry, it expected the Basutos and other
32rebel tribes to anticipate favorable treatment, considered the rebels their
33
friends, and foresaw immediate submission. 5canlen, however, who was an au­
thority on native affairs, meant to prolong the war for the benefit of ex-
greatest achievement was forcing recognition of the equality of the Afrikaans 
and English languages in Caps Colony, and he almost prevented the outbreak of 
the Second Anglo-Boer War. Hofmeyr later assisted in drafting a constitution 
for the Union of South Africa.
^Theal, South Africa, XI, 69-7G.
Pall Mall Gazette (London), May 4, 1881, p. 8; cf., Ibid., May 11,
1881, p. 3.
^ I b i d . , May 6, 1881, p. 4.
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29 I bid., May 7, 1881, p. 3.
3UIbid., May 30, 1881, p. 8.
31J. G. Lockhart and C. M. Woodhouse, Cecil Rhodes (New York: The Macmil­
lan Co., 1963), p. 72.
3^Theal, South Africa, XI, 70.
33Pall Mall Gazette (London), May 17, 1881, p. 4.
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34pansionist Free State intimates of Hofmeyr, according to one author. The new
ministry asked if London was prepared to arbitrate further should the rebels
35
not accept the award. The Home Government, answered Kimberley equivocally,
36would not interfere with the Cape Government in Basutoland.
In the middle of May, to the satisfaction of the new ministry, Letsie, 
Lerothodi, Joel, and their subordinate chiefs, but not Masupha, wrote that 
they understood the award and would abide by it. They apologized for rebelling 
against a government which they had willingly acceptel^and began to register 
therr guns.
Aided by the British and French Red Cross, the reverend Mabille, as the
PE5 continued to help these rebels, purchased medical supplies in England for
the hostiles. Prime Minister Sprigg at Cape Town detained for six weeks the
supplies as enemy contraband and in vain advised the missionaries instead to
39
offer their services to colonial aid stations.
The Sprigg ministry, in appraisal, had accepted the Robinson Award because 
of British pressure to end the war, and the Scanlen ministry was too optimi­
stic about enemy submission. Provisions of the award should have more strict­
ly applied the PPA and should have provided for the trial of rebel ringlea­
ders; the colonial eight-point program would have better served the situation. 
Masupha instigated his cohorts to do all the fighting, while he hid out safe-
34
Ian D. Colvin, Cecil John Rhodes (London: T. C. and E. C. Jack, 1912), 
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ly in his lair. The parliamentary apposition stabbed the troops in the back, 
as did the gross misconduct of the English and French Red Cross.
COMMENTARY ON AND IMPLICATIONS OF THE COLONIAL AND 
REBEL MILITARY CONDUCT IN. THE REBELLION
Historians agree that either Cape Colony suffered defeat or at least 
failed to win military victory over the rebels for various reasons in the Ba­
suto Rebellion, whereas I found Cape Colony falsely and unjustly maligned in 
its combat role against the rebels.
40Colonral troops, says De Kiewiet, retreated from Basutoland in defeat, 
and R. T. Hall, official historian of the PAG, terms the war disastrous. South 
African historian F. Perridge indicates that the unsuccessful conflict evi­
denced a waste of more than ,000,000, political incompetence, bickering in 
the officer corps, lack of campaign management, lethargic combat, and public
apathy. He also notes the effect of poor equipment, improper hygiene, and
41
illness on the soldiers. No documentation, however, shows that colonial troops 
fled from Basutoland in defeat, notwithstanding strategic evacuations and with­
drawals to base camps from the battlefield whenever the rebels surrounded or 
vastly outnumbered colonial forces. Though some burgher units along with 
other volunteers deserted from the front, these men fled from their awn army, 
not from the rebels. Colonial forces never lost a battle; at Kalabani in Oc­
tober, 1880, troops after the initial shock drove off the hostiles.
^ D e  Kiewiet, The Imperial Factor, p. 290.
^□rpen, Prince Alfred*s Guard 1856-1966, pp. 26, 45-46.
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42
Cecil Rhodes alleges that, in this unnecessary war, the rebels worsted 
43
Cape Colony, which made no impression on the aggressive and victorious enemy
44
entrenched in mountains. Rebels, in reality, after serious setbacks fled to 
the mountains, where it was logistically impossible for a large army to fallow, 
and where the enemy had definite advantage in trapping or ambushing the sol­
diers. Available troops could not have dislodged hostiles strongly scnantzed 
in mountain strongholds, positions which provided ample defense, shelter, and 
food for fleeing or tired rebel warriors.
Colonial forces, believes Stevens, were stymied in a war which cost the 
* 45
colony 3l5,000,000, and Thomas Fuller maintains that colonial troops never pene-
46
trated further than 8—10 miles into iiasutoland and that their campaign failed. 
Cape Town, contends Lagden, abandoned some magistrate stations, and its army 
never advanced more than a few miles from Mafeteng. Actually, the assumption 
that the colonials never pacified much rebel territory does not reflect badly 
upon the troops, because, at some points, only 8-10 miles from the border 
stratched the Maluti Mountains to the eastward, terrain largely uninhabited and 
wherein impossible to locate rebel positions without more manpower than avail­
able to Cape Town.
Th3 hostiles, continues Lagden, resisted an irreproachable military power
having ample funds, manpower, and scientific inganuity to enforce its rule.
Rebels mistakenly exalted their military prowess, whereas lack of colonial mili-
47tary organization and political strife actually insured their advantage. Eric
42Vindex, Cecil Rhodes, p. 211.
43
Smith, The Mabilles of Basutoland, p. 297.
44
Colvin, Cecil John Rhodes, p. 35.
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46
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Walker and George Theal declare that rebels successfully thwarted the colonial
48soldiers and inflicted a much resented blow to white prestige in South Africa.
49Troops fought only defensively, according to another source, and A. Aylward
50
believes that the hostiles held colonial troops in contempt. Catastrophic re­
bel losses, in actuality, greatly outnumbered colonial casualties, not so much 
from the difference in weaponry, but because the rebels were careless about 
their protection, and it seemed odd that rebels should hold in contempt sol­
diers who consistently beat them. European pride indeed received a shock, be­
cause white troops did not militarily vanquish a black rebellion, and because 
the war ended unsatisfactorily for Cape Town.
Concerning the quality of manpower available for the cumbersome mobiliza­
tion, enough trained soldiers were never mobilized for the war, and those mo­
bilized were not equipped properly at first or sent to the front quickly, as 
army transport was primitive. The recruitment laws and inducements for mili­
tary service were ineffectual. Prime Minister 5prigg from necessity personally 
mobilized units for the front, because, if he had convened the Capa Parlia­
ment, debating would have slowed or disallowed the movement of troops. Accor­
ding to Louis Cohen, with the exception of the CMR-and Loyalists, the Carring­
ton force was inefficient. The volunteers were seedy characters, especially
those recruited from Kimberley, and partly consisted of foreigners and Cape
51Colony naval deserters. Pretoria and the diamond fields supplied mercenaries 
who relished war as a pastime, valued the life of a native as less than a dog,
^Lagden, The Basutos, II, 525, 561.
48
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Strategically, the troops fought offensively, in that they struck out from 
fortified enclaves, and only by necessity fought defensively. Too few troops 
in the field precluded a sweep of the entire Basuto lowlands, and logistics 
wasitoo primitive to supply and feed soldiers for such an operation. A heavier 
concentration at Mafeteng might have permitted the pacification of a larger 
section of the country, but troops systematically pacified only smaii areas, 
because, as soon as the troops marched through a location, hostiles would re- 
occupy the territory. General Clarke never captured his prime objective of 
Morija, and Colonel Bayly by vegetating at Maseru hampered the campaign.
In guerrilla warfare, pitted against these men, the rebels chose battle 
sites to their own advantage, reluctantly engaged in pitched battles, used hit- 
and-run or surprise tactics while trying to split colonial ranks, cut supply 
lines, and capture horses, and could afford more combat losses.
Although Cape Town blundering, in reflection, caused most of the failure 
in the campaign, there was no substitute for military victory, and domestic 
and British hindrance of the war effort ultimately produced a no-win war policy 
which in turn generated poor morale in the army.
RECONSTRUCTION: FIRST PHASE
Rebel words and deeds did not signify total acceptance of the Robinson 
Award. Secretary for Native Affairs Sauer visited Basutoland, held pitsos be­
tween June 21 and 25, where Chief Moletsane and others registered their guns,
*^Pall Mall Gazette (London), October 2B, 18S0, p. 4.
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53
and said that rebels had paid more cattle toward their fine (Masupha later
54
sent in 405 cattle), thus paying almost the entire fine. The rebels, however, 
felt that the results of the colonial military campaigning had justified their 
struggle. The burgher volunteers so vociferously demanded their relcaoo that 
they were discharged, and most other volunteers and the yeomanry received per­
mission to leave the front; thus, Sauer had no force to back his authority and
to protect Loyalists. Meetings held throughout the country accomplished lit- 
55tie. Most rebel chiefs, lying purposely to the contrary, did not observe the 
award. They did not restore Loyalist property, surrendered few guns, and paid 
little hut tax; thus, the colonial treasury had to provide foodstuffs to Loya­
lists.
Chief Magistrate Griffith, now that the war was over, asked to retire be­
cause of ill-health, and on August 25, 1861, Joseph Orpen assumed the post at
56Maseru upon invitation from Secretary Sauer. Gmil Rolland, brother-in-law to
Orpen and also a good friend of the Basutos, became resident magistrate at
Maseru. Griffith actually quit out of pity for the unfortunate Loyalists, and
his absence from the inequities which presently transpired comforted Loyalists
57George and Tsekelo Moshesh.
At a pitso in August, where Orpen was introduced to the tribe, the rebels 
58still seemed powerful. Cape Town, alleged George Moshesh, did not adequately 
protect loyal Basutos, who had to submit to the rebels. Loyalists could not
53
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54
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59reclaim their homes and land, and a councilor to one chief said that Loyalists 
had no plows or oxen to till fields and that the hostiles refused to lend such 
items. One Loyalist asserted that there was still no peace in the country and 
that Cape Town was unable to enforce the Robinson Award^ The rebel chief's 
felt superior to the whites and ignored magistrates and their summonses, as 
Cape Town would not force compliance, and Orpen, because of stubborn Masupha, 
feared to reopen the magistracy at Teyateyaneng^
Secretary Sauer, with others optimistic and intent on subduing Masupha, 
also attended the pitso and told the natives either to coerce Masupha to sub­
mit or face direct government intervention. Events were progressing satisfac-
6 2
torily, believed both Orpen and 5auer, and the latter thought that Loyalists
63
from Maseru appeared on good terms with the rebels. The secretary, trusting 
Letsie to coerce Masupha, refused to personally negotiate the return of cattle 
with the rebel leader and judged that Masupha from his own clan and the re­
mainder of the tribe derived no support. Paid by the Cape Government, Letsie, 
assumed Sauer, could ’’eat up" Masupha, eject him from Thaba Bosigo, and poli­
tically isolate him should that rebel resist, and should the paramount chief
not restrain Masupha, Sauer warned that Basutos might not receive sanction to
64
settle in Quthing and Matatiele Districts. According to Orpen,m November*
65
Letsie probably would not act unless supported by soldiers, and Smith contends
59
Tylden, The Rise of the Basuto, pp. 174-75.
^Pall Mall Gazette (London), October 31, 1881, p. 8.
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that the tribe would not fight Masupha, because even the Loyalists respected 
66
the chief. Sauer, considering the Basutos naturally indolent, waited patient­
ly for their implementation of the Robinson Award provisions. The secretary
trusted Masupha to comply with the award, and the chief did rob his own clan
68
to pay his cattle fine.
In that the rebels remained predominant, the Loyalists remained hapless, 
and some colonial officials misinterpreted the situation, Chief Joel reigned 
supreme in Leribe District, and, flushed with his victory in the rebellion, 
promised to assist Cape Town if the latter legitimized his position. Cape 
Colony here was rationing food to refugee loyal natives, who returned to 
Thlotsi Heights because of insults from their headmen and confiscation by re­
bels cf their fieldsf^yet Orpan insisted that rebels were surrendering Loya­
list cattle^and that all the reliable natives in the Leribe and Mohales Hoek
71Districts had returned home. Masupha, reported newly-promoted Magistrate Da­
vies, was the most obnoxious influence in Basutoland and while at Thaba Bosigo
72precluded peace progress. Masupha, insisted Magistrate Bell, ruled supreme in 
Thaba Bosigo District, harassed loyal chiefs and headmen hitherto protected by 
magistrates, as conditions after the armistice had allowed no refugee Loya­
lists to return to Thaba Bosigo District, vowed to injure Loyalists attempting 
to claim their cattle, and divided Loyalist fields among his own clan. Natives
66
Smith, The Mabilles of Basutoland, p. 292.
^]3.J5., (1882), XLVII, 206, ltr. Sauer to Scanlen, September 9, 1881. 
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73
here relapsed into barbarism, and numerous Loyalists left to work in the dia­
mond fields. While Masupha did not follow terms of the Robinson Award, the
chief, indicated Orpen, was rumoring that Scanlen had acknowledged the chief*s
74
full compliance with the award, and Governor Robinson had informed the Colo­
nial Office that Masupha had accepted all the peace conditions, which alleged-
75
ly were being implemented everywhere in Basutoland.
Chief Magistrate Orpen, decrying further obstacles to peace, believed 
that Loyalist weakness and rebel resistance stemmed from outside interference 
which Cape Town must thwart. The rebels presumed that Cape Colony, the Orange 
Free State, and Great Britain were bickering over Basutoland and that, if the 
award failed, the colony would abandon the Loyalists; therefore, declared Or­
pen, the three governments must agree on one course of action. While colonial
newspapers accentuated dissension in the Scanlen ministry and proposed offer-
76ing sanctuary for Loyalists in Quthing and abandoning Basutoland, white agi-
77tators warned the hostiles of imminent death and expropriation of rebel land.
Magistrate Alexander C. Bailie, who replaced Arthur Barkly at Mafeteng,
in November reported further rebel illegalities, as did Magistrate Bell, who
suggested remedies. Bailie deplored the soaring illegal whiskey trade around 
7 8
Mafeteng. Rebel chiefs, argued Bell, had recovered from the hardships of 
their rebellion and defied Cape Town, which must use coercion to restore its 
rule, even though the hostiles, who refused to return more stolen Loyalist
73
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cattle and once again were employing passive resistance, would meet Government
force with martial resistance. To sufficiently intimidate Chief Joel and
other rebels and to encourage Loyalists, Magistrate Bell requested 150 more
79
Europeans at Thlotsi Heights.
Chief Joel, regarding further friction in Leribe District and the reac­
tion of the Chief Magistrate, reviled Letsie for blocking his inheritance and
80
prompting his rival, Jonathan. Orpen advised against reinforcing Thlotsi
Heights and hoped that a "new impartial" magistrate would be assigned cases
81
involving disputes over ownership of cattle, whereupon, Magistrate Bailie re-
82lieved the disgusted Bell.
Magistrate Surmon, commenting on rebel activities and intimidation of
Loyalists in Mohales Hoek District, alleged that Lerothodi had allowed his
clan to harvest Loyalist crops, had not recovered all Loyalist cattle as pro- 
83
mised, and only belatedly had forced rebel Tembus to return stolen Free State 
84
cattle, which Surmon had not attempted to recover because of probable hostile 
resistance. Hostiles and Loyalists still despised each other. The former 
threatened natives who sought to reclaim stock, and rebel chiefs redistributed 
Loyalist land to their followers. 5ome returning district Loyalists, after 
receiving a sullen reception, migrated out of the country* Basutos at a 
pitso held to discuss war lasses actually connived to aid Masupha, and all
^ Ibid., 258, ltr. Bell to Orpen, November 30, 1881.
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attending warriors carried unregistered guns.
Concerning the post-war situation in Quthing, Magistrate M. Clarke at
Quthing reported that lands between the Telle and Silver Rivers and cattle
posts further up the Orange River were occupied by Loyalist refugees. Rebels
86were encroaching on the inaccessible parts of northeast Quthing.
Secretary Sauer in December, 1881, in relation to Loyalist grievances and 
his consequent actions, was startled to see a Loyalist petition accusing him 
of inadequate help, and some trustworthy Basutos feared that the Robinson 
Award would unfavorably alter their position in the tribe. Sauer thereupon 
insisted that rebels vacate stolen land, did not force Loyalists to return 
home, and told loyal natives at Maseru, most of whom desired to return safely 
to their original homes, that they might settle in Quthing. He alleged that 
his actions were making more progress against the rebels than had the military
. 87
Campaign.
In December, views of colonial officials focused on how to stifle the re­
bels, the situation of whom observers saw differently, and how to handle the
88
Loyalist predicament. 5auer dispatched border patrols to capture smugglers,
89
who Masupha aided. Magistrate Davies angrily quit, as be believed that only
90a colonial army by vanquishing the rebels could restore peace. Letsie and 
Lerothodi, according to Davies, refused to coerce Masupha, because the major—
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91ity of chiefs supported this rebel leader, however, the Chief Magistrate be-
92lieved that Letsie and Lerothodi were sincere about restraining Masupha, who
93allegedly was on unfriendly terms with Lerothodi, who in turn mobilized some
warriors to overawe Masupha, Orpen reported that Masupha had failed to rally
94 95
a force on Thaba Bosigo, that the Masupha clan had dispersed, that the chiefly
96household was quarreling, and that Masupha had informed Letsie that the Masu-
97pha clan would cooperate, yet Lepogo with 267 warriors joined his father to 
98
resist Letsie, and Masupha, contended The Times, harbored a large band of war-
99riors and offered to supply anyone with a gun and assegai. The Chief Magis­
trate doubted that the rebel chief even with an armed force could withstand a 
siege^and, until the neutralization of Masupha, legal cases involving cattle 
would take a longer time to settle^^ Disbelieving that the Government would 
feed them if they left refugee camps or would keep other promises, the Loya­
lists, some of whom exaggerated the rebel influence, by their attitude ham­
pered reconciliation^^ Cape Town, though failing to encourage Loyalists, urged 
them to return home to Thaba Bosigo, because compensating them from the cola-
91 Ibid., 266, ltr. Davies to Orpen, December 6 , 1881.
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103
nial treasury was proving burdensome. Chief Bereng, meanwhile, was usurping 
authority over the clan of George Moshesh^ 4
Chief Magistrate Orpen, in that the 5canlen ministry failed to quash re­
belliousness in the first phase of reconstruction, definitely had some influ­
ence over the Basutos. Letsie, nevertheless, easily tricked him, while Orpen,
consistently accepting the excuses of the paramount chief for failing, deluded
105
himself into considering his own methods successful. Cape Town, on the other
hand, had purposely undermined Letsie*s authority because of his duplicity
106during the war, whereupon, his power over the entire tribe had plummeted. 
Lerothodi insolently insisted on the right to grant gun licenses^and Masupha 
refused to register his guns, acknowledge his magistrate, and pay taxes. Tra­
ders illegally carted brandy into Basutoland and peddled it openly to desirous 
chiefs, and Basutos without passes crossed over the Free State border to visit
numerous Boer saloons, while the helpless magistrates could not enforce the 
108
pass law or prevent increased border raids by hostiles. Cape Colony prestige
109
in Basutoland disappeared, although The Times reported that most of the tribes­
men and chiefs wanted peace and the return of the magistrates'^^
Prime Minister Scanlen, not quite realizing the true situation and wary 
of future alternatives and British interference, announced that his ministry 
did not believe the Basuto situation critical, although rebels had not abided
Ibid., 245-46, ltr. 'Orpen to Molteno, December 7, 1881.
~^4 Ibid., 266, ltr. Davies to ®rpen, December 6 , 1881.
105
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by the award, mostly because of Masupha. If Chiefs Letsie and Lerothodi failed, 
the ministry by other means would enforce the awardl^ Cape Colony ultimately 
had the following three alternatives: 1) abandon Basutoland, 2) militarily en­
force colonial authority, or 3) appeal to.Great Britain to re-establish its 
own rule with Imperial troops. The colonial ministers disliked the first and 
third alternatives and, according to Robinson, dismissed hope of success unless 
London promised to allow Prime Minister ocanlen without restriction to handle
binding peace terms with the rebels; otherwise, Cape Colony would make no heavy
. - . 1 1 2sacrifices.
In appraisal of the first phase of reconstruction, Cape Town should have 
cancelled the Robinson Award immediately after initial rebel intransigence, be­
cause the hostiles refused to comply with some terms, only partially complied 
with others, and promised to but did not fulfill other conditions. Rebel be­
lief in their supreme position was the major obstacle to peace. Moral force, 
as had repeated Gx~iffith at an earlier date, was useless against the Basuto 
tribe, and Cape Colony used this policy too long in reconstruction. The weak 
policy made it appear that the rebels had won the war and enhanced their tri­
bal position. No actual reconstruction of the country occurred. Magistrates 
had little power; the more intelligent hard-line magistrates quit in disgust 
over the impotent reconstruction policy. Robinson, Sauer, and Orpen all were 
overoptimistic and misunderstood x-ebel motives, and the Secretary for Native 
Affairs should have negotiated directly with the fearsome Masupha. The sanc­
tioning of Loyalist emigration to Quthing, and the partial abandonment of loyal 
natives, evidenced the timid Scanlen ministry approach. Exile and disposses-
illB>.S.P., (1832), XLVIX, 264-65, ltr. Scanlen, December 29, 1881.
11?
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sion seemed the reward for native loyalty. Orpen unfairly censured the Loya­
list attitude, which he unintentionally helped formulate.
RECONSTRUCTION: SECOND PHASE
The futile colonial efforts during the first phase of reconstruction car­
ried over into the second phase. Chiefs Lerothodi and Joel, in the January,
1882, Basuto expedition planned by Orpen against Thaba Bosigo, assembled their
113warriors and began to march. Though native public feeling was amenable to 
such a solution and thought Masupha would not resist^^etsie vacillated^and
116
Loyalist Jonathan, contending that other chiefs unanimously supported Masupha,
117refused to join the expedition. Tribesmen around Thaba Bosigo joined the ex­
pedition as it neared its objective, and Masupha; having begged Letsie for le- 
J.X8
niency, by the time the expedition had climbed Thaba Bosigo nonetheless had
119moved his cattle northward.
Orpen, in investigation of and consequent to the useless expedition, re­
tained only about one-third of his force after2?he others, fearing reprisals,
121fled to Masupha. The Times thought that all the military preparation by Ma-
113
Ibid., 270, ltr. Orpen to Sauer, January 4, 1882.
114
Ibid.. 271, ltr. Urpen to Sauer, January 10, 1882.
115
Ibid., 271, ltr. Orpen to Sauer, January 11, 1882.
^ ° The Times (London), February 10, 1S82, p. 3.
^  "^Editorial, New York Timas, February 11, 1882, p. 4.
"^^ B..S_._P., (1882), XLVII, 272, ltr. Orpen to Sauer, January 14, 1882.
119 ^Ibid., 274-75, ltr. Orpen to Sauer, January 16, 1882.
120Editorial, New York Times, February 11, 1882, p. 4.
121
J3. S_._P« , (1882), XLVII, 275, ltr. Orpen to Sauer, January 18, 1882.
195
supha merely allowed Letsie to defy the Cape Governmen^and that the rebel chief
123
probably had agreed to allow Letsie to scale Thaba Bosigo. Gn January 19,
124Orpen admitted that Letsie, mouthing ’’empty froth, had shown the cowardice
125
that mostly caused failure for the expedition. The Chief Magistrate there­
upon suggested that other natives pay the fine of Masupha. Though Orpen or­
dered Chief Letsie to seize the cattle herded away by Masupha, Letsie would
not advance unless his sons, some of whom were still in league with Masupha,
126and others accompanied him, and the paramount chief later refused to attack
127 123Masupha. Though the failure of the January expedition had disgraced Basutos,
the loyal chiefs complained of the prolonged hostilities and refused to combat
129Masupha.
The Chief Magistrate, lashing out and suggesting further action, condemned
Basuto chiefs who collaborated with white troublemakers. He could not tell
Lerothodi or Joel what, if any, Government assistance to expect should the
130
chiefs fail to subdue Masupha. He insisted that, with a resolute policy from 
Cape Town, he could subdue Masupha in three weeks with only natives, that ano­
ther expedition, for which the rebels would have to eventually pay, would at­
tract to it Loyalists seeking to reclaim their property, and that declarations
122
The Times (London), January 10, 1882, p. 10.
123
Ibid., January 25, 1882, p. 5.
124
Lagden, The Basutos, II, 526.
125
H.«,S.£L , (1883) , XLIX: ’’Further Correspondence Respecting the Cape Colo­
ny and Adjacent Territories,” 12, ltr. Orpen to Sauer, January 22, 1682.
126
B_.S_.FL, (1882), XLVII, 275-76, ltr. Orpen to Sauer, January 18, 1802.
127
The Times (London), January 30, 1882, p. 6 .
S_. Pj > (1883), XLIX, 32, ltr. Orpen to Sauer, February 4, 1882.
129
Ibid., 49, ltr. Loyal chiefs to Orpen, February 8 , 1882.
130
, (1882), XLVII, 276-77, ltr. Orpen to Sauer, January 19, 1882.
196
of support from London and the Orange Free State would prevent renewed f igh- 
131
ting. Orpen still believed it wiser to allow Letsie rather than regular 
troops to coerce Masupha’!’^
Governor Robinson, moreover, reporting new Scanlen ministry proposals in 
the face of British hindrance, informed Lord Kimberley that British restric­
tions on Cape Colony, with which the rebels were acquainted, prohibited the 
colonial ministry from submitting to the Cape Parliament a proposal for pos­
sible renewal of hostilities. Regarding the present situation as intolerable, 
the ministry therefore offered to the Cape Parliament the following sugges­
tions: 1) abandonment of Basutoland north of the Orange River, 2) repeal of the 
Basutoland Annexation Act of 1S7I, and 3) satisfaction of Loyalist claims by 
land grants in Quthing, which would remain an integral portion of Cape Colony, 
and elsewhere, together with colonial compensation for their losses. The ef­
fect of withdrawing colonial rule over Basutoland, especially the effect on 
Basuto-Free State relations, weighed on the ministers, however, to uphold au­
thority was impossible while rebels believed themselves protected from the con-
133
sequences of their rebellion, and the ministry believed useless further attempts
to assert in Basutoland rule which the governor was forbidden to enforce or to
burden itself with the expenses of maintaining order under severely restricted
134
responsible government.
Lord Kimberley, disagreeing with some of the proposals, advised Robinson 
not to withdraw colonial rule from Basutoland, because London would not res-
131
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132
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tore order north of the Orange River, and because abandonment would endanger
the security of other 5outh African Bantu, cause problems with the Orange Free
135State, and nullify the colonial efforts to civilize the Basutos.
Governor Robinson, in the revision of colonial policy and with only par­
tial British cooperation, reported that after his ministers had confiscated 
all of the territory south of the Orange River, proceeds from the disposal of 
Quthing as waste Crown land would compensate Loyalists, traders, and others. 
Morth of the Orange River, Cape Town would confiscate land of the rebellious 
and reluctantly enforce the law, as otherwise, in subsequent fighting, the
Free State would annihilate the Basutos. The Scanlen ministry asked the Home
136Government to allow just colonial punishment for Basuto offenses, but Kimberley 
agreed only to possible cancellation of the Robinson Awarci^followed by punish­
ment of offenders by reasonable confiscation, and did not grant freedom of ac-
133tion to Cape Town, which therefore could not force the Basutos to obey.
Objections attended to forced Basuto collective acceptance of the Robin-
139son Award and its deadline on March 15. Loyal chiefs affirmed their accep-
140
tance of the award and alleged that Robinson ignored their advice. The ulti-
141 _
matum, announced Magistrate Bailie, made Letsie disconsolate. ihe Chief 
Magistrate complained that this short notice seemed impractical in the con—
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fused tribal situation, in which the only viable tribal government consisted
of a few desperate rebel leaders who jealously commanded a factious mob and who
could not enforce the award; some either refused obedience outright or slyly 
142
hid their spoils. Although pleading that the tribe feared other alternatives,
143
Orpen received no extension for the ultimatum.
While the Chief Magistrate, faced with the possibility of militarily
handling the crisis, noted that the deteriorating situation might soon neces»
sitate the recall of small garrisons from Basutoland via the Orange Free State,
which probably would not allow more troops passage after this withdrawal be-
144cause of anger in the Volksraad over the Basuto situation, a military predica-*
ment would arise if the Free State did not furnish a troop corridor. As the
Basutos were as resolute against confiscation as disarmament, Orpen wanted to
evacuate all the magistrates from Basutoland before troops entered the terri— 
145
tory in force and evacuate all whites, Loyalists, and ammunition from Mafeteng,
146which he believed an untenable position. Moving forward a regiment of Im­
perial troops would restore confidence and quash Masupha, and Jonathan approved
147
of dispatching Loyalists to Berea Mountain to act as a military reserve. Cape
Town use of armed force to reorganize and protect the tribe, said the Chief
Magistrate, would cause opposition to vanish without inordinate expense or
148
risk and seemed the only method to gain Loyalist support.
142
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In addition, as the noxious ’'Mabille Ring” in this dire crisis again
meddled, the reverend Mabille supposedly asked Masupha to surrender^^dvocated
ejection from Basutoland of whites who incited violence^and allegedly aided
151the position of Orpen. All the chiefs, according to Mabille, feared that
abandonment would lead to their fighting the Orange Free State. The pastor
condemned the proposed confiscation of Quthing and rebel land and suggested a
policy of patience. He considered the award successfully completed but dis-
152liked the compensation provision. Still assuming that Basutoland was a 
directly-ruled British possession, the PES in July, 1B82, requested London to 
have elected a Cape Parliament which would accomplish the Basuto reconstruction 
and to allow the French missionaries to halt the liquor traffic and again 
teach schooll^^
As affairs further degenerated, war became imminent except in Leribe Dist­
rict. The hostiles, willing to die to retain their ancestral property and
believing that the Queen wanted a resumption of hostilities, again contrived
154
to rebel against the unprepared Cape Colony. While Masupha was fighting Joel 
for paying the hut tax^and was urging Basutos to fight^ 5£bief Mama and other 
chiefs operated saloons in their villages and were not permitting officials 
to fine liquor smugglers. Magistrates were unprepared to repel assaults^^nd
149
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150
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152I3.5_._P., (1883), XLIX, 55, ltr. Mabille to 5auer, March 12, 1882,
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The Times (London), April 1, 1882, p. 7.
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The Times (London), March 20, 1882, p. 5.
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Chief Jonathan was placed in "protective custody.”
Furthermore, land speculators told the Basutos not to trust the colony or 
159
pay fines, and rambunctious whites from disbanded irregular array units promoted 
renewed conflict by intriguing and influencing the press against the Scanlen 
ministry. The Opposition in the Cape Parliament used the anarchy to undermine 
the ministry^and ridiculed Scanlen and Sauer as negrophiles^^
Regarding new ex-rebel initiatives and the criticism by Orpen of colonial 
policy facing the odious outlook, Chief Lerothodi maintained that only puni­
shing the recalcitrant by fines could restore control^lnd sought Government
support for himself to coerce Masupha without confiscation. Chief Letsie, who
163stalled for more time, desired support from Imperial troops. Orpen wanted to
164revoke the confiscation orders but discouraged further amnesty. The Robinson 
Award, he maintained, was unconstitutional, recognized colonial power that did 
not exist, and enforced taxes strange to the tribe^^ Some chiefs obviously 
with reservations had accepted the award, others had accepted unwillingly or 
under duress, and some like Masupha, gaining sympathy and halp from other
166chiefs all the while, had awaited the first opportunity to resist the award.
He refused to respect Letsie, appeared mentally deranged^and later informed
159
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159
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^^Lagden, The Basutos, II, 529.
^^Theal, South Africa, XI, 73.
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a delegation of Letsie, Lerothodi, Mana, and Mabille that he would make peace 
but not pay his hut tax, §fter which the delegation denounced hinu^All the
Basuto chiefs felt confident of subduing Masupha with only the help of the
• + * 169 magistrates.
Frustrated Prime Minister Scanlen, in new steps, disavowed confiscation
of land and renewed hostilities except as reluctant and remote alternatives.
A commission would investigate Loyalist grievances and the advisability of
both Basuto local self-government and their representation in the Cape Parlia- 
170
ment. For allegedly showing cowardice in these latest steps, the Cape Argus
171
condemned the ministry. Climaxing this period of reconstruction, Scanlen
cancelled the Robinson Award and repealed the PPA on April 6 and determined to
172colonize Quthing with whites and abandon the remainder of Basutoland. Never­
theless, while the Legislative Council at Cape Town voted 14-6 to repeal the
Basutoland Annexation Act^ihe House Assembly by a 34-23 vote rejected aban-
174 . 175donment, and London refused to relieve Cape Colony of Basuto responsibility.
Concerning alleviation of Loyalists and further misconduct by rebels after
these announcements, though Chief Jonathan in May ejected a rebel wardmaster
1T6
from Leribe District and redistributed rebel land to Loyalists, and although
16 8 Ibid., 71, ltr. Deputy-Acting Chief Magistrate to Sauer, April 19,
1B82.
169t
Ibid., 71-72, ltr. Deputy-Acting Chief Magistrate to Sauer, April 19,
1882.
170 T
-t-bid. , 44, ltr. Robinson to Kimberley, March 28, 1882.
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(-erothodi reassigned village rights to Loyalistsf^eorge Moshesh collected 100
loyal Basutos to migrate to Matatiele. Cape Colony already had settled Loya-
178
list refugees from Mafeteng and Mohales Hoek elsewhere. Disgusted natives
detested such chiefly tyranny as the embezzlement by Chiefs Bereng and Mama of
179most of the hut tax paid these chiefs. Masupha in June overran the village
ISO
of Loyalist Chief 5ofonia. Letsie, who wanted colonial protection without
loss of more independence, secretly encouraged Masupha.
As Basuto magistrates watched helplessly, a year-long cattle and inheri-
181tance conflict erupted between Chiefs Jonathan and Joel in November, 1882.
Numerous Basuto refugees fled into the Orange Free State, whose inhabitants
they aggravated, and the rival clans destroyed villages, stole cattle, and en-
182gaged in armed clashes. Masupha threatened Jonathan so seriously that the
183
latter abandoned most of Leribe District, and in May, 1883, President Brand re­
fused to allow Jonathan to herd cattle, many of which were diseased or stolen,
184
into Boer territory. Basuto magistrates, according to Chief Magistrate Orpen,
^ ^ Ibid., 77, ltr. Deputy-Acting Chief Magistrate to Sauer, May 17, 1882.
^^ I b i d . , 81, ltr. Deputy-Acting Chief Magistrate to Sauer, May 29, 1882.
178r
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cf., B.5_.P_., (1883), XLIX, 115, ltr. Orpen to Sauer, December 21, 1882.
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185
deserted Jonathan and advocated abandonment of Basutoland.
The Scanlen ministry, in conclusion, still treating the rebels too le­
niently, neither could expect tribal self-government in view of divisiveness 
and anarchy in the tribe and colonial abandonment of Loyalists nor could seek 
to employ British troops without accepting more British interference. Chief 
Magistrate Orpen did not realize for too long, and the Loyalists with justifi­
cation detested, the futility of using a "Basuto against Basuto'* method to 
bring peace. The rebels were still as rebellious as before the war and waited 
for exasperation to undermine Cape rule. Lerothodi aided reconstruction only 
because he feared the paramountcy of Masupha. Ignorant Pastor Mabille betrayed 
the Loyalists.
British interference with the restoration of strict colonial rule made 
Cape Town weary of Basuto responsibilities and eager to find a simple, if ex­
pedient solution. Lord Kimberley restricted colonial options yet unfairly ex­
pected Cape Colony to handle the necessary responsibility and control over the 
Basutos.
tfCHINESE" GORDON AND BASUTO RECONSTRUCTION
Colonel Charles G. Gordon, who came to Cape Colony on a military mission
in 1881, had produced a plan for the reorganization of and economization in the
Cape army, a plan never acceptecl^DecausB of opposition by Prime Minister Scan- 
187len. Scanlen on March 3, 18B2, contacted Gordon about the reconstruction
i pir
_B.5_.FL, (1883), XLIX, 163, Annual Report of Chief Magistrate Orpen for 
1882, January 12, 1883.




situation in Basutoland and requested his assistance. The Scanlen ministry,
189
alleges Tylden, wanted to shift some of its Basuto responsibility onto Gordon.
"Chinese'1 Gordon, in his initial views of the Basuto crisis, denounced 
London for allowing Cape Colony to annex Basutolancl^and contended that the Ba­
sutos had unjustly lost land notwithstanding treaties of guarantee and had 
lost rights. After a colonial commission examined Loyalist claims, Gordon
wanted the Imperial Government to pay indemnity to Loyalists at a tribal pitso
191in order to rid Cape Colony of one burden. Scanlen ignored these suggestions.
An admirer of the Basuto tribe, Colonel Gordon believed that the Cape Govern—
192ment was trying to sow dissension among the chiefs in order to stifle them.
From Basutoland he wanted immediately to withdraw military forces and magis-
193
trates, leaving only three officials to advise the chiefs. To maintain
troops in Basutoland was too expensive, and the Orange Free State could block
the only line of retreat. Though isolated garrisons, in the opinion of Gorr? -
194don, could offer little resistance to the Basutos, bcanlen expected a large
18 TH. E. V/ortham, Chinese Gordon (Boston: Little, Brown, and Co., 1933),
p. 286.
I DO
, (1883), XLVIII, 215, ltr. bcanlen to Colonel Charles Gordon, 
March 3, 1832; cf., Forbes, Chinese Gordon, pp. 183-84; cf., Wortham, Chinese 
Gordon, p. 285.
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ry between Lerothodi and Masupha into another civil war, De Kiewiet, The Im­
perial Factor, p. 290. 
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195Bisuto war in the future and intended to refortify Basuto magistracies. Gor­
don in July planned to visit Basutoland under the guise of inspecting the re­
maining troops in order to make peace v/ith Masupha^^
Regarding the initial reception, ideas, and warnings of Gordon upon his
arrival in Basutoland on September 2, 1882, he bewildered, then angered offi­
cials. Secretary for Native Affairs Sauer, Orpen, Gordon, Magistrate Rolland, 
the Reverend Mabille, Letsie, Lerothodi, Mama, Tsekelo, Nehemiah, and other 
chiefs attended a pitso at Morija on September 16. Sauer insisted that Basu­
tos act peacefully, obey their magistrates, and pay their hut tax. He berated
Letsie for not controlling his sons or explaining disorder but endorsed the new 
military stance of the paramount chief against Masupha. Gordon explained his
own desire to make peace and advised that Cape Town would crush Masupha if that 
197chief resisted. Basutos in thousands converged on the pitso to meet "Chinese'' 
198
Gordon, and, although he told the tribesmen of his auxiliary role under Sauer,
the natives regarded Gordon as of superior rank and ignored the Secretary for 
199Native Affairs. Colonel Gordon criticized Cape Town for not motivating the. 
paramount chief and believed that Lerothodi would assume an attitude like that 
of Masupha if the former crushed the rebel chief. The colonel sought to end 
the rivalry between Lerothodi and Masupha. In a future Basuto war, Cape Colony 
would have to fight embittered Loyalists; thus, Gordon cautioned that Cape 
Town, to pacify the tribe, not press Letsie to attack Masupha, replace all Ba­
suto magistrates, allow Basuto police to replace the CMR garrisons, and allow
195
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don: Edward Arnold, 1910), p. 135. Hereafter cited as Michell, Rhodes.
199Lockhart and Woodhouse, Cecil Rhodes, p. 77.
206
200
the tribe internal self-government. Colonel Gordon, according to Smith, con­
sidered the Basutos as persecuted "dear black lambs of the Savior." Alleging
201that Chief Magistrate Orpen evoked almost no confidence from the Basutos,
202Gordon suggested the removal of the chief magistrate.
"Chinese" Gordon, next visiting Chief Masupha atop Thaba Bosigo, voiced 
unwillingness there to fight the tribe and promised not to incite other chiefs
against Masupha. The colony, said Gordon, would allow the Boers to overrun
2^2 204
Basutoland if the tribe refused to pay its taxes. The chief stalled.
As the conduct of Gordon and colonial officials alienated each other,
205Secretary Sauer relieved him from the Basuto mission. Gordon simultaneously 
quit all his dutiefPover the objections of Sauer^^ Believing the Gordon posi­
tion not conducive to the colonial welfare, Prime Minister Scanlen gladly ac-
2qq
cepted the resignation. According to Sauer, Gordon had offered Masupha bet-
209ter terms than the Government had promised. Colonel Gordon, in turn, denied
2°GB._5._p. , (1883), XLVIII, 294-95, ltr. Gordon, September 19, 1882; cf., 
Ibid.t 235-36, Convention between the Cape of Good Hope and Chiefs and People 
of Basutoland; De Kiewiet, The Imperial Factor, p. 290; cf., Smith, The Habil- 
les of Basutoland, p. 311.
201Smith, 1 he Mabilles of Basutoland, pp. 310, 314.
202Lagden, The Basutos, II, 534.
2Q3B -5.P., (1883), XLVIII, 296-97, ltr. Gordon to Masupha, September 25, 
1682; cf., De Kiewiet, The Imperial Factor, p. 290.
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26, 1882.
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Ibid., 300, ltr. Arthur Garcia, Inspector-General of the War Depart­
ment, to Sauer, September 27, 1882.
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that Sauer had a set policy or that the secretary had given him written instruc­
tions which limited negotiations^Sut later admitted to purposely disregarding
2XX
Government orders and acting on his own initiative. Gordon, contends Lagden,
improperly consulted the French missionaries, was ignorant of Basuto affairs,
and sent notes to Masupha which compromised the Cape position. The meeting
between Gordon and Masupha angered Lerothodi, the royal heir-apparent^ who,
with Secretary Sauer, in the meantime had led an armed force to crush Masupha.
213
Cowardly attendant chiefs, however, caused the expedition to fail. Though
Sauer, felt Gordon, had betrayed him by disavowing warlike intentions and then
marching against Masupha, the colonel offered to remain as magistrate with Ma-
214supha for two years. While Sauer was alleged to have consented reluctantly,
Gordon indicated that the secretary had persuaded him to visit Masupha. Smith
condemns Secretary Sauer for launching an assault on Masupha before realizing
the results of the Gordon visit but denies that this strategy endangered the
215colonel, who received notification. Masupha, according to one author, did
2X 6not kill Gordon for suspected treachery, despite advice to the contrary, out 
another author reveals a threat by the chief to murder the colonel?"^ Chief
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Magistrate Orpen later warned Gordon to stop interfering in the renewed figh-
2X8
ting between Jonathan and Joel. Cape Town, despite this friction, later in-
219corporated Gordon proposals to support Lerothodi and isolate Masupha.
The Government, in reflection, from the beginning thwarted and compromised 
the position of Gordon, who, although he intelligently sought to bargain with 
the supreme Masupha, wanted Cape Town to capitulate to the rebels and abandon 
Loyalists.
THE BASUTOLAND LOSSES COMMISSION
In handling the prolonged predicament of white traders in Basutoland, who 
had resided under the control of Basuto chiefs since the end of the war and 
had made little profit22?he Scanlen ministry on July 24, 1882, appointecl2a 
four-member Basutoland Losses Commission, which included Colonel Charles Grif- 
fit£2!nd Cecil Rhodes, to investigate wartime losses of Loyalists and white
traders. The commission subsequently recommended payment of 3LlQ4,156 to Laya-
223lists and £.42,316 to the traders, after traveling to Maseru, Thlotsi ^eights, 
Mafeteng, Mohales Hoek, and Alwyn's Kop, and the deputation on May 16, 1883, 
made its recommendations to Governor Robinson. Rhodes, in a minority report,
217
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objected to proposals for compensation to traders. Traders, he continued, in 
native wars always had undergone hardships, and their military and material aid 
in the rebellion did not warrant reimbursement, because Prime Minister Sprigg 
had not guaranteed compensation to traders who sustained losses in the war
zone, and because other states in such circumstances had not compensated mer-
224 225
chants. Rhodes prevailed; the traders received no indemnification.
As these traders, in impartial appraisal, helped maintain order and of­
fered protection until colonial troops arrived to handle the rebellion, the 
merchants deserved reimbursement, and Cape Town shamefully abandoned them once 
more to the mercy of Basuto chiefs.
224
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225
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CHAPTER VII
BASUTOLAND REVERTS TO BRITISH RULE
De Kiewiet, in that temperament persisted in Cape Colony to relegate more 
Basuto obligations, believes that Cape Town wanted to disannex Basutoland, be­
cause London had prohibited colonial farmers from seizing rebel land, and be­
cause Basutoland traders only under British protection could regain native 
customers!- As early as May, 1881, a motion in the colonial legislature had
called for the disannexation of Basutoland, and another had proposed the Im-
2
perial takeover of that territory. When in the January, 1833, Cape Parliamen­
tary session, the Scanlen ministry, having been rebuffed in 1882, proposed
«
that Cape Colony unilaterally abandon responsibility for the internal govern­
ment of Basutoland and only retain control of Basuto external affairs because
3
of responsibility to the Grange Free State, the legislature accepted the pro- 
.4
posal.
As Cape Town sought to apply its new system of management over Basuto af­
fairs, on March 17, 1883, Captain Matthew Smith Blytf? replaced Joseph Orpen as 
Chief Magistrate, an action necessitated by the change in colonial policy. To 
Basutoland traveled both Prime Minister Scanlen and Secretary Sauer to secure 
peace, and at Matsieng and Thlotsi Heights they held pitsos in order to sample
^Be Kiewiet, The Imperial Factor, p. 291.
2
_B.]3._P. , (1881), LXVII, 614, ltr. Robinson to Kimberley, May 22, 1881.
3
_3.S_._P. , (1883), XLIX, 117, ltr, Robinson to the Earl of Derby, January 
19, 1883; cf., Lagden, The Basutos, II, 540; cf., Theal, South Africa, XI, 76.
4
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» P* *^ 2. Blyth: Born in Norfolk, England, Blyth joined the 
British Army, served in the Indian Mutiny and in the West Indies, and fought 
in Cape Colony frontier campaigns until his retirement in 1866. He later be­
came a British magistrate in Fingoland, Griqualand East, and Transkei.
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Basuto opinion. While Masupha and his supporters ignored the pitsos, Letsie 
and his upholders attended, complained about abandonment, and requested Impe­
rial rule? After numerous indecisive pitsos and much patience, Bcanlen threa­
tened to abandon all Basuto responsibilities if the tribe did not act orderly 
and accept the following terms: 1 ) a constitution to govern the tribe, 2 } a 
council of just and humane chiefs and headmen to administer internal self- 
government, 3) the judgement of civil and criminal cases involving only whites 
by the chief magistrate, 4) the judgement of cases involving whites and Basu­
tos and murder cases by magistrates and chiefs, 5) the expenditure in the 
country of all Basuto tax money, 6 ) reduction of the ;Ll hut rax to 10s. if the 
council and economy would permit, and 7) the inclusion of Quthing District in 
Basutoland. On April 25, at a national pitso held by Blyth to obtain an an­
swer to the conditions, Letsie accepted, but the absent Masupha insulted the 
Chief MagistrateJ other chiefs ignored the terms, and'one-third of the tribe
remained recalcitrant; thus, the Bcanlen mission failed? Although Pastor Ma-
9bille urged acceptance of the terms and condemned Masupha, according to Chief 
Magistrate Blyth, Basutoland was financially bankrupt, and Cape Colony by set­
ting chief against chief had alienated the tribal
The Scanlen ministry, regarding the British reaction to the colonial de­
sire to hand over Basutoland to Imperial rule, sent John X. Merriman, in his
^Theal, South Africa, XI, 77; cf., Lagden, The Basutos, II, 541.
^Lagden, The Basutos, II, 541-42; cf., Theal, South Africa, XI, 77; cf., 
Ashton, The Basuto, pp. 217-19; cf., Brookes. History of Native Policy, p.
105.
°Theal, South Africa, XI, 77-78; cf., B .5.P., (1883), XLIX, 149, ltr. 
Blyth to Sauer, April 25, 1883.
9Smith, The Mabilles of Basutoland, p. 315.
103.S_.P. , (1S83), XLIX, 148, ltr. Blyth to Sauer, April 7, 1883.
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capacity as Commissioner of Crown Lands and Public Works, to England^where ha
suggested that the Imperial Government administer all native dependencies of
12Cape Colony and that this colony and Natal help enforce the law. The Earl of
Derby, having succeeded Kimberley at the Colonial Office, warned that Cape
Town would have to furnish officials and pay Basuto customs duties to the High
Commissioner. Though at first he agreed to only temporary British control of
13Basuto obligations, Derby on June 4 told the British Parliament of his fear 
that anarchy in Basutoland would spread to other native districts and did not 
want to expel the tribe from the British Empire just because the Basutos pre­
sented a problem. Cape Town and the tribe, he added, would pay for most of
14the alteration in rule, and Basutos would enjoy internal self-government.
Merriman, because Cape Colony on British-condoned Basuto policy already .had
15spent vast sums, balked at the British stipulations.
British sanction received, the Cape Parliament on June 27, 1883, formally 
disannexed Basutoland, thereby provoking dissatisfaction^ Cecil Rhodes on 
July 18 spoke in the House Assembly against Basuto home rule, which he believed 
would further anarchy and alienate the Orange Free Stated The conservative
, (1B83), XLVIII, 323, Scanlen minute, April 30, 1893.
12
Ibid., 338, Merriman memorandum; cf., Brookes, History of Native Policy, 
p p .  105-06.
_P., (1883), XLVIII, 341, ltr. Derby to Acting-Governor L. Smyth, 
June, 1883; cf., Theal, South Africa, XI, 78; cf., Lagden, The Basutos, II,
551; cf., Smith, The Mabilles of Basutoland, p. 318.
^ Hansard, 3rd ser., Vol. 280 (1883), 522-24, Earl of Derby speaking,
June 14, 1883.
15
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Afrikaner faction in the Cape Parliament deplored the spread of British author­
ity in South Africa, especially in Basutoland.. Jan Hofmeyr so virulently op­
posed disannexation that he plotted, though unsuccessfully, with the Free
State to overrun Basutoland so that Boers could seize farmland end extend their
18
influence in South Africa. A native administration in Basutoland was repug­
nant to Hofmeyr, whose faction became dominant in the newly-elected Parliament
19and ultimately caused the fall of the Scanlen ministry.
The Colonial Jffice in November, 1883, with admonition from within, lis­
ted the conditions under which Britain would manage Basutoland. The tribe 
would have to acknowledge British rule, pay taxes, and obey the laws and com­
mands of the High Commissioner, and the Grange Free 5tate would have to promise 
not to allow raids into Basutoland and to arrest by itself Basutos who commit­
ted crimes in Boer territory. Cape Town would have to pay in quarterly in­
stallments to London £.20,000 annually for Basuto administration, provide 2 or 
3 magistrates at a total cost of i.5,000 a year to help the High Commissioner, 
and pay a mounted police force about £.15,000 annually?*"* Governor Robinson, 
however, counseled Lord Derby that Cape Town must provide at least £20,000 and 
the tribe &JLD,00Q a year for Basuto administration, £.20,000 for the police, and 
£.5,000 for the jails?'*'
Chief Letsie, in the tribal reaction to the British offer, called a na-
22
tional pitso on November 29, 1883, where Aciing-Governor L. Smyth informed the
18
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notables that London had given the tribe the choice of either reverting to
British rule as proclaimed in 1868 or returning to independence. Derby in a
telegram censured the tribe for its lack of gratitude and broken promises and
said that, though Britain had no obligation to gWern the Basutos, he feared
23for a Basuto future without British protection. Letsie, his sons, and thirty-
three other chiefs signed an agreement accepting 3ritish rule, and Chief Joel
accepted belatedly. Chief Magistrate Blyth believed that Masupha, who with
his followers snubbed the meeting, represented about one-third of the tribe
24that wanted independence, and the chief on December 5 at his own pitso preven­
ted from speaking those natives who desired British rule and promised to de-
25fend himself against Imperial troops.
Tribal misbehavior during the alteration in Basuto rule once again annoyed 
the Orange Free State in the face of British dereliction and Cape Colony in­
dictments of Doers. Derby absolved himself of responsibility towards guarding
the Basuto-Free State border as prescribed by the Treaty of Aliwal North ’ .
26
(1869), even though the Boers captured Basuto offenders in their territory
27and helped maintain order on the frontier. Though President Brand complained
about British failure to uphold the Aliwal treaty, Derby insisted that Cape
28Colony enforce the pact. In April, 1883, a band of warriors threatened to 
23 Ibid., 549, ltr. Derby to Smyth, November 24, 1883; cf., Stevens,
Lesotho, etc., p. 28.
2 43 .S . P., (1884), LVI, 551, ltr. Smyth to Derby, n.d., r. December 2,
1S83; Ibid., 552, ltr. Smyth to Derby, n.d., r. December 5, 1883; cf. , Theal, 
South Africa, XI, 79.
» (1884), LVI, 553, ltr. Smyth to Derby, n.d., r. December 12, 
1883; cf., Tylden, The Rise of the Basuto, p. 185.
^ k j j . , (1883), XLVIII, 340-41, ltr. Derby to Smyth, June, 1883.
2 ^Ihid., 342, ltr. Merriman to Colonial Office, June 11, 1883.
^Lagden, The Basutos, II, 542, 547, 551.
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29cross into the Free State to recover cattle stolen by Chief Jonathan, and Ba-
suto marauders, complained Brand in May, were depositing their families in the
30
Free State and returning to fight in Basutoland. While one Boer field cornet
/
considered the border predicament intolerable, as Basutos encamped on Boer
31farms and, armed and insolent, incited Free State natives, Magistrate Bailie
said that some Boer farmers encouraged Basutos across the frontier and that
the native refugees, their numbers decreasing, had paid for their refugee 
32sites. After Chief Magistrate Blyth compiled a list of Boers who sold whiskey,
33
some of it poisonous, to Basutos in the Free State, Brand in August acted
34
against his countrymen illegally selling whiskey on the border. Blyth further
35charged Boers with arming the dissidents against Letsie, and Cecil Rhodes ac­
cused irresponsible Boers living on the border of encouraging Basutos to rebel 
36again. President Brand in November prepared but hesitated to dispatch an armed
37fores to the border.
Dn March 18, 1884, concerning the implementation of British rule and its 
consequences, a British Order-in-Council promulgated the Basutoland Disannexa-
, (1883), XLVIII, 354, ltr. Lepogo Masupha to W. H. Van Andel, 
April 4, 1883.
^ Ibid♦, 352, ltr. Brand to Smyth, May 10, 1883.
31B .S.P ., (1884), LVI, 526, ltr. Brand to Smyth, July 12, 1883.
^ Ibid., 529, ltr. Bailie to Blyth, July 23, 1883.
33
Ibid., 534, ltr. bauer to Molteno, July 26, 1883; Ibid., 535, ltr. 
Blyth to 5auar, June 11, 1883.
34
Ibid., 537, ltr. Brand to Smyth, August 27, 1883.
~^*Ibid. . 538, ltr. Blyth to Sauer, September 30, 1883.;
3 6
Vindex, Cecil Rhodes, p. 49.
37




tion Act (Infra, App. A, p. 221), and Lieutenant-Colonel Marshal James C l a r k e ,
in the establishment of direct Imperial rule, became resident commissioner of 
39Bssutaland. Clarke, sympathetic to the Basutos, earned the respect of both
40natives and the Cape Government. Directly responsible to the High Commissioner, 
he held the chiefs to account by allowances and initiated external British
control as the price of protection. The Basutos, however, lost their right of
41 42individual land ownership, and Masupha still sought independence and, trium-
43
phant, ignored commands of his new rulers, who excused his stubbornness.
Greswell, in Commentary on the British resumption of rule in Basutoland,
says that London believed that British rule was more beneficial than colonial
administration for nativss. As colonial authority in the future undoubtedly
would control South African natives, Greswell considers the reversion to Bri-
44
tish jurisdiction as regressive, and Aylward indicates displeasure that British
taxpayers had to protect natives with whom they had no interest and from whom
45
they could gain no advantage.
Bcanlen, in conclusion, offering Quthing to the Basutos as a bribe and
T Q
Who Was Who 1897-1915 (London: 1935), p. 140. Clarke: Starting his po­
litical and military career in South Africa, Clarke served as resident magis­
trate at Pietermaritzburg, Natal, in 1874, fought in the First Anglo-Boer War, 
and became Commissioner of the Cape Police in 1882. After his army retire­
ment in 1882, Clarke became resident commissioner of Basutoland from 1884-93, 
acting administrator in Zululand from 1893-98, and resident commissioner of 
Southern Rhodesia from 1898-1905.
^Theal, South Africa, XI, 79.
40
Lagden, The Basutos, II, 559.
41Tyiden, The Rise of the Basuto, p. 186.
4^Theal, South Africa, XI, 80.
4^Lagden, The Basutos, II, 5S8.
44Greswell, Our South African Empire, II, 98, 104.
45
Aylward, ''Basuto,'* p. 341.
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otherwise capitulating to the tribe, nevertheless failed. Frustrated, and ham­
strung by British interference, the Cape pushed final Basuto responsibility 
back onto Britain, much to the delight of some Basutos, who perceived British 
rule as lenient. London wanted to rule Basutoland, as before, without the 
burdens-of financial and local administrative responsibility and evidenced 
weakness by assuming Basuto obligations without gaining control over the entire 
tribe. Loyalists and internal tribal reforms were sacrificed to the whims of 
chiefly tyranny. The Boers and their Cape supporters, moreover, were justi­




This work examines a significant period of Basuto relations with Capa Co­
lony and the British Empire. In 1883, as in 1868, the Basuto tribe success­
fully called for and received British protection in order to escape merited
punishment for causing troubled Overwhelming evidence points to a premeditated
2civil war and rebellion a3 the true nature of the conflict, which did not re-
3
medy either Basuto or colonial grievances. In the confused aftermath of the
war and in the complicated peace negotiations, the rebels won much that they
had lost before and during the war and manipulated Great Britain against Cape
Colony or took advantage of the divisiveness between Cape Town and London in
4order to regain lax Imperial rule.
Of further significance is the failure of the Imperial Government and Cape
Colony between 1868 and 1884 to enforce their rule in Basutoland, causing de-
5jection among loyal natives, recalcitrance in disloyal Basutos, and anarchy, 
and making the much lauded and much debated British policy of indirect rule, 
which applied to Basutoland from 1884 to eventual independence in 1966, seem
^Supra., p. 1 , n. 3; p. 2, n. 5; p. 152, nn. 268-69; p. 162, n. 319; p.
211, n. 6 ; p. 214, n. 24.
2
Supra., p. 20, n. 89; p. 29, n. 24; p. 43, n. 8 8 ; p. 57, n. 19; Chap. IV,
specifically the first, second, third, and fifth sub-chapters.
3
5upra.. Chaps. VI and VII.
^Supra., pp. 171-72, n. 356; p. 173, n. 362; p. 187, n. 69; p. 188, n. 76; 
p. 211, n. 6 ; p. 214, n. 24.
5
Supra., p. 8 , nn. 38-39, 41; p. 12, n. 56; p. 15, n. 65; p. 17, nn. 73- 
74; p. 40, n. 72; p. 55, nn. 9-10; pp. 55-56: n. 11; p. 60, n. 35; pp. 60-61, 
n. 39; p. 64, n. 52; p. 65, nn. 59-64; p. 6 8 , n. 8 ; p. 76, n. 57; p. 82, n. 96; 
p. 87, n. 132; p. 8 8 , n. 139; p. 94, n. 154; p. 99, n. 175; pp. 99-100, n. 180;
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like a reluctant and expedient British afterthought. Cape Colony had numerous
opportunities to depose and replace the sly and treacherous Paramount Chief
Letsie, who, by his deceit fooled the Cape Government into perpetuating its
irresolute and disreputable lenient policy towards the rebels and added to
6complications faced by that government during and after the war. The Sprigg
ministry discovered, as an American administration discovered in the following 
7
century, the difficulty of fighting a war to victory on the battlefield and at
the peace table when its constituents are emotionally divided, with part,
through misguided counsel or mischievousness, hindering the war effort and gi-
8
ving aid and comfort to the enemy. Britain and Cape Colony together made the
fatal mistakes of not coming quickly and strongly to the aid of the Loyalists
and later of abandoning those Basutos who were willing to cooperate to at least
9
some degree with Imperial and Cape rule.
Regarding issues of broader historical importance, Great Britain, already 
thoroughly detested by the voortrekkers, abused, misuded, and allowed to be 
mistreated by rebels the Boer government and populace in the Orange Free Stated
p. 100, n. 183; p. 185, n. 55; p. 186, n. 61; p. 189, nn. 81-82; p. 190, n*
87; p. 195, n. 130; p. 196, n. 133; p. 203, n. 185; p. 216, nn. 42-43.
^Supra., p. 58, n. 27; pp. 58-59, n. 28; p. 62, n. 44; p. 73, nn.35-37; 
p. 78, nn. 68-69; p. 80, nn. 82, B5-86, 88-89; p. 81, n. 90; p. 84, n. 109; 
p. 92, nn. 148, 150; p. 93, n. 151; p. 94, n. 155; p. 101, nn. 188-89; p. 125,
n. 121; p. 150, n. 254; p. 178, n. 19; p. 192, n. 105; p. 194, n. 115; p. 195,
nn. 124-27; p. 200, n. 163; p. 202, n. 181.
^The Johnson Administration.
8
Supra., p. 51, n. 134; p. 100, n. 184; p..134, n. 185; p. 141, n. 222; 
p. 151, n. 259; p. 178, n. 22; p. 179, n. 28; p. 200, nn. 159-60.
9Supra., p. 85, n. 112; p. 8 6 , n. 124; p. 93, n. 151; p. 139, n. 209; pp. 
185-86, n. 59; p. 187, nn. 69, 73; p. 188, n. 74; p. 189, n. 85; p. 190, n.
8 6 ; p. 191, n. 103; p. 2 0 2 , n. 178.
Supra., p. 4, nn.16-18, 20; pp. 4-5, n. 21; pp. 6-7, n. 32; p. 85, nn. 
112, 114-15; pp. 85-86, n. 118; p. 132, nn. 168-69; p. 133, n. 174; p. 139, n. 
211; p. 140, nn. 212, 215; p. 192, n. 108; p. 198, n. 144; p. 202, n. 182; p. 
213, n. 20; p. 214, nn. 26, 28; p. 215, nn. 30-31.
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who aided the forces of law and order employed in the Basuto Civil War and Re­
bellion without expectation of gain or reward‘d  Furthermore, the Imperial 
Government used its constitutional right to intervene in native affairs any­
where in the Empire as a lever to hinder and discredit responsible government
12in Cape Colony and thus undermined the authority of the colonial troops. Lon­
don offered little help when constitutional requests were made yet insisted
upon having the final word in Basuto affairs without assuming administrative
13and financial responsibilities. The assumption of the financial and admini­
strative burden by Cape Colony, and later shouldered by the Union of South 
Africa and the Republic of South Africa, today provides the main basis for the 
mutual social and economic intimacy expected and desired by the Republic of 
South Africa with Lesotho.
Supra., p. 76, n. 56; p. 65, nn. 
179; p. 101, n. 192; p. 115, nn. 6 6 , 68 
nn. 175-76; p. 140, nn. 216, 218.
12Supra., p. 22, n. 1QQ" p. 23, nn 
n. 64; p. 97, nn.169, 171; pp. 97-98, n 
n« 348; pp. 169-70, n. 351; p. 170, nn 
nn. 357-59; pp. 172-73, n. 360; p. 173 
188, n. 76; p. 193, n. 112; p. 196, nn 
175; p. 210, n. 1.
13Supra., pp. 3-4, n. 14; pp. 161' 
n. 135; p. 201, n. 175; p. 212, nn. 13
112, 117; pp. 85-86, n. 118; p. 99, n. 
69; p. 132, nn. 167, 171, 173; p. 133,
102-03; p. 37, nn. 59-63; pp. 37-38, 
172; p. 1 6 8 , nn. 343, 345, pp. 168-69, 
352—53; pp. 171—72, n« 356, p» 172, 
nn. 361-62, 365-66; p. 178, n. 25; p. 
133-34; p. 197, nn. 137-38; p. 201, n.
■62, n. 318; p. 166, n. 335; pp. 196-97, 
•14; p. 213, nn. 20-21.
221
APPENDIX A
ACT FOR THE DISANNEXATION■OF BASUTOLAND FROM THE 
COLONY OF THE CAPE OF GOOD HOPE
Whereas it is desirable that Basutoland should cease to form part of the 
Colony of tho Capa of Good Hops; and whereas Her Majesty’s Imperial Government 
has expressed its willingness to provide for the future Government of Basuto­
land upon certain conditions; and whereas it is expedient that due provision 
should be made for relieving this Colony from all responsibility for or in con­
nection with the Government of Basutoland: Be it indicated by the Governor of 
the Caps of Good Hope, with the advice and consent of the Legislative Council 
and House of Assembly thereof, as follows:
I. The Act No. 12, 1871 intituled /sic/, "An Act for the Annexation to 
the Colony of the Cape of Good Hope of the Territory inhabited by the tribe of 
people called the Basutos," shall be and the same is hereby repealed.
II. From and after the taking effect of this Act, there shall be paid an­
nually to Her Majesty’s High Commissioner, or such other officer as Her Majesty 
may be pledged to appoint in that behalf, as a contribution towards any defi­
ciency that may arise in the revenues of the Government of Basutoland, out of 
the public revenue of this Colony, such sum, not exceeding twenty—thousand 
pounds, as may be hereafter from time to time agreed upon by and between Her 
Majesty’s Imperial Government and the Government of this Colony.
III. This Act shall come into operation when the Governor shall by pro­
clamation declare that Her Majesty has been pleased to allow and confirm the 
same.
IV. The short title of this Act shall be the ’’Basutoland Disannexation 
Act, 1883.”
PRO. C.O. 50/7
^G. W. Eybers, ed., Select Constitutional Documents Illustrating South Af­
rican History 1795-1910 (London: Geo. Routledge & Sons, Ltd., 1918), pp. 67-68.
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